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At the end of the eighteenth century the British movement for the abolition of the slave 
trade emerged, arguing for reform based on notions of humanity and the fellow-feeling 
of mutual sympathy. With slavery still one of the biggest and most profitable crimes in 
the world today, how public sentiment was mobilised to create the first humanitarian 
movement to attempt to put an end to the slave trade remains a pertinent question. The 
chief aim of this thesis is to investigate the development of abolitionist emotional 
norms, evidenced in their mobilising materials, through an exploration of “emotional 
practices”, Monique Scheer’s concept for historical change in emotions. This approach, 
when combined with Barbara Rosenwein’s concept of “emotional communities” and 
the rescripting of emotional norms, opens up the possibility of engaging with 
abolitionist texts in a new way, giving access to the methodology behind their 
politically engaged appeals to emotions like compassion and benevolence.  Through 
analysis of the sentimental arguments employed across a range of texts, written both 
before and during the abolition campaigns, I uncover the centrality of the idea of 
emotional cultivation and improvement to the political agenda of abolitionist writers. In 
doing so I argue that there is a congruence between eighteenth-century theories of 
potentially transformative moral sentiments and the assumptions about the plasticity of 
human nature and emotions that informs emotions as a kind of practice. However, I do 
so while acknowledging that there are fundamental eschatological and teleological 
differences between the two. The politics of sympathy expressed by abolitionist 
academics, newspaper correspondents, preachers and divines, writers of fiction, and 
poets had an educative, progressivist, moral purpose which post-Romantic theories of 
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emotions have revised or discarded. Through their conviction that steady cultivation of 
the moral sentiments led to active and virtuous reform of society, abolitionists give their 
own account of the historical and emotional changes that saw communities within 
Britain come together to fight for abolition. Their conviction in the efficacy of their 
politics of sympathy may have wavered once their attempts at sentimental moral 
persuasion failed in the combative context of parliamentary debate. However, the 
question for my thesis is not whether emotional practice can answer why abolitionism 
developed or why it did or did not succeed. Rather, the question I ask is whether an 
emotions-as-practice approach can give an effective account of the methods by which 
communities manage emotions and how they understand the emotional shifts which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Atlantic slave trade flourished from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth century, 
and was a source of immense revenue for the European governments and individuals 
involved.  For much of this period British planters and slave traders had the full support 
of the legislature and their source of income was little questioned by the public. By the 
end of the eighteenth century, however, a change in public opinion led to the creation of 
a social movement which built its arguments for the abolition of the institution on 
notions of humanity, sympathy and natural rights. Such terms had become so important 
during the abolition campaigns that many pro-slavery lobbyists and writers complained 
that “humanity is now the pop’lar cry” of reformist communities.1 A “Humanity-mania” 
had spread across the country and its “Furor” had “seized on the people”.2  The British 
movement for the abolition of the slave trade, officially founded in 1787, involved 
people from all levels of society and from widely different religious and political 
backgrounds.3 It was perhaps the first time in modern society that a social movement, 
from grass-roots committees to influential political figures, arose out of a concern for 
the condition of others. The debate over whether Britain should abolish the slave trade 
dominated public discourse during the height of abolitionist campaigning, from early 
1787 to around 1793, when war with France took its place as the biggest national 
concern. Newspapers, pamphlets, popular literature, cartoons, sermons, public debates, 
                                                          
1 John Walker, A Descriptive Poem on the Town and Trade of Liverpool (Liverpool, 1789), line 56, 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale, (CW0114109230). 
2 Public Advertiser, 31 March 1788, 17th and 18th Century Burney Collection, Gale, (Z2001201301); 
Matthew Gregson quoted in Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, The Last Years of the English Slave Trade, 
Liverpool 1750-1807 (London: Putnam, 1941), 194. 
3 The movement was instigated by the establishment of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the 
Slave Trade in London in June 1787. Similar committees were set up around the country in its wake 
whose purpose was to raise awareness through publications of political tracts, essays, sermons, and 
poems, and gathering petitions to send to parliament. 
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and plays were dedicated to discussing abolitionism, whether for, against, or 
somewhere in between. 
With slavery still one of the biggest and most profitable global crimes today, 
how public sentiment was mobilised to create the first humanitarian movement to 
attempt to put an end to the slave trade remains an interesting object of study.  While 
the question of whether legislative abolitionism was achieved as a direct result of a 
newly developed humanitarian impulse is debateable, there is no doubt that a 
fundamental change occurred in the eighteenth century which opened up the possibility 
for a movement like abolitionism to emerge. Understanding just one aspect of this 
change is the aim of my study. The focus of my thesis is to explore how emotional 
practice informed the mobilising methods of the British movement for the abolition of 
the slave trade. Its chief aim is to investigate the development of abolitionist emotional 
norms through an exploration of various communities’ “emotional practices”.4 Taking 
into account specific cultural understandings of the role of emotions in eighteenth-
century British society, we can begin to make sense of why activists used sentimental 
argument and expression to mobilise public opinion. The spaces used by abolitionists 
served as tools of those emotional practices, whereby shared emotional norms and 
values were developed, communicated, and reinforced. Such norms are revealed within 
abolitionist literature, which highlights the political and social purpose of emotional 
practice within the movement.  
Through analysis of the sentimental arguments employed across a range of texts, 
written both before and during the abolition campaigns, I uncover the centrality of the 
                                                          
4 Monique Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And is That What Makes Them Have a History)? 




idea of emotional cultivation and improvement to the political agenda of abolitionist 
writers.  In doing so I argue that, while we may not be able to fully explain the cause of 
the changes in attitude towards slavery and the slave trade towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, we can at least perceive in abolitionist arguments their own 
understanding of how their movement developed when it did. Through their conviction 
that steady cultivation of the moral sentiments led to active and virtuous reform of 
society, they give their own account, however biased, of the historical change that saw 
communities within Britain come together to fight for abolition. When it came to the 
success of that fight, however, their conviction wavered and the limits of their politics 
of sympathy were realised. From the perspective of recent theories of emotion, this 
raises the question of how effective emotions-as-practice is in accounting for the 
emotional shifts that are necessary for change to occur. 
1.1 Overview of Scholarship: A Brief History of the History of British 
Abolitionism 
Exploring the reasons behind the emergence of the British movement for the abolition 
of the slave trade has been the subject of historical research and scholarly debate for 
over 200 years. Thomas Clarkson gave the first full account of his own movement’s rise 
and achievements in 1808, just one year after the first Abolition Act was passed. The 
History of the Rise, Progress and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the Slave-Trade 
by the British Parliament explains abolitionism as the result of benevolent British 
humanitarianism, an account which helped create the legend of abolitionist activists as 
evangelical “Saints”.5 Since his book, there is hardly an aspect of British abolitionism 
                                                          
5 This view lasted in British memory until well into the twentieth century. Thomas Clarkson, The History 
of the Rise, Progress and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the Slave-Trade by the British Parliament, 




that has not been covered by histories of the movement. Eric Williams’s Capitalism and 
Slavery (1944) was the first to challenge Clarkson’s account, his book marking the 
economic turn of historical research on abolitionism.6 Williams argued that the slave 
trade was eventually abolished simply because it was no longer as profitable at the end 
of the eighteenth century as it had once been. While this argument had merit, insofar as 
it introduced new criteria into the reasons behind abolitionism, it was successfully 
contested in the 1970s by Seymour Drescher’s Econocide (1977) and other works 
which shifted the focus onto political and socio-cultural factors.7 Several important 
studies by Drescher and Roger Anstey positioned abolitionism within the general 
broadening of the British political system at the time.8 
The 1990s saw the attention on socio-cultural factors turn to disenfranchised 
groups and the role of women and dissenting religious communities in an effort to 
expand the notion of who was responsible for the emergence of abolitionism.9 This 
phase in research also focused on the moral imperatives built into abolitionism as a 
movement for change. This is extensively explored by Christopher Brown in his 
                                                          
6 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, (Richmond, Virginia: University of North Carolina Press, 
1944). 
7 Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition, (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1977). 
8 See Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810 (London: Macmillan, 
1975); Seymour Drescher, “People and Parliament: The Rhetoric of the British Slave Trade”, The 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 20 (April 1990), 561-580, doi: 10.2307/203999. John Oldfield’s 
Popular Politics was also important in this area: Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The 
Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1995). 
9 Davis was among the first to analyse antislavery as a reflection of the ideological needs of various 
groups and classes: David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823, 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975). On women’s roles see Clare Midgley, Women Against 
Slavery: the British Campaigns, 1780-1870, (London: Routledge, 1992); Moira Ferguson, Subject to 
Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery, 1670-1834, (New York: Routledge, 1992); Anne 
Mellor, Mothers of the Nation: Women's Political Writing in England, 1780-1830, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000); and Charlotte Sussman, Consuming Anxieties: Consumer Protest, Gender, and 
British Slavery, 1713-1833, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). For discussion of the role of 
religious sects see David Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780-1860, (London: Routledge, 
1991); Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher, eds., Anti-Slavery, Religion, and Reform: Essays in 
Memory of Roger Anstey, (Hamden, Conn.: Archdon Books, 1980). 
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seminal Moral Capital (2006).10 Most of these studies concur that abolition eventually 
occurred because of a complex mixture of financial and cultural factors; the extent of 
the movement’s role in achieving it is still debated. However, while they reference the 
vast amount of literature produced by abolitionist supporters, most of these studies, 
including Brown’s, lack close readings of primary texts. It has been left to literary 
scholars to uncover the ways in which abolitionism was mobilised and the extent to 
which it influenced literary tropes in Britain and the colonies. Peter Kitson and Debbie 
Lee’s Slavery, Abolition and Emancipation (1999) instigated this interest in antislavery 
literature, their work placing abolitionist texts within the genre of Romanticism.11 
Studies that followed in its wake placed abolitionism more specifically within the 
literary trend that pre-dates Romanticism: sentimentalism. Markman Ellis and Brycchan 
Carey’s work in this area has uncovered the extent to which sentimental language was 
employed by abolitionists across a wide range of sources, from novels, pamphlets and 
newspaper accounts, to sermons and poems.12  
It is largely thanks to these studies that the emotional content of abolitionist 
literature has been uncovered and emotions have become central to the majority of 
literary, and increasingly historical, studies of abolitionism in the last ten to fifteen 
years. Stephen Ahern’s edited collection Affect and Abolition (2013) has been an 
important contribution to the study of abolitionism in terms of emotions in history, yet 
                                                          
10 Brown’s account claims it was the loss of the American colonies which led the British to re-evaluate 
their moral standing. Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
11 Peter Kitson and Debbie Lee, eds., Slavery, Abolition and Emancipation: Writings in the British 
Romantic Period, (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999); see also Debbie Lee, Slavery and the Romantic 
Imagination, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 
12 Markman Ellis, The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Brycchan Carey, British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric 
of Sensibility: Writing, Sentiment, and Slavery, 1760-1807, (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). See also Brycchan Carey, Markman Ellis and Sara Salih, eds., Discourses of Slavery 




the essays it contains do not point to any specific theories current in the field of 
emotions research which could be useful to an understanding of the emergence, 
development and practices of the abolition movement.13 There is therefore a gap which 
the concepts developed by researchers from the History of Emotions may help to bridge 
when examining historical movements like abolitionism, as they provide methodologies 
for uncovering the cultural and emotional systems within and around social groups and 
spaces when we do not have the benefit of surveying and questioning participants 
themselves. Particularly influential has been Arlie Hochschild’s work on “feeling rules” 
– the shared norms about appropriateness or legitimacy of the feelings we display – and 
“emotion work” – the ways in which people consciously “manage” their emotions 
according to their social situation.14  Many emotions historians base their theories of 
uncovering emotional styles or repertoires on Hochschild’s concept.15 My study is 
aimed at contributing to the gap in abolitionist studies which emotions history could 
potentially fill, adopting more recent approaches by Monique Scheer and Barbara 
Rosenwein to investigate their value to a study of literary abolitionism.16  
 
 
                                                          
13 Stephen Ahern, ed., Affect and Abolition in the Anglo-Atlantic, 1770-1830, (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 
2013). 
14 See Arlie Hochschild, “Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure”, American Journal of 
Sociology 85, no.2 (1979): 551-575, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778583.  For an overview of influential 
work in the area of historical research on emotions see Susan J. Matt, “Current Emotion Research in 
History: Or, Doing History from the Inside Out”, Emotion Review 3, no.1 (2011): 117-124, doi: 
10.1177/1754073910384416. 
15 See Peter N. Stearns and Carol Zisowitz Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions 
and Emotional Standards”, The American Historical Review 90, no.4 (1985): 813–836,doi: 
10.2307/1858841; William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of 
Emotions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional 
Communities in the Early Middle Ages, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
16 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”; Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in 
History”, The American Historical Review 107, no.3 (2002): 821-845, EBSCO (6909152). 
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1.2 Sentiment, Sensibility and Sympathy: Key Terms in the Abolitionist Emotional 
Repertoire 
Abolitionist literature made use of the language and emotional expression of 
sentimentalism, a style that encouraged effusive emotional displays and that stressed the 
importance of compassionate responses to those in distress. Sentimentalism has 
traditionally been studied as a literary style, concentrating on the emotional rhetoric 
used in the early novels of the period, and, rightly or wrongly, abolitionist discourse has 
been placed within this field. 17  Derived from “sentiment”, sentimentalism became 
associated with moral judgement once the word became attached to eighteenth-century 
accounts of the moral sense.18 To be “sentimental” was to have “a conscious openness 
to feelings, and also a conscious consumption of feelings”.19 Sentimental literature, 
therefore, focused on the feeling response of the characters and the readers alike, using 
an array of somatic language, expression and gesture to produce an affective and 
affecting moral tale.  
“Sensibility” also denoted an open responsiveness to feeling. The person of 
sensibility was understood to be “quick both to understand an event and to experience 
feelings appropriate to it”.20  Some critics thus use the terms “sentimentalism” and 
“sensibility” interchangeably. 21  Barker-Benfield’s seminal work on sensibility 
                                                          
17 I maintain a distance from classifying abolitionist literature as strictly sentimental. Much of the poetry 
and fiction can be placed within the genre of sentimentalism, however there are many works which 
cannot. While the sentimental aspects of their literature is my focus here, it is to be understood that they 
use sentimental language and arguments alongside myriad other arguments, such as legal, religious 
providential, and economic. 
18Amy M. Schmitter, “Passions, Affections, Sentiments: Taxonomy and Terminology” in The Oxford 
Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, ed. James A. Harris (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 202.  
19 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, (London: Fontana, 1976), 236-7. 
20 Carey, British Abolitionism, 5. 
21 G.J. Barker-Benfield and Chris Jones, for instance, insist that the terms are cognate. G.J. Barker-
Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992), xvii; Chris Jones, Radical Sensibility: Literature and Ideas in the 1790s, 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 5. Others have insisted that “sentimentalism” and “sensibility” in fact imply 
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concludes that the magnitude of practices which come under the heading of sensibility, 
and the pervasiveness of them in all sorts of social, religious, political, and cultural 
arenas, attest to its being a dominant culture in eighteenth-century British society.22  
However, as a set of emotional practices it was not always so widely approved of as to 
be considered the defining cultural and emotional style of the era.  Sensibility was as 
often disparaged as a dangerous, effeminate quality as it was celebrated as a moral 
value.  Nevertheless, thanks to its ties to both popular culture and the ideas of polite 
sociability, its ubiquitous appeal persisted throughout the century in all sorts of 
discourses, whether philosophical, religious, or cultural. Moreover, whether one 
proclaimed oneself a person of sensibility or not, the rhetoric of heightened emotional 
responsiveness, and the language of feeling which characterised the man or woman of 
sensibility, remained a fixture of eighteenth-century writing of all genres, even when 
professing itself to be against the supposed self-indulgence and falseness of literary 
sensibility.23  
While it has been a difficult concept to precisely define, the essential quality of 
a person of sensibility is their emotional receptivity.24  As Brissenden states, the key 
word in eighteenth-century discourses on sensibility “is ‘sensible’: what we know 
derives ultimately from what our senses tell us – from our sensibility”.25  To have 
                                                          
very different meanings and traditions. For these discussions see Janet Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction, 
(London: Methuen, 1986); Jerome McGann, The Poetics of Sensibility: A Revolution in Literary Style, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); and Ann Jessie Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The 
Senses in Social Context, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
22 See Barker-Benfield, Culture of Sensibility, xix.  
23 I discuss the complexities of eighteenth-century receptions of sensibility in literature further in chapter 
5.  
24 Williams states that eighteenth-century uses of sensibility range “from a use much like that of modern 
awareness (not only consciousness but conscience) to a strong form of what the word appears literally to 
mean, the ability to feel”. Williams, Keywords, 236-7. In scientific and medical terms, it signified the 
receptivity of the senses, the operation of the nervous system and the “psychoperceptual scheme” of 
human consciousness as defined and systematised by seventeenth century doctors, scientists and 
philosophers like Newton and Locke. See Barker-Benfield, Culture of Sensibility, xvii.  
25 R.F. Brissenden, Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade, 
(London: Macmillan, 1974). 
16 
 
sensibility was to be open and responsive to the emotions of others, to have a 
heightened “susceptibility to tender feelings” and a capacity to identify with and 
respond to the sorrows of others.26  On top of its physiological and psychological 
qualities, its usage in moral philosophy and theology added spiritual and moral values 
to its meaning so that it became synonymous with virtue and one’s moral character: to 
be without sensibility connoted a lack of feeling and, thus, of humanity. It worked 
alongside sympathy, being the physical, mental and spiritual capacity that allowed the 
communication of feelings to pass from one to another.  
Sympathy was therefore an important feature of sentimentalism. By the middle 
of the eighteenth century, “sympathy” had variable meanings and functions; it could 
describe the emotion, or sentiment, of fellow-feeling, as well as serve as an “index of 
physiological connection and communication”.27  While sympathy could sometimes 
denote a moral and emotional response, in abolitionist literature it more often represents 
a “social bonding force”, and is described using notions as disparate as magnetic and 
mechanistic attraction, a physiological transfusion of feeling between bodies, or as a 
form of imaginary identification.28 As Burgess points out, scholars tend to agree that 
“sympathy” meant much “more than the pity that it implies etymologically, and that is 
now conventionally associated with it”; it came to designate, rather, a feeling with 
another, as much as a feeling for another.29 According to Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl 
of Shaftesbury, humans receive, via sympathy, the feelings of others through various 
                                                          
26 J.A. Cuddon, A Dictionary of Literary Terms, (New York: Penguin, 1984), 615. 
27 Mary Fairclough, The Romantic Crowd: Sympathy, Controversy and Print Culture, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 21. As with sensibility, the history of the term “sympathy” is, as 
Csengei points out, “marked by extensive transmission between fields, from astronomy to medical 
theory, and from moral treatises to the novel”. Ildiko Csengei, Sympathy, Sensibility and the Literature of 
Feeling in the Eighteenth Century, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 9. 
28 See Csengei, Literature of Feeling, 9. 
29 Miranda Burgess, “On Being Moved: Sympathy, Mobility, and Narrative Form”, Poetics Today 32 
no.2 (2011): 297.  
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means, “from accounts and relations of such happinesses, from the very countenances, 
gestures, voices and sounds, even of creatures foreign to our kind, whose signs of joy 
and contentment we can anyway discern”.30 Sympathy is the communicative 
mechanism by which we intuit such signs of emotion in others and enables us to be 
affected in turn.  
For moral philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith, sympathy is a means 
of communication for all passions, sentiments and feelings: its social operation is to 
conduct the movement of passions from one person to another. When we sympathise 
with others we “receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments”.31 Hume 
draws on a physiological notion that was often found in early modern medical theory 
and natural philosophy, which used the term “sympathy” to explain how the body, 
which is made up of separate parts, nevertheless works as a systematic whole.32 As 
Forget states, there was a “logical continuity between physiological and sociological 
investigation” at this time.33 Thus we see terms like “contagion” and “infection” being 
used in sentimental works with regards to the transfer of sentiments between people. 
Hume states that when we are “excited by sympathy”, “the passions are so contagious, 
that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce 
corresponding movements in all human breasts.”34 Smith, on the other hand, bases his 
                                                          
30 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times, 3 vols. (London, 1711) 2:108, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale, National Library of 
Australia (CW3304278427). 
31 Davide Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3 vols. (London, 1739-40) 2:73, Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online, Gale, National Library of Australia (CW3318260025). 
32 For discussions on early modern medical theories on sympathy see G.S. Rousseau “Nerves, Spirits and 
Fibres: Toward defining the origins of Sensibility”, AMS Studies in the Eighteenth Century 3 (1976): 
137-57; and Christopher Lawrence, “The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment”, in 
Natural Order: Historical Studies in Scientific Culture, ed. Barry Barnes and Stephen Shapin (London: 
Sage, 1979). 
33 Evelyn Forget, “Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory 
and Physiology”, Annual Supplement, History of Political Economy 35, no.1 (2003): 283, EBSCO 
(0728248). 




theory of sympathetic communication on the imaginative process. In his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759) Smith formulates a concept of sympathy that is a process of 
identification achieved through an effort of imagination on the part of the sympathiser. 
His Theory stresses the specular nature of sympathy, arguing that it derives from an 
“impartial spectator” within, who allows us to change places with an object of 
sympathy.35 However it was formulated, the moral and ethical basis of modern society 
depended for these philosophers on mutual feeling, or sympathy, between its parts. 
These ideas became crucial to notions of improvement in British society. There 
is a practical purpose to eighteenth-century moral sentiment philosophy. As Harris 
points out, the moral philosophers understand philosophy not as a set of doctrines but as 
a practice, the purpose of which is to “help human beings live happier and more 
virtuous lives”.36 Being virtuous is not only in the interest of one’s own happiness but 
also the happiness of society in general. Cultivating one’s sensibility, “the power to 
feel”, was an individual virtue which allowed sentiments to be easily transmitted from 
one person to the other through sympathy. 37  If this affective complex is allowed to 
flourish, “moments that fuse pain and virtue” become extremely important to one’s 
emotional repertoire.38 When the pain and suffering of another becomes our own, via 
sensibility and sympathy, we must feel a natural desire to relieve that pain.   
In his work on abolitionist sentimental rhetoric, Carey points out that 
“recognition of the sympathetic impulse was vital to the formation of campaigns and 
                                                          
35 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (London, 1759), 11, Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online, Gale, National Library of Australia (CW3320137306). 
36 James A. Harris, “The Government of the Passions” in Harris, Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy, 
271. 
37 Julie Ellison, “Sensibility”, in Joel Faflak and Julia M. Wright, eds., A Handbook of Romanticism 
Studies, (Hoboken: Wiley, 2012), 39 and 41. 
38 Ibid., 38. 
19 
 
policies that aimed to relieve the suffering of others”.39  Sentimentalism, sensibility and 
sympathy were intended to be active impulses, linked as they were to ideas of morality, 
human sociability, and social improvement and reform. The ability to feel compassion 
towards another was lauded as the foundation of good society and moral welfare and, as 
such, became linked to a variety of words which describe the role of the sentimental 
person in society – “benevolence”, “charity”, “humanitarianism”, and “philanthropy”. 
These qualities, as Carey states, were used in sentimental discourse as “models of 
behaviour to be emulated by those with sensibility”.40 In their own discourse, 
abolitionists employed these qualities to gain public attention and encourage political 
action. As such, their politics of sympathy is closely linked to the idea of emotional 
cultivation, or practice. 
Nevertheless, the idea and understanding of sentimentalism and sensibility was 
not always homogenous and abolitionists had to find ways around notions of affectation 
which became attached to the concepts late in the century. The multiplicity of 
discourses that contributed to its development as an idea, as a cultural phenomenon, and 
as an emotional practice made it possible for groups of various and opposing opinions 
to claim sensibility for their own views. Thus, as a form of rhetoric or persuasive tool, 
we can see its use on both sides of the abolition debate, with pro-slavery lobbyists using 
sentimental expressions to argue against humanitarian reform.41 I do not claim therefore 
that the rise in popularity of sentimental discourse caused the emergence of 
humanitarianism or of the abolition movement. Only that the practices which aimed at 
habituating the moral sentiments were often engaged within the written sources of 
                                                          
39 Carey, British Abolitionism, 5. Many scholars agree with this point. See Norman S. Fiering, 
“Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism”, Journal of 
the History of Ideas  37, no.2 (1976): 195-218, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708821; and Lynn Hunt, 
Inventing Human Rights: A History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2007). 
40 Carey, British Abolitionism, 5. 
41 I will explore this further in chapter 3. 
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reform communities. As Swaminathan points out, the improvement or “progress 
narrative” evident in abolitionist discourse offered the movement a compelling premise 
from which to question the existence of the slave trade.42  
1.3 Theory and Methodology  
In her 2012 article, “Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have 
a history)?”, Scheer asks whether emotions can be conceived of as practices in the 
terms defined by Pierre Bourdieu.43 Bourdieu’s practice theory emphasises the 
importance of habituation and social context to human action, his notion of “habitus” 
stressing “the permanent internalisation of the social order in the human body”.44 
Rather than the body being seen as a timeless, ahistorical entity, practice theory 
emphasises the body as socially situated, adaptive, and trained, thus making it 
historical.45 An “emotions-as-practice” approach therefore understands emotions as 
emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context with cultural and 
historical specificities. 46 As Scheer states, in practice the body is not just a collection of 
organic material and processes but is conceived of as a “knowing” or “mindful body” 
which “stores information from past experiences in habituated processes and 
contributes this knowledge to human activity and consciousness”.47  The implication of 
this is that emotional expressions, gestures, and actions can be seen as “acts executed by 
                                                          
42 Srividhya Swaminathan, Debating the Slave Trade: Rhetoric of British National Identity, 1759-1815,  
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009), 33. 
43 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990). 
44 T. H. Eriksen and F. S. Nielsen, A History of Anthropology, (London: Pluto Press, 2001). 
45 Scheer claims her theory bridges the gap between conflicting ideas about emotions as either universal 
or socially and culturally constructed: practice theory “elaborates most thoroughly the infusion of the 
physical body with social structure, both of which participate in the production of emotional experience”. 
Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 199. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 201. See also Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret M. Lock, “A Mindful Body: a Prolegomenon 
to Future Work in Medical Anthropology”, Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1, (March 1987): 6-41. 
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a mindful body”, or as cultural practices in themselves.48 As a concept for the history of 
emotions, it offers a way to integrate the physiological aspects of emotional processes 
with those that are constructed out of social norms. 
In conceiving of a knowing body with a “habitus” that stores a “practical sense”, 
practice theory highlights the largely unconscious and implicit knowledge of how we 
should behave in a given situation.49  The “habitus” – Bourdieu’s term for the body’s 
“system of cognitive and motivating structures” – is described as “the active presence 
of the whole past of which it is the product”.50 The body therefore contains history. 
That history “consists not only of the sedimentations of evolutionary time, but also the 
history of the society in which the organism is embedded, and its own history of 
constantly being molded by the practices it executes”.51 Practices are therefore 
understood as skilful behaviours and habits, dependent on practice until they become 
automatic.52  Thus, if emotions are considered practices, we must understand them as 
the habits, behaviours and everyday rituals that help people achieve an emotional state.  
These habits, or the “doings and sayings” that are dependent on and connected with 
emotional experiences and expressions – such as speaking, gesturing, and remembering 
– are termed “emotional practices”.53 Emotional acts like weeping, sighing, blushing, 
and trembling, though seemingly spontaneous and automatic responses, are learned and 
socialised behaviours which, according to practice theory, make lasting changes to the 
body and brain.54 
                                                          
48 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 205. 
49 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 66. 
50 Ibid., 56. While Scheer prefers the term “emotional style” over “habitus”, the concept is nevertheless 
important to an understanding of practice. 
51 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 201. 
52 Ibid., 202. 
53 Ibid., 209. 
54 See Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
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Emotional practices are a part of what is often referred to as “emotional 
management”.55 That is, they are the ongoing learning, maintaining, and shaping of an 
emotional repertoire.56  In this sense, emotional practices can be said to be mobilising; 
they are the “manipulations of body and mind to evoke feelings where there are none, to 
focus diffuse arousals and give them an intelligible shape, or to change or remove 
emotions already there”.57 The implication for methodology is that, “instead of 
searching the historical record for the ‘trigger’ to explain the emotion that followed, the 
emotions can be viewed as the meaningful cultural activity of ascribing, interpreting, 
and constructing an event as a trigger”.58 In studies of political and social activism, the 
act of mobilising emotions through emotional practices is crucial. According to Eugenia 
Lean, in order to historicise emotions “the key methodological challenge is not just to 
identify the words or expressions (textual or bodily) of affect, but to think about how a 
particular narrative or bodily expression moves from mere rhetoric or empty gesture to 
become viscerally felt, somatically embodied, or to gain the status of a social norm.”59 
Inherent to the study of emotions as practices, in the Bourdieuian sense of the word, is 
that emotions not only change over time because norms and expectations change, but 
also “because the practices in which they are embodied, and bodies themselves, 
undergo transformation”.60 This would suggest that thinking of emotions as practice can 
look beyond norms to felt experience, thus helping historians “get over the sense that 
                                                          
55 See Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983). 
56 There are many terms for the idea of emotional management: “style”, “repertoire”, “system”. While 
Scheer uses “style” in her theory, I prefer the term “repertoire” as it encompasses the whole range of 
skills or behaviours that a person habitually uses.  
57 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 209. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Eugenia Lean, “AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions”, American Historical Review 
117, (December 2012): 1498, doi: 10.1093/ahr/117.5.1487. 
60 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 220. 
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the history of emotions can only be a history of changing emotional norms and 
expectations but not a record of change in feeling”. 61  
My study does not intend to explore whether this claim is applicable to 
eighteenth-century emotional repertoires or, indeed, if we can in fact get at changes in 
actual feeling in historical sources. I use Scheer's approach, rather, to look at normative 
changes over time which contributed to the abolitionist emotional repertoire, as I think 
this is all we can do as historians and literary analysts.62 Moreover, if feelings change 
rather than norms, this would suggest that the emotions I focus on in this study 
somehow appeared and disappeared within the span of around a hundred years. Scheer 
claims that the “fashion” of sentimentalism may be considered more an emotional style 
than a habitus because it was so easily reversed by competing emotional repertoires.63  
If we are talking about the term “sentimental” itself then Scheer is right: the privileging 
discourse of sentiment came and went relatively quickly. Yet, emotions do not appear 
from nowhere. Compassion is still a felt experience in today’s post-Romantic world. I 
am in accord with Michael Bell in that we often assume wrongly that the decline of a 
word represents the downgrading of its object.64 In Bell’s view, the transformation of 
the word “sentimental” into a negative descriptor of self-indulgent and mawkish feeling 
after the Enlightenment was not “a rejection of feeling, or of the underlying impulse of 
eighteenth-century sentimentalism”, but was in fact “the development of an implicit 
                                                          
61 Ibid.  
62 Like Rosenwein, I do not claim that the study of the emotional practices will tell us how “a certain 
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understood, and represented how they felt. As Rosenwein states, “This, in fact, is about all we can know 
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63 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 217. 
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criterion of true feeling on which the modern pejorative sense rests”.65 The change in 
how people privileged sentimentalism is on the level of discourse, not feeling itself.  
The underlying assumptions about how emotions work in Scheer’s theory itself 
justifies this view. She states that a practice theory approach to emotions is useful 
because it “does not reproduce assumptions in the sources”. Yet, to the degree that the 
sources I examine in this study presume the potential transformation of the self and 
society through habituation to a “second nature”, emotions-as-practice can be almost 
directly applicable to the assumptions about emotions that underpin the sentimental 
emotional repertoire, and which were also central to the changing emotional repertoire 
of the abolitionist community. In eighteenth-century formulations of sentimentalism the 
supposedly “natural” tendency to be sociable and benevolent was understood to require 
careful cultivation and practice over the course of one’s life. Emotions-as-practice thus 
serves as a valuable entry point into abolitionists’ methods of using sentimental 
language and argument and the meanings behind such use. In applying this approach, 
however, we need to keep in mind the fundamental differences between pre- and post-
Romantic discourses on emotions and their underlying psychological, physiological, 
and theological foundations.66 The eschatology and teleology that underpin eighteenth-
century theories of emotion have apparently disappeared from modern theories, if not 
entirely from their application, and we need to be aware of this change when attempting 
to find a congruence between modern and Enlightenment ideas.67 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 2. 
66 For an overview of the idea of human nature that Shaftesbury and other eighteenth-century moral 
philosophers need to assume see Nancy Yousef, “Feeling for Philosophy: Shaftesbury and The limits of 
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Dehumanization in Graphic Narratives”, SubStance 40, no.1 (2011): 135-155. In her work on narrative 
empathy Keen critiques the claim that modern theories have discarded or displaced the teleological 
function of emotions.  
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Having said this, one of the most interesting implications of the concept of 
emotions-as-practice is that it allows us to focus on the practical emotive function of 
emotional expressions.  It thus makes it possible to engage with abolitionist texts in a 
new way, giving access to activists’ methods of mobilising political action through 
appeals to what they perceived to be embodied emotional norms in their society. Their 
material interest lay in moving the public to put pressure on the government by shaping 
their call for abolition as an act of humanity. In order to understand this process, we 
need to pay attention to language, performance, and gesture in abolitionist works and 
consider the ways in which their emotional rhetoric was used as a practice.  Scheer does 
not provide a methodology for how to go about uncovering the practices of the past 
other than this necessary focus on language in extant records. I combine Scheer’s 
approach with Barbara Rosenwein’s theory of “emotional communities”.68 Her concept 
of uncovering a community’s “system of feeling”, or emotional repertoire, through its 
primary material sources provides a practical methodology for studying historic 
communities by which we can gain an understanding of how they expressed particular 
emotions and their purposes in doing so.69 An important part of Rosenwein’s 
methodology is to consider the social role of emotions, and the focus on how they are 
communicated sits well with emotions-as-practice, the two concepts emphasising the 
practical communicative function of emotional language. Changes which occur to 
communities and social groups over time drive the emergence of new emotional norms, 
or changes to “cultural scripts” for specific emotions.70 In other words, emotions can be 
                                                          
68 Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions”, 842. 
69 Rosenwein, “Problems and Methods”, 11. 
70 Cf. Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 204. For the idea of “emotion scripts” and their 
“rescripting” see Rosenwein, “Problems and Methods”, 20.  
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“rescripted”. Thus we can account for the fact that sentimentalism came and went as a 
dominant emotional culture over the course of the eighteenth century.   
It is the concept of “rescripting” that drives the structure of my thesis. I posit 
that the realisation to which many came about the iniquity of the slave trade, and which 
drove them to form a movement to change British policy in this area, led those who 
privileged sentimentalism within their emotional repertoires to “rescript” their 
sentimental norms. Emotional practices function to sustain emotional communities, but 
they also create new ones.71 We can see this in the development of the abolitionist 
movement. By drawing political conclusions about the slave trade and shaping them in 
terms of their sentimental norms, the abolitionist community created a new set of 
emotional norms, a politics of sympathy, by which they communicated their appeals to 
the public for reform. Over the next four chapters I examine the emotional practices 
which created the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the politics of 
sympathy of this new community, which began emerging from the 1760s and 70s and 
which coalesced into a formal movement in 1787. In doing so I trace the ways in which 
abolitionists rescripted the emotional norms that these practices were engaged with to 
suit their new political and reformist aims.  
Access to the relevant practices is through the “doings and sayings” of various 
communities which build on their knowledge of habituated emotional norms.72 The 
language of sentimentalism was a somatic one which highlighted the body and its 
responses to emotional stimuli and which centred particularly on pathos and the ability 
to sympathise with distress and misfortune. Both Adam Smith’s idea of imaginative 
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72 Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice”, 209. 
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sympathy and Hume’s sympathetic contagion are in play here. The reader of a 
sentimental text, whether a work of fiction or a piece of religious or philosophical 
polemic, goes on the same emotional journey as the hero, heroine, or writer, thus 
establishing moments in which a community of readers can put their moral sentiments 
into practice and test their sensibility by sympathising with, or catching, the emotions 
on the page. The language of tears and of blushing, the up-close scenes of misery, and 
the emotion words, such as sympathy, benevolence, compassion, and shame, which 
represent the moral sentiments, are all signposts which point to the emotional repertoire 
of sentimental communities. I read these signposts as emotional practices and focus 
specifically on the ways in which different communities used this language to home in 
on the importance of the habituation of moral sentiments to their emotional repertoire. 
This focus allows us to see a common thread between the emotional practices of the 
communities which existed before antislavery became popular and the abolitionist 
community that emerged after 1787. It also uncovers a politicisation of the 
sentimentalism used by abolitionists, a rescripting of their emotional norms. 
A key aspect to reading emotional practices is the sites in which they are carried 
out. As Benno Gammerl asserts, emotional styles or repertoires are shaped by the kinds 
of spaces they are performed in.73 The notion of “spaces for feeling” current in studies 
of historical emotions is therefore useful to this study because such spaces are 
understood as communities, formed by shared norms and emotional repertoires which 
are practised through a specific set of emotional expressions, acts, or performances.74 
Spaces allow the engagement of emotional practices and can often determine the ways 
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in which emotions are engaged in, managed, and expressed. Such spaces can either be 
physical, in which members of an emotional community meet face-to-face, or textual, 
in which practices are engaged between readers.75 For instance, a site in which people 
gather to engage in sociability, such as the coffeehouse or club, is a space for feeling in 
which emotional practices are engaged, communicated and shared, and a novel is a 
space for feeling in which an imagined reading community shares in the emotional 
practices communicated by the writer. These spaces, particularly textual ones, become 
important tools of emotional practice, the communicative aid in which emotions can be 
mobilised and passed between members of a community. The texts produced by the 
communities which privileged sentimentalism in their emotional repertoires are central 
to this study and it is through the emotional practices – the doings and sayings 
presented within them – that I aim to uncover how abolitionists rescripted sentimental 
language and created their own emotional norms.  
Each chapter explores a particular practice, or practices, in specific spaces, all of 
which were aimed at the cultivation of moral sentiments.  I divide each chapter into 
three sections, the first of which examines the practice in question, followed by how the 
language employed in habituating the practice began to be adopted within antislavery 
texts before the emergence of abolitionism as a political movement. The third section of 
each chapter explores how abolitionist writers adapted this language, rescripting it into 
their own politics of sympathy to encourage action against the slave trade. Chapter one 
examines the emotional practice of habituating moral sentiments within educational 
settings, examining the ways in which an emotional education was advocated among 
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some elite university circles and dissenting academies. It follows how the language of 
cultivation was adopted within early children’s literature that presented slavery as cruel 
and inhumane, through to its rescripting in the university essay of Thomas Clarkson 
into a tool of abolitionist mobilisation. Chapter two explores the emotional practice of 
sociability, in particular the way in which the press enhanced emotional cultivation, 
how early antislavery newspaper correspondence surrounding the trial of James 
Somerset, a runaway slave, adopted this understanding in their debates, and how 
abolitionists adapted it in their own debates on the abolition question. Chapter three 
looks at the combined practices of religious weeping and of moral and social 
improvement, following how sermon literature was used by both antislavery and 
abolitionist preachers to employ Christian sentimental arguments against slavery. The 
final chapter explores the literary practice of “reading for the sentiment”, aimed at 
cultivating an emotionally sensitive reading public, the way in which this was used by 
writers to explore new responses to slavery, and how abolitionist poetry relied on 
reaching an audience practised in the art of sentimental reading.76 
While each chapter focuses on specific practices and spaces of abolitionist 
argument separately, the aim is to show that the sentimental reading practices which 
abolitionists were relying on to mobilise public opinion were informed and influenced 
by a range of practices from a variety of emotional communities which shared a similar 
understanding of sentimental ethics. Given the vast array of sources, I have limited my 
choice to works which were printed during the main years of campaigning between 
1786 and 1792. I have chosen texts which were popular as pieces of persuasive material 
at the time and which particularly centre on their engagement with the idea of emotional 
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cultivation. I use the term antislavery when talking of texts and activity prior to the 
formation of the movement, or at least prior to a shift in emphasis from antislavery to 
abolitionism. These generally fall between the years 1760 and the early 1780s. 
Abolitionism refers to works from the period between 1786 and 1792, when the 
campaigns were focused solely on the main goal of an abolition of the slave trade, 
rather than slavery in general. While I use the term sentimental in regards to abolitionist 
literature, I mean only that they employ sentimental language and argument within their 
politics of sympathy, evidence of their rescripted emotional repertoire.  
The rescripting of emotional norms carried out by abolitionists turned 
sympathetic feeling into a force of political action. Theirs was a politics of sympathy 
which was expressed by academics, newspaper correspondents, preachers and divines, 
writers of fiction, and poets, in an attempt to impose their emotional norms onto 
parliament, willing the legislature to act in the interests of humanity rather than 
commercial gain. Beginning with the antislavery writers of the middle of the eighteenth 
century who published tracts, sermons, and novels that ask readers to respond 
benevolently to the slave, and ending with the abolitionist activists who turned these 
appeals into methods of political mobilisation, the writers I examine in this study see 
benevolence as an active emotion, not a passive one. The main thread that runs through 
their texts is the idea of emotional habituation and the importance of cultivating 
sensibility as the key to morality. This led to the creation of abolitionist emotional 
norms which portrayed the actions of that community as morally virtuous and humane, 
a community which consisted of people who had cultivated sincere sentiments, the 
proof of which was in their reformist actions. This stood in direct contrast to their 
depictions of the pro-slavery opposition, who are painted as habituated in cruelty and 
tyranny and therefore incapable of feeling. Their conviction in the efficacy of their 
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politics of sympathy may have wavered once their attempts at sentimental moral 
persuasion failed in the combative context of parliamentary debate. However, the 
question for my thesis is not whether emotional practice can answer why abolitionism 
developed or why it did or did not succeed. Rather, the question I ask is whether an 
emotions-as-practice approach can give an effective account of the methods by which 
communities manage emotions and how they understand the emotional shifts which 





Chapter 2: The “Mind Habitually Disposed to 
Cherish...Humanity”: Emotional Self-Improvement and 
the Cultivation of Abolitionist Sentiments 
 
Scheer’s theory of emotions-as-practice emphasises actions and doings.77 If we are to 
consider sentimentalism as a set of emotional practices within different spaces and 
communities in eighteenth-century Britain, then improvement inhabits a central role 
within those actions and doings which were aimed at habituating the moral sentiments. 
Social reform and the advancement of notions of progress were ubiquitous across 
different communities around Britain during the eighteenth century and abolitionism 
can be seen as just one part of the philanthropic turn that occurred during this period. 78 
This also encompassed notions of self-development through education, sociability, and 
the cultivation of appropriate emotional experiences.  These emotional practices, which 
aimed at refining the passions in order to function in a sociable world, are the focus of 
this chapter. As Taylor points out, the moral concerns that lay behind British 
philosophy and the science of human nature in the eighteenth century meant that much 
“attention was given both to self-cultivation and to social reform”.79 In the sentimental 
argument used by abolitionist writers, acts of social reform are the result of a cultivated 
sentimental emotional repertoire. The abolitionist emphasis on the difference between 
their own cultivated benevolence and the practised cruelty of slavers demonstrates the 
political rescripting of sentimental emotional norms that abolitionists engaged in, 
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adopting the language of emotional cultivation and adapting it to suit their own politics 
of sympathy. 
In the first section I examine how philosophical ideas about the cultivation of 
moral sentiments manifested in the emotional practice of sociability, particularly among 
small communities of educated elite in Britain, which was aimed at improvement. Many 
have already explored the influence of moral sentiment philosophy on the growth of 
humanitarianism as an intellectual concept during this period.80  However, these studies 
concentrate on higher order ideas. What also needs to be considered are the practical 
foundations of moral philosophy. The prescriptions for social life and advocacy of 
individual emotional cultivation in the works of moral philosophers attempted to 
engender specific emotional norms among elite educational and sociable communities 
that privileged the expression of calm sentiments and benevolence using sympathy as 
the chief tool of emotional communication. Their understanding of the body and its 
emotions called for affective cultivation of so-called inherent qualities, the nurturing 
and habituation of certain emotions which were considered crucial to the happiness of 
society in general.  
The second section of this chapter explores some of the communities that were 
engaging in practices of emotional self-improvement and the texts which they produced 
which set about mobilising a sentimental emotional repertoire. The focus remains on 
educational settings, from those centred around spaces of sociability that were 
established for self-improvement, like the philosophical and literary societies, to 
academic communities, such as the Warrington Academy for students from dissenting 
families. The emotional practices of these communities are evident in the literature they 
                                                          
80 See in particular Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion” (see chap. 1, n. 39); and Hunt, Inventing Human 
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produced, which can be viewed as tools of their cultivation of moral sentiments. The 
didactic and moral children’s literature that was written by members of these 
communities was aimed specifically at mobilising the moral sentiments and social 
affections which should be habituated through constant practice. The texts I examine 
teach moral sentiment philosophy as a practice for the cultivation of virtue. Moreover, 
the strong antislavery sentiment that emanated from the communities which privileged 
self-improvement and sentimental cultivation, foreshadows the relationship abolitionists 
later made between sentimental ethics, humanitarianism, and political reform. 
In order to demonstrate the political rescripting of sentimentalism that 
abolitionists engaged in, I conclude this chapter with an examination of the arguments 
used in one of the most important abolitionist publications produced at the beginning of 
the first campaign. Thomas Clarkson’s An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the 
Human Species (1786) was one of the most reprinted abolitionist essays written at the 
end of the eighteenth century. Created within an academic space, the movement of the 
essay as it was republished and distributed across Britain for use as a mobilising 
political tool highlights the way in which the sentimental emotional repertoire of one 
community was rescripted by abolitionists to suit their own emotional norms. The essay 
acts as a tool of emotional communication, mimicking the movement of emotional 
practices as people move from one space to another, journeying from its role as an 
academic dissertation to an abolitionist circulation, and finally on to national 
publication. Clarkson’s use of sentimental discourse, based on a presumed cultivated 
benevolence in the reader, set an important precedent for the abolitionist discourse 
which followed its publication, highlighting the importance and popularity of its moral 
and emotional foundations. His arguments against the slave trade, using the moral 
sentiments as the basis of Christian and British ethical standards, make his essay a 
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production of the emotional norms of its creator and the spaces in which he socialised 
and cultivated them. At the same time, it acts as a space itself through which a new 
community emerges which privileges a politics of sympathy.  
2.1 “An Habit is Necessary”: Cultivating Sentimental Communities  
One of the most important aspects of putting the idea of improvement into practice was 
the cultivation and education of one’s own emotions because, according to theories of 
moral sentiment, it is only through enhancing one’s sensibility to emotion and ability to 
sympathise with others that any broader notion of improving society in general can be 
achieved. The theories of emotional cultivation advocated by philosophers like 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith, are a crucial element to the idea and 
practices of improvement that emerged during the long eighteenth century. Scholars 
have acknowledged the role of moral sentiment philosophy in informing notions about 
social sympathy and humanitarian philanthropy and reform. However, I am interested 
in the emphasis such philosophy placed on the idea of practice in their theories for 
improvement. The practices which these philosophers advocated in their work, and in 
which they themselves participated, are in fact very similar to the idea of emotions-as-
practice that Scheer has proposed, particularly in the ways they envisage emotions as 
both bodily and cognitive processes which people are capable of refining and 
habituating through actions and experience.  
Conceiving of emotions-as-practice means understanding our feelings “as 
emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context, which always has 
cultural and historical specificity”.81 This is an idea that would have been familiar to 
eighteenth-century philosophers and scientists. Writers on the passions and sentiments 
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understood emotions as bodily processes; an emotional response activates the bodily 
senses while the effects of feelings are written on the body so as to make them visible 
and transmissible to others. They thus apprehended “the mutual embeddedness of 
minds, bodies, and social relations”, as Scheer puts it.82 They advocated the need for 
nurturing particular sentiments over others, the moral sentiments requiring careful 
cultivation so as to become a natural response in a given situation rather than other, 
more violent passions, which could have dire social consequences. They were as much 
aware of the “knowing body” – one that stores information from past experiences in 
habituated processes – as Bourdieu and Scheer.83 The emotions they wished to become 
normative to society needed to be practised so as to become “natural”.  
According to the notion of emotions-as-practice, while the emotional practices 
which inform our experience of different emotional states are dependent on the 
environment around us, the social spaces we move in, and our interactions with other 
people, they are also bound up with the self, our bodily and mental dispositions 
experienced during an emotional moment.84 Our experience of emotions therefore is 
shaped by our own past experiences and the ways in which we activate emotions 
habitually over time.  If we are practised in feeling anger when faced with adversity 
then, more often than not we will feel that same emotion habitually over the course of 
our lives in similar situations. At the same time, it is possible to train ourselves to feel 
differently over time.85  In the same manner, eighteenth-century moral writers on 
passions and sentiments are interested in the ways in which people can bring emotions 
under self-control, allowing the sociable ones to flourish. Sensibility may be considered 
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an inherent human capacity for feeling but its effectiveness is dependent on the 
cultivation of affective experiences which centre on the social sentiments, such as 
benevolence, compassion, and pity.86 Thus emotional practices which mobilise and 
habituate these emotions are of central importance to theories of moral sentiment and 
notions of improvement in the eighteenth century. Moral sentiment philosophy is not 
simply a set of doctrines and theories about human nature, but is considered a practice 
by its advocates – the affective cultivation of so-called inherent qualities that is 
habitually acted out within specific social contexts and spaces. Emphasis is put on the 
cultivation of so-called calm, natural, and sociable feelings which keep society in check 
against the violence and cruelty bred by harbouring unnatural passions. As will become 
clear, the argument that cruelty to other beings is unnatural and that compassion 
towards others is natural to humanity becomes an important feature of abolitionist 
publications and debates.  
Hume’s essay ‘Of Eloquence’ contrasts the “very stubborn and intractable” 
passions with “the sentiments and understanding, which are easily varied by education 
and example”.87 The “easily varied” affections and sentiments have a more cognitive 
content than the unruly passions; they “assume the form of judgments and become 
amenable to public assessment”, as Schmitter points out.88 As such, they are also 
considered more normative and capable of cultivation than passions because, in order to 
have appropriate, sociable and calm affective responses, we must subject our feelings 
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to, as Hume puts it, “some steady and general points of view”.89 In other words, we 
form our sentiments and affections through correction and cultivation and by 
conforming to what is deemed socially appropriate. As Schmitter states, “Such 
adjustments allow us to achieve felt responses that nonetheless stem from a privileged 
standpoint, one that counts as impartial and appropriate by conforming to how others 
(should) respond”.90 This is not an idea particular to Hume’s work; both Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson also focus on the importance of cultivating the right kinds of affections 
and sentiments in order to be able to function in a sociable world. Shaftesbury couches 
the idea in terms of “self-study” and the disciplining of one’s own mind.91  His moral 
sense, an equivalent to other bodily senses like sight and taste, must be cultivated 
through self-reflexive refinement in order to be able to spontaneously distinguish 
between right and wrong. 
Shaftesbury’s belief in the necessity to cultivate the moral sense may have come 
from his own educational experience. The young Earl was under the tutelage of John 
Locke, whose own sensational psychology rejects the idea of innate qualities and 
advocates instead a sort of social constructionism – the self is created from the 
environment in which one is reared.92  As a consequence, Shaftesbury was instructed in 
the notion that the practice of kindness in the child would shape the man: 
Be sure to keep up in him principles of good-nature and 
kindness, and encourage them as much as you can, by credit, 
commendation, and other rewards that accompany that state: and 
when they have taken root in his mind, and settled there by 
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practice, the ornaments of conversation and the outside of 
fashionable manners, will come of themselves.93 
While the adult Shaftesbury opposed his tutor in asserting the innateness of human 
nature and of human sentiments, Shaftesbury clearly adhered to Locke’s views that 
self-study was also necessary to cultivate virtue in individuals and, in turn, society. For 
Shaftesbury, those who do not cultivate themselves constitute an “unthinking world”, 
only ever appreciating pleasures superficially, and unable to take full possession of the 
role of the virtuous man in society.94 Our reason must cultivate our moral sense if we 
are to enjoy the pleasures of taste and virtue.95    
Hutcheson also advocates moral sentiment philosophy as a practice which 
nurtures the appropriate sentiments in the individual in order to improve society in 
general. According to Ellis, Hutcheson “refused to relinquish the pedagogical function 
of moral philosophy: that it should not only describe the operation of virtue and duty, 
but should recommend it too”.96 He believed that we have the ability to reduce the 
effects of “particular Passions” and establish the dominance of “calm universal 
Benevolence” through “frequent Meditation and Reflection”.97 The point of 
Hutcheson’s philosophy is to help people help themselves, to instruct people, as Harris 
states, and to adopt “a particular kind of perspective upon the world, a maximally 
impartial perspective, a point of view which reveals one’s place in the larger moral 
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95 Ibid. 
96 Ellis, Politics of Sensibility, 12 (see chap. 1, n. 12). 
97 Francis Hutcheson, Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral 
Sense, (London, 1728) 167, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale (CW3319816865).   
40 
 
system”.98  It is through self-cultivation, attention to mind, and “due culture” that “our 
nature can be raised” to a level that makes it publically useful.99  
Eighteenth-century moral philosophy, then, is as much interested in the practice 
of ordering and restraining affections and passions as the analysis of them.100  Virtue 
and morality are attainable through the cultivation of those emotions that bring people 
together in a sociable manner.  In Smith’s words, “Virtue requires habit and resolution”: 
this is the “foundation upon which the superstructure of perfect virtue can be built”. 101 
Cultivating the moral sentiments has the knock-on effect of cultivating the sensibility. 
One cannot receive, intuit, or feel along with someone else’s emotional pain or 
suffering without sensibility, and a civilised society is one in which humans respond 
with compassionate benevolence to the feelings of others; sensibility is thus a crucial 
quality to nurture in the self. Sympathy – the mechanism by which we intuit emotions 
in others and enables us to be affected in turn – aids emotional practices which privilege 
the social sentiments and it, too, requires cultivation in order to function well. 102  As 
Smith points out, although human beings are “naturally sympathetic”, it requires a 
certain amount of effort in the individual: the spectator must “endeavour, as much as he 
can, to put himself in the situation of the other”, must “strive to render as perfect as 
possible, that imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded”.103  
So, while the social sentiments, sensibility, and the ability to communicate 
emotions through sympathy are all supposed inherent human qualities, they are not 
quite instinctual or automatic. The moral philosophers are insistent that these qualities 
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must be exercised and practised regularly in order to be spontaneous and, therefore, 
natural. Fellow-feeling requires education in the appropriate affections and sentiments 
which make us sociable and virtuous and habituation in the operation of sympathy as a 
communicative tool.  As such, the practice of moral sentiment philosophy is an 
emotional practice. True virtue, according to Hutcheson, relies on habits which have to 
be developed and cultivated by a process he calls the “culture of the mind”, a process 
which allows the moral sense to assert itself against other, more inferior, passionate 
impulses:104  
The turbulent appetites and particular passions whether of the 
selfish or generous kind […] naturally arise on certain occasions 
[…] To govern and restrain them an habit is necessary, which 
must be acquired by frequent recollection and discipline. […] 
[W]e must recollect our former experiences in ourselves, and 
our observations about others.105  
In other words, performing and feeling calm affections over the course of one’s life 
habituates them so that virtuous behaviour eventually becomes natural. In practice 
theory, “nature” is understood as the habitus. The habitual practice of an emotional 
response or experience over the course of one’s life, or even as a result of one’s external 
environment, makes that response or feeling seem automatic. This does not mean our 
emotional experiences and responses are false or consciously activated in any way; 
rather, that habitual practice of emotions make them embodied and normative – 
“natural” in the terms of moral sentiment philosophy. As with other cultural practices, 
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the habitus of the individual specifies what is “feelable” in any given setting or 
situation.106 
One of the ways in which emotions are practised, according to Scheer, is 
through the mobilisation of specific feelings: “emotional practices are habits, rituals, 
and everyday pastimes that aid us in achieving a certain emotional state. This includes 
the striving for a desired feeling as well as the modifying of one that is not 
desirable”.107 In other words, the practice and habituation of emotions can be 
considered as strategic “manipulations of body and mind to evoke” the feelings required 
in a certain space, among certain people, and in response to a certain situation.108  In a 
practical sense, this means that we often seek out spaces, people, objects and activities 
which help to manage our moods and to nurture those emotions which we, or our 
community, or society, find appropriate or acceptable. With this in mind, any 
examination of the practice of moral sentiment philosophy in eighteenth-century Britain 
must highlight the phenomenon of sociability as a key practice of improvement and 
sentimentalism.109 As an activity which mobilises the social affections, like mutual 
sympathy, sociability was strongly advocated as a crucial emotional practice by those 
philosophers writing on the moral sentiments. Sociability – the phenomenon of middle-
class socialising which began in the coffee-houses and taverns in the late seventeenth 
century and grew to encompass many kinds of clubs, societies, and social circles, both 
public and private – meant more to eighteenth-century culture than simply socialising 
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with friends and colleagues. It had as its aim, through habitual social gathering, the self-
cultivation of the affections and sentiments which held polite society together.  
Like the affections on which it is based, sociability is considered a natural 
impulse by writers in the eighteenth century, but one that needs to be habitually 
practised. Shaftesbury states, for example, that society is not “a kind of Invention, and 
Creature of Art”, but is naturally based on our affections, which are a “herding 
Principle, and associating Inclination”.110 According to Smith, human beings are social 
animals who have a natural sociability towards one another. The best model of society 
is a conversational one in which pleasure arises “from a certain correspondence of 
sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds, which like so many musical 
instruments coincide and keep time with one another”.111  Sociability is thus considered 
key to morality, dependent upon the proper communication of passions and 
sentiments.112 It relies on manners and rules of politeness, arrived at through the 
cultivation of the social affections such as benevolence and compassion.  
Moral sentiment philosophers needed to advocate the practice of sociability as a 
daily activity not least because it proved that passions are controllable. Importantly, 
then, the moral sentiments were not just an abstraction from within the philosophical 
theories and treatises of a select group of intellectuals and elite; they consisted, rather, 
of “an ethics that could be taught and lived”, as Ahnert and Manning put it.113  Hume, 
Smith, and their contemporaries among the Scottish schools of moral philosophy, were 
in fact known for cultivating their social affections among themselves through their 
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socialising habits.114 As Mullan points out, David Hume in particular exemplified the 
way in which these writers self-consciously put their conception of harmonious 
sociability into daily practice and lived out their models of social being: “the social 
existence of the philosopher and man of letters is seen to support, even sanction, his 
projects of enquiry and analysis. [...Hume’s social being] depended not simply on a 
personal habit of gregariousness, but also historically (and geographically) specific 
forms of social organization”.115 As a member of the intellectual elite in eighteenth-
century Edinburgh, Hume took part in a number of associations with his peers, 
including the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, the Select Society, which founded 
the Edinburgh Society for Encouraging Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture 
in Scotland, and the Poker Club, all of which consisted of members from Edinburgh’s 
intellectual and social elite and all dedicated to improvement and sociability.116 
Hume clearly either based his social existence on his theories of human nature 
or, conversely, his philosophical theories on his own social existence and the society 
that he knew and participated in. In his Treatise, Hume states that a “science of man” 
must be based on observations of human behaviour and the daily habits and customs of 
everyday life: observations which were to be taken “as they appear in the common 
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their 
pleasures”.117 Hume’s account of sympathy and social affection is shaped by the 
context in which it was written, published, and read. As Fairclough points out, this 
context was very specific: “a genteel readership of individuals known to the author”.118 
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This had the implicit effect of restricting his notion of “society” to a very small and 
defined community of educated, elite men.119 Thus although, for Hume, sympathetic 
contagion allows the spread of refined sentiments and manners within a community, 
this community is imagined as a very specific “Club or Knot of Companions”.120 The 
same can be said of Shaftesbury, whose own resources for his notions of an innate 
human nature lay in his “very name and being”, the heritage of his aristocratic family 
and their political views as “arch-Whig Commonwealthmen”.121 As Barker-Benfield 
states, Shaftesbury had clearly “been thinking of himself and his intellectual and class 
peers, taking ‘Society’ for ‘society’” in his interpretation of an innate moral sense, 
even though the notion of its innateness allowed for wider applicability.122 
Thus, the social existence of the moral sentiment philosophers was one of 
intellectualism, the pursuit of knowledge and education, and polite sociability based on 
the social affections of an elite group of men. The clubs and societies in which Hume 
and his peers gathered fostered philosophical and scientific advancements and activities 
which set out to improve their intellectual and emotional selves. The spaces in which 
this was taking place tell us something of the people involved.  The culture of 
improvement in Scotland took root strongly within the universities and intellectual 
circles looking to “improve Edinburgh and Scotland and make them of more note in 
Britain and Europe, and in the republic of letters where their members' works and the 
clubs' activities might achieve recognition”.123  Academic spaces were essential, in 
Scotland at least, to the foundation of practices of improvement and sociability for those 
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communities advocating and practising the cultivation of sentimentalism, sensibility, 
and social sympathy. While the English universities were slow to follow suit, the 
Scottish universities were aimed at becoming “agents of improvement”, as Borsay puts 
it, seedbeds of new ideas in science, medicine, and philosophy which modernised 
education in Britain and adopted “more polite norms of behaviour” among its 
professors and students.124 The lectureships and chairs of the major Scottish universities 
were taken up by the moral philosophers and academics leading the advancement of the 
moral sentiments – Adam Smith and John Millar in Glasgow, Hugh Blair and Dugald 
Stewart in Edinburgh, and James Beattie in Aberdeen.125 While Hume never held an 
academic position due to the ambiguity of his religious convictions, he was a close 
associate of the Edinburgh professoriate through his membership of associations like 
the Philosophical Society.126  
The Scottish project of improvement, as Ahnert and Manning state, “took place 
in a context where philosophical inquiry was essentially continuous with educative 
function”.127 Habit, education, and cultivation of the self on an intellectual and 
emotional level were the driving forces behind the practices of sociability and 
improvement which took place in the academic communities and intellectual clubs of 
early eighteenth-century Scotland.  Hume, for instance, argued that education was 
imperative for a moral life, writing that “the great force of custom and education, […] 
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mould the human mind from infancy, and form it into a fixed and established 
character.”128  That education and cultivation did, of course, remain the privilege of a 
select group of people at the beginning of the eighteenth century. As Borsay points out, 
“the acquisition of reading and writing skills was a socially selective process” and 
education of any higher order remained for the social elite.129 The society of Hume’s 
experience was different to that of an illiterate labourer for instance or, indeed, a 
woman of his own class.  His fellow members of the societies and clubs in which he 
socialised were male, educated, professional, landed, and affluent.130 Women were not, 
as yet, included in the public sphere of polite sociability and, as Emerson states, there 
was also a notable absence of members of the merchant class in the Philosophical 
Society in the first half of the eighteenth century, most likely due to the fact that until 
mid-century such men lacked the same educational opportunities or wealth to have 
made them eligible to join.131  
However, as the middle classes increased in number, affluence, leisure, and 
literacy, sociability and improvement became increasingly pursued by a variety of 
communities across Britain, including women and the less affluent sections of society, 
such as artisans and shopkeepers.  Emulation was a key factor in the growth of clubs 
and societies as people created new spaces and communities in which to practise self-
improvement. The idea of the “Penny University” is a perfect example. Coffeehouse 
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culture was creating spaces in which men, who had not necessarily attended university 
and who were not necessarily wealthy, could engage in debate, read newspapers and 
periodicals, conduct business, and practise sociability in a conversable manner. This 
was all achieved for a penny, the price of admission and a dish of coffee.132  This was, 
of course, still a more or less elite form of cultural practice. A penny was not a 
particularly small sum to spend daily on a leisure activity. Nevertheless, the idea of the 
coffee shop being labelled as an educative space that everyone (male) might participate 
in indicates the importance of the idea of improvement for a widening section of society 
which came to include businessmen and members of the trading and merchant class. By 
the end of the eighteenth century, when the abolition of the slave trade emerged as a 
movement, sociability had become a central feature of society in general across Britain 
and the lines between public and private sociability blurred as women gained more 
influence on the consumption of culture. Sociability, and the emotional practices it 
engaged, moved beyond the all-male clubs and universities of the social elite to mixed 
social circles that included both genders and, to some extent, different classes, and 
religious communities.133 The spaces of learning I examine next are of this more 
inclusive type, where women and religious dissenters engaged in their own practices of 
cultivating a sentimental emotional repertoire among their communities and where 
issues of national import, like antislavery, began to be discussed. 
2.2 Refining “the Feelings of the Heart”: Cultivating Humanitarian Sensibilities in 
Spaces of Sociability and Learning 
The practice of a sociability based on politeness, virtue, and the activation of moral 
sentiments was not confined to those spaces and communities which made up the 
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intellectual and social elite, either in Scotland or the rest of Britain. As the eighteenth-
century progressed, more and more people were engaging in this cultural phenomenon, 
in as many spaces as they could gain access to. Many were informal meetings held in 
coffeehouses and pubs.134  In the capital, women became involved, some of the elite 
female members of London society finding it possible to host their own literary circles 
which included members of both sexes.  Elizabeth Montagu, the famous bluestocking, 
held regular entertainments in her home in which literary and philosophical discussion 
was encouraged. By 1770 her house on Hill Street had become home to the leading 
literary circle in London and attracted the cream of eighteenth-century society, 
including Samuel Johnson, Sir Joshua Reynolds, Edmund Burke, David Garrick, and 
Horace Walpole.135 While London was home to several thousand formal and informal 
clubs and societies, by the middle of the eighteenth century most regional centres had 
their own scientific, literary and philosophical societies.136 Perhaps one of the best 
known was the Lunar Society (so named because members would meet only during the 
full moon, as the extra light made the journey home easier in the absence of street 
lighting), an informal institution established in Birmingham in the 1750s as a place to 
discuss new developments and theories in the fields of natural and moral philosophy.137 
Other self-improving societies that emerged in the mid- to late eighteenth 
century were more formal gatherings, like the Literary and Philosophical Society of 
                                                          
134 The Robin Hood in Butcher’s Row, London, for example, was host to a literary club which gathered 
around the publisher Edward Cave whose members read papers which were afterwards printed in his 
Gentleman’s Magazine. See Clark, British Clubs, 70. 
135 Barbara Brandon Schnorrenberg, “Montagu, Elizabeth (1718–1800)”, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, (Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., May 2009), doi: 10.1093/ref:odnb/19014.  
Montagu was also a great patroness of women writers, including Hannah More, Sarah Fielding, and Anna 
Laetitia Barbauld, all of whom wrote against slavery and the slave trade. 
136 Clark, British Clubs, 2. 
137 Several members of the Lunar Society became involved in abolitionism including Josiah Wedgwood, 
creator of the seal and medallion of the kneeling slave which would become the unofficial symbol of the 
abolition movement, and Joseph Priestley, scientist and dissenting minister whose sermon against the 
slave trade I discuss in chapter 4. 
50 
 
Manchester, which had a subscription list, publishing agenda, and constitutional rules. 
Held in a room of the Unitarian Cross Street Chapel, the society was set up in 1781 by 
some of the leading figures of Manchester society – physician Thomas Percival, cotton 
merchant Thomas Walker, Unitarian minister Thomas Barnes, and surgeon Thomas 
Henry. These men were of a different class to some of the societies in London and 
Scotland. Predominantly professionals – doctors, lawyers, merchants, and 
manufacturers – and members of the Unitarian church, they took an active role in 
creating a culture of improvement in their city. Percival and his fellow members of 
Manchester society were highly active in their pursuit of sociability.  Alongside several 
institutions for reform, they took part in political societies such as the Manchester 
Constitutional Society, wrote papers for the Philosophical Transactions, became 
members of the London-based Royal Society, and founded their own Literary and 
Philosophical Society.138 Percival, along with educational reformer Thomas Barnes, 
was also involved in the establishment of the first British College of Arts and Sciences 
in 1783 and the Manchester Academy in 1786. 
Not only were the clubs and societies of regional centres like Manchester 
providing the spaces in which people could engage in the practice of sociability, they 
also gave the men who frequented them the opportunity to actively read about and 
debate contemporary ideas through educational texts. This included ideas about 
emotions and their place in social practice. Tracts on the emotions and their proper 
cultivation were among the reading materials provided by clubs and highlight the 
optimistic view of progress and improvement such societies wished to promote. The 
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Memoirs of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, published annually 
since 1783, afford a good view of the types of publications members were reading, 
discussing, and contributing for publication.139 Titles such as “On the Advantages of 
Literature and Philosophy”, “On the Pleasure which the Mind, in many Cases, receives, 
on contemplating Scenes of Distress”, and “On the Influence of the Imagination and the 
Passions upon the Understanding” are among other items on natural science and the arts 
included in the volume published in 1789. Moreover, the preface to this volume hints at 
the importance of self-improvement to the members of the Society, as well as the role 
of emulation in the advancement of intellectual clubs, stating that “the progress that has 
been made in Physics and the Belles Lettres, owes its rapidity, if not its origin, to the 
encouragement which these Societies have given to such pursuits, and to the emulation 
which has been excited between different academical bodies, as well as among the 
individual Members of each institution”.140  
Manchester was not a university town: its social elite was made up of middle 
class merchants and manufacturers, and professional men.  Nevertheless, those who 
founded the improving societies in Manchester were not uneducated. Many were self-
taught, in the true tradition of self-improvement. Thomas Henry, for instance, taught 
himself chemistry and became an apprentice to an apothecary in Oxford in order to be 
near the educational institution he had always hoped to attend.141 Thomas Walker was 
also self-educated, writing in his later years that his opinions had been formed by an 
early acquaintance with the works of Rousseau, Hume, Locke, and Voltaire.142 But 
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many had received a university education in Scotland, whose universities were open to 
religious dissenters. 143 Thomas Percival had attended the University of Edinburgh and 
maintained friendships with fellow students and professors through correspondence for 
many years. His surviving letters show his continued contact with numerous figures of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, including David Hume, for whom he “entertained a strong 
personal regard”, and William Robertson among other renowned professors.144 His 
contact with the educational spaces of Edinburgh and with men like Hume who both 
advocated and practised sociability as an ideal form of human interaction may have had 
some influence on Percival’s future endeavours in the realm of improvement. 
The educational life of a man like Percival highlights another important 
institution which engaged in the emotional practice of sociability and which advocated 
moral sentiment philosophy as an achievable way of life. Before attending the 
University of Edinburgh, Percival was the first enrolled student of the Warrington 
Academy, a school situated between Manchester and Liverpool, founded in 1756 for 
students from Dissenting families.145 Such schools were an important feature of the 
increase in education of the middle classes in regional centres and were renowned for 
encouraging an atmosphere of free enquiry and intellectual debate. As I discuss in 
chapter four, the religious convictions of dissenting denominations were in many ways 
congenial with sentimental discourse and their schools often promoted the teaching of 
moral sentiment philosophy. The Warrington Academy is one such institution and the 
connections to both the intellectual societies of Manchester and the academic spaces of 
Scotland were important to the way it taught its students as well as to the sociability of 
                                                          
143 Manchester having a large population of Dissenters and Unitarians, many men had been barred from 
studying at either Oxford or Cambridge, and so took degrees in Scotland, many of them in medicine. 
144 See Edward Percival, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Percival, M.D., (London, 1807), 
13, Google Books, https://books.google.com.au/books?id=9LNbAAAAQAAJ. 
145 Although the school was founded by Dissenters for Dissenters, it did have an open-door policy to any 
religious denomination.  
53 
 
the area.146 Before he entered the Academy, Percival’s private tutor was John Seddon, 
one of the founders of the school and its first rector and librarian. Seddon had studied at 
the University of Glasgow and is said to have been a favourite student of 
Hutcheson’s.147 It is due to his move to the Academy that Percival was enrolled in the 
same school. Percival’s son notes in his Memoir of his father that: 
The study of Ethics, […] which formed an important branch of 
academical discipline, attracted his early curiosity. Guided by an 
able master, he explored the various and fascinating regions of 
moral science; and imbibed a partiality for these pursuits, which, 
while it prompted his immediate industry, furnished a source of 
the most grateful occupation of his riper leisure.148  
While he states that his father’s “relish” for moral philosophy “might, perhaps, be 
associated with the singular purity or integrity of sentiment which characterised his 
moral nature”, he points out that he had always been encouraged by “the assistance and 
example of a private instructor, to whom he has acknowledged the deepest 
obligations”.149  
The aim of schools like Warrington was to produce students like Percival, with 
his “integrity of sentiment”: students who, once they had completed their schooling, 
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would carry the values of tutors like Seddon out into the world, into their own 
communities and spheres of practice.150 The circular that Seddon sent out in 1754 
seeking students for the school was particular in pointing out that a Warrington 
education would be “well calculated for those that are to be engag’d in a commercial 
Life”.151 The majority of students who attended Warrington did indeed come from the 
new commercial middle classes, sons of businessmen, manufacturers, and merchants, 
including West-Indian planters.152  The background of its students and the curriculum 
of the school seem to be contradictory at first glance but it perhaps tells us something 
about the ambitions of its principles and tutors. Watts states that the academics at 
Warrington and at its successor, Manchester College, were “acutely aware” of the 
society of which their students were a part and, perhaps fearing the impact of the 
commercial world on the moral development of its new classes, sought to educate 
future citizens to direct their businesses “for the good and not the detriment of the 
individual and society”.153 Thus the emphasis on an extensive and moral education, 
“because of the roles which it was hoped a virtuous and enlightened laity might play” in 
the world.154  The purpose of creating a cultured commercial class through education 
was simple for Thomas Barnes, Percival’s friend and co-founder of the Philosophical 
Society in Manchester: to “contradict the disgraceful idea that a spirit of merchandise is 
incompatible with liberal sentiment, and that it only tends to contract and vulgarise the 
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mind”.155 Yet, at the same time, most of these men were staunch anti-slavery and 
abolitionist campaigners who must have known that the “spirit of merchandise” which 
governed institutions like the slave trade was indeed incompatible with the “liberal 
sentiments” they wished to habituate in their students. Perhaps this is why they deemed 
it so necessary to cultivate those sentiments in the merchant class. 
The idea of inculcating improvement was thus central to the educational spaces 
of the dissenting academies. All students at Warrington were taught moral 
philosophy.156 Yet it was not just through the curriculum that the Warrington academics 
sought to pass on their values, but also through an attempt to habituate students in 
everyday practices of sociability which, within their emotional repertoire, were aimed at 
cultivating sensibility and the moral sentiments. Before a boarding house was built in 
the school’s grounds, the principals and trustees decreed that all students must board 
with the families of its tutors or “only in such other families in the town as the Tutors 
shall approve of”.157 One of these families was the Aikins; perhaps the prime model of 
eighteenth-century dissenting sociability, they built a community around them at 
Warrington which exemplified the emotional norms the school was promoting. John 
Aikin, tutor in languages, literature, and divinity at Warrington and later principal of the 
school, and his literary children Anna (later Barbauld) and John, participated fully in 
the life of the school, both educationally and socially.158 Anna was fifteen when her 
father took his first post as tutor and was central to the cultural life of Warrington and 
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the sociability of the school, becoming friends with the tutors and their wives, as well as 
a sister figure to many of the students. Her poem, “The Invitation”, depicts the 
atmosphere at Warrington and the type of learning they were offering to students. She 
describes the academic community in which she lived as a space where “generous 
youth” read “the classic page; / and virtue blossoms for a better age”; where “quick 
affections, kindle into flame / At virtue’s, […] honour’d name”; and where students 
learn “generous scorn of vice’s venal tribe” and “proud disdain of interest’s sordid 
bribe”.159 This last line attests to the school’s aim of producing a commercial class 
which spurns the “interest” which sees traders engage in practices which may bring 
wealth but ignores humanity, like the slave trade. 
John Aikin’s daughter Lucy wrote a memoir of her aunt’s life which is explicit 
in its praise of the “softening” influence of both the academic community at Warrington 
on the Aikin family and of the Aikin-Barbauld circle on the students that lived among 
them. The spaces that were shared by the members of these close-knit communities in 
Warrington, and the practices they engaged in, were, according to Lucy, critical to the 
self-improvement and cultivation of sensibility in both her aunt and the students who 
attended the school and lived among the tutors’ families. She states of her aunt that “in 
some tempers sensibility appears an instinct, while in others it is the gradual result of 
principle and reflection, of the events and the experience of life. It was certainly so in 
that of Mrs. Barbauld”.160  For the young Anna Barbauld sensibility was not a “leading 
feature”, but through constant effort her manners changed over the course of her life: 
“Her disposition […] now mellowed into softness”.161  As with the practical advice 
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given by moral philosophers like Hume on the necessity of cultivating one’s sentiments, 
Anna Barbauld, according to her niece,  learned and applied her sensibility through 
practice. In the progressivist narrative of the Aikin family, sensibility was seemingly 
not an innate quality for Barbauld but an active result of practice and experience, 
learned from her daily contact with others in her community who shared her emotional 
norms and practices.162  
These norms and practices were also being taught and shared among the tutors 
themselves and the students. Lucy Aikin claimed that their “manners softened with their 
system” of religion and education.163  The norms that students were being taught and 
that they were encountering through living and studying in the family homes of the 
Aikins and other tutors were clearly much more representative of the “softened” 
manners and sentimentalism of the domestic space than the preparation for a 
commercial life would suggest.  After all, as Wykes points out, “the social values and 
habits acquired” or, at least, were expected to be acquired, within the school through its 
teaching and through the environment of the institution itself “were often inimical to 
successful economic activity”.164 Perhaps knowing the background of many of their 
students and knowing that they would enter a commercial world which did not always 
take feelings and morality into consideration, they were attempting to temper the ethos 
of aggressive commercialism with a measure of sentimental ethics. 
The emotional practices which took place in the academic and family spaces at 
Warrington aimed to make the moral sentiments normative to the community that used 
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them. The spaces they shared provided the physical contact necessary to engage and 
practice the sentimental ethics and sociability of their emotional repertoire. However, 
the training and cultivating of feeling required of people of sensibility does not just 
occur through tacit socialisation, but also through explicit instruction.165 Therefore it is 
important when considering the emotional practices of a community to examine their 
cultural output and use of media that communicates their emotional norms. The 
community at Warrington had its own printing press run by William Eyres, with links 
to publisher Joseph Johnson in London, from which numerous works by tutors, former 
students, and dissenting friends and families of the school community were issued.166 
As White points out, by printing and publishing nationally recognised works by Aikin 
and Barbauld, as well as by Thomas Percival, dissenting ministers Joseph Priestley and 
William Enfield, abolitionist William Roscoe, and prison reformer John Howard, Eyres 
“provided a coherent identity for the network of authors associated with Warrington”.167  
The publications issued by these writers show a shared view of the world which was not 
just dissenting and reformist but which was dedicated to sharing their emotional norms 
with readers all over Britain. 
Thomas Percival’s collection of tales for children, printed by Johnson, reflects 
the values and emotional norms of his emotional communities, among which were the 
sites of learning and sociability in Manchester and Warrington. “Designed to Promote 
the Love of Virtue, [and] a Taste for Knowledge”, according to its subtitle, A Father’s 
Instructions: Moral Tales, Fables, and Reflections (1775-77) was written to: 
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refine the feelings of the heart, and to inspire the mind with the 
love of moral excellence: and surely nothing can operate more 
forcibly, than striking pictures of the beauty of virtue, and the 
deformity of vice; which at once convince the judgment, and 
leave a lasting impression on the imagination. 168 
Percival hopes, through his instruction and through “the pure and correct moral 
sentiments with which it abounds”, according to his son, that those who read his work 
are as affected by his prescription for a virtuous life as he was by his time spent in 
Warrington and Edinburgh.169  Aikin, who later wrote his own collection of children’s 
educational stories with his sister, writes to his friend in 1784 of his approval of the 
moral scheme of the collection, expressing his “peculiar satisfaction in the design of 
teaching virtue by examples, and appealing to the feelings of youth as much as to their 
reason”.170  
The moral tales in the collection provide a textual space in which the emotional 
norms of the community that produced and used it could be mobilised and spread 
further into other communities. They also provide a space in which the writers could 
shape their arguments for reform in the language of their own emotional repertoire.  
Moral tales that proselytise against cruelty and oppression and that laud compassion and 
benevolence make up a majority of Percival’s collection. Several of the titles are written 
explicitly on the necessity of treating other creatures with humanity, including 
insects.171 The tale of “Cruelty to Horses”, in which a racehorse is “broken” and 
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“seasoned” for a life of servitude, is particularly interesting as it can easily be read as a 
metaphor for the life of the slave.172 The horse is taken from his native Arabia, “where 
he ranged […] in the most fertile and extensive plains”, and sent to England to become 
a racehorse and to live a life of “servitude and misery”.173 Percival gives details of the 
tortures of “the lash” inflicted upon racehorses by “savage” masters who do not feel for 
their victims.174 The distress of the compassionate onlooker is contrasted to the 
inhumanity of the perpetrator of the violence. This technique, often used in antislavery 
writing, is aimed at mobilising the compassion of the reader, who is meant to identify 
with the witness of the suffering in the story.  
In the second volume of the book, published in 1777, Percival focuses his moral 
teaching on the slave trade itself and the cruelty and suffering which slaves endure on 
their journey from Africa to the West Indies. Like the horse, the African is “torn” from 
family, friends, and native land, “consigned for life to misery, toil, and bondage”.175  
Aside from the scenes of torture which it relates, in which slaves are held over the sides 
of ships and dunked, the most shocking fact, he states, is that “this infernal commerce is 
carried out by the humane, the polished, the Christian inhabitants of Europe; nay even 
by Englishmen, whose ancestors have bled in the cause of liberty, and whose breasts 
still glow with the same generous flame!”176  He is “shocked” to have to relate this to 
young English minds and the intent is to highlight the brutality that, arising from an 
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uncultivated sensibility, can be carried out by even the most “polished” and supposedly 
“humane” race of people.177 The young readers of his Instructions, after being practised 
in compassion and benevolence through reading tales such as his “Cruelty to Horses”, 
should be able to feel similarly for the African slave and shame for the actions of 
tyrannical slavers. 
While “teaching virtue by examples” was clearly the aim of communities like 
that at Warrington, whether a majority of students felt themselves affected by their 
tutors’ appeal to their feelings and whether they became habituated in their emotional 
norms we cannot say. As with any community, there must have been individuals or 
groups within Warrington who did not agree with, conform to, or practise those 
emotional norms that the school and its tutors were aiming to pass on. Indeed, many of 
its students were the sons of West-Indian planters and merchants who dealt in the slave 
trade. According to Bright, these students were the cause of “great anxiety to those who 
had charge of the Academy” as they would delight in shocking the tutors with their 
tales of plantation life, “declaring that the earliest request of a planter’s child was 
always for a ‘young nigger to kick’”.178 Moreover, being practised in sensibility and 
softened manners did not necessarily lead to an ability to sympathise with the sufferings 
of others. As Scheer points out, our reactions to another person’s feelings, such as 
experiencing compassion for another’s distress, are themselves emotional practices and 
thus also deeply embedded in social settings.179  Whether we feel compassion for 
someone is “tightly bound up with apprehensions of who the other is, […] if they are 
like or unlike oneself,” and is mediated by our habitual predispositions learned from an 
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early age.180 This, indeed, is the argument abolitionists use to assert the value of 
cultivating sensibility, as Clarkson’s essay, discussed below, demonstrates. Habituation 
in violence leads to hardened hearts. If these students, who were born and raised on 
plantations in the West Indies, and whose first requests as children involved inflicting 
violence on a slave, as Bright suggests, the school’s intentions of creating a 
compassionate commercial class may not have always been successful.   
Nevertheless, such behaviour, if true, perhaps suggests a reason for the emphasis 
placed on the moral sentiments and cultivation of virtue by the Warrington community 
as a whole.  In any case, the extant documents written by members of that community, 
and those associated with it, certainly tell us of the value placed on self-improvement 
through education, sociability, and the cultivation of moral sentiments. The texts 
produced within the spaces shared by members of the Warrington community 
consistently reinforce their emotional norms. These works must thus be read as 
products of the spaces in which they were written, often collaboratively, edited and 
published. The collections of children’s stories, poetry, prose, and essays that emerged 
from the Warrington press were, as White tells us, “colored by the sympathies of its 
domestic space”. 181  The cultivation of sensibility and moral sentiments inform their 
pedagogy, their practical advice for living, and their ethical system.  
Edward Percival states of his father: “to a mind habitually disposed to cherish 
the strictest notions with regard to the rule of justice and humanity, it may readily be 
conceived, that the negro trade of Africa, and slavery in the West-Indies, would appear 
in a high degree iniquitous”.182  The Percivals, and no doubt many others who shared 
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their emotional norms, had a firm belief in the power of cultivating a disposition that 
was open to seeing the injustices around them. Those “habitually disposed” to ideas of 
justice and humanity, that is, those practised in privileging emotions such as 
benevolence and compassion, must naturally see the slave trade in its proper light: not 
as a necessary evil of a booming economy but as an immoral, unjust, and hateful crime 
against humanity. Whether such a disposition is naturally inclined to feel 
compassionately towards people other than those within one’s own community or 
nation, no less act on that compassion, is not always a given, but there is no doubt that 
the Warrington Academy aimed to produce men like Percival: active members of 
society who contributed both to the improvement of their own communities and to 
aiding those without a voice. The Warrington community as a whole, and many of its 
alumni, were heavily involved in abolitionism when it emerged as a movement in 1787.  
According to McLachlan, the tutors at Warrington were “Anti-Slavery to a man”.183 
While perhaps an exaggeration, the abolitionist activities of tutors like Joseph Priestley, 
Gilbert Wakefield, George Walker, and the Aikins, and their networks with abolitionists 
around Britain who came in and out of their social circles, attest to a strong link 
between the Warrington community and anti-slavery sentiment.184 
For many abolitionists, the spaces of learning and sociability they frequented 
were crucial both to their emotional practices and to their political engagement in 
antislavery. James Currie, a physician based in Liverpool who befriended Percival 
while both were studying in Edinburgh, writes of abolitionism: “literary societies ought 
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particularly to interest themselves in this question, which addresses itself equally to 
reason, the feelings, and the imagination”.185 He clearly sees academic spaces and 
literary and philosophical clubs and societies as sites which not only promote emotional 
cultivation but which foster a culture of social reform. His hopes are that these societies 
will “establish the first link of a long chain of triumphs, which the influence of letters 
and of truth will obtain over prejudice, ignorance, and barbarity”.186  This was 
something he did not find in his home town of Liverpool.187  For a man who had 
become “deeply versed” in the theories of David Hume during his years at Edinburgh, 
and who wrote essays on “the influence of affections [...] on the corporeal functions, 
and particularly of the passions and emotions”, Liverpool did not provide many 
opportunities of engaging in practices that suited his own emotional repertoire.188  
In Manchester, however, and in Warrington where he would often make visits, 
Currie found the spaces which were conducive to his emotional repertoire and to his 
views on slavery.  He made frequent visits to his friends based at the Warrington 
Academy with fellow Liverpudlian and abolitionist William Roscoe and was a member 
of the Literary and Philosophical Society in Manchester, the majority of whom were 
also active members of the Manchester abolition committee. The link between the 
emotional practices and norms of the spaces of self-improvement and social reform was 
clearly strong in that city, despite the interest of many inhabitants in the slave trade 
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itself.189  Roscoe was also able to provide a space in his own home in which likeminded 
men in Liverpool could engage in sociability, self-improvement, and discussions on 
political reform. His abolitionist poem, The African, was written in such a space as a 
collaborative project with Currie.190 Roscoe, whose major poetic contribution to the 
movement, The Wrongs of Africa, I discuss in chapter five, had already displayed his 
antislavery sentiments in his verse Mount Pleasant (1777), written in 1772 when he was 
nineteen. The poem is an early denunciation of slavery in the terms which became 
commonly used by abolitionists later in the century. “Torn from each joy”, the African 
slave is “by rigorous hands opprest”.191 Shame is mobilised by the writer as a feeling 
which the humane must experience when considering the “horrors” of slavery: “shame 
to BRITONS most, Who all the sweets of Liberty can boast; / Yet, deaf to every human 
claim, deny / That bliss to others” (15-18). Slavery, and the Britons who engage in it, is 
an “inhuman rage” (23) that is “deaf” to the pain of others. Those who cannot feel the 
shame of “our avarice” when consuming produce “madly purchased by a brother’s 
blood” – that is, slave-produced sugar – must, like the traders and slave-owners 
themselves, be inhuman.  
The works of writers from the formal and informal academic communities in 
Manchester, Warrington, and Liverpool reveal their concerns on a wide range of 
political and social issues, from their own exclusions from public life to the conditions 
of the poor and sick, from the rights of children and animals to those of slaves.  What 
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we see in their texts is the projection of their emotional norms onto the social injustices 
of the day, applying their optimistic belief in the malleability of human nature and its 
ability to cultivate benevolence to new political causes that fought for the rights of those 
less fortunate. Moreover, they were able to use their texts to establish networks between 
their communities and those further afield, using the “congeniality of their sentiments 
on many important subjects which affect the welfare of the human race” in order to 
push for social change.192  With the founding of the Society for the Abolition of the 
Slave Trade in 1787, and its far-reaching committee system, the political potential of 
sentimentalism began to be realised, and the texts that argued against slavery became 
political tools of mobilisation against British involvement in the slave trade. The 
emotional repertoire of the new abolition movement, evident in texts such as Thomas 
Clarkson’s academic essay, drew on a rescripted form of sentimentalism to create a 
politics of sympathy. 
2.3 Thomas Clarkson’s Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species: 
Politicising the Sentimental Ethic  
Thomas Clarkson’s account of the manner in which he became aware of the Atlantic 
slave trade is clear in terms of the influence of the academic spaces he attended. He 
states that before his time at Cambridge he “was wholly ignorant of the subject” of the 
slave trade.193 His awareness was raised in his final year when the vice-chancellor of 
Cambridge, Peter Peckard, set the question for the 1785 Latin essay prize for senior 
bachelors: “Is it lawful to make slaves of others against their will?” Peckard was known 
for his liberal views, “a warm friend” of civil and religious liberty, as Clarkson claims, 
who preached often against the slave trade in his office as master of Magdalen 
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College.194 As a student of the same college, Clarkson would have been very familiar 
with Peckard’s views and he states that, having heard him pronounce “so warmly 
against it” he chose the African slave-trade as his subject for the competition.195 
Knowing nothing about the trade, the question set by Peckard forced Clarkson to 
research and read into the facts about slavery, gained largely from asking other students 
who had personal experience of the trade and from coming across Anthony Benezet’s 
works.196 Expecting to experience pleasure by engaging “in an innocent contest for 
literary honour”, he spent restless nights in “grief” for the slaves and decided that the 
essay must be more than “a trial for academic reputation”, but a work that “might be 
useful to injured Africa”.197 
Thus, by setting a question based on his own interest in ending the slave trade, 
Peckard produced one of the most tireless activists for the abolition movement, which 
would be established barely more than a year after Clarkson won the prize.  By being 
encouraged to examine the slave trade as an academic endeavour, Clarkson states that 
he came to be “seriously affected” and “disconsolate” by what he had learned, and 
determined to translate his Latin dissertation into English as soon as he left Cambridge 
and prepare it for publication in London, thus setting the essay on its path to achieving a 
wider audience.198   Encouraged by a vice-chancellor known to be critical of the trade 
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and judged by him to be the winner of the prize, the essay was clearly created in an 
environment that was conducive to an anti-slavery perspective. His college provided 
him with a space in which he could explore his feelings about the slave trade, discuss it 
with others, and finally share his views when, as winner of the prize, he was invited to 
read the essay before the senate-house of the university.199  The arguments of the essay 
are based on sentimental ideas about benevolence and its proper cultivation which, 
when looked at against Peckard’s own abolitionist works (discussed in chapter four), 
reveal a common emotional repertoire between two men from the same community. It 
also reveals a slight adaptation of these sentimental ideas – a rescripting – as he 
politicises the moral ethic of benevolence to appeal for reform. 
Published in 1786, An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human 
Species is prefaced with an appeal “to the feelings of the benevolent reader” and an 
acknowledgement addressed to every “humane and worthy” person who had made the 
subject of the slave trade one of popular discussion in recent years.200  Benevolence and 
humanity are the main emotional drivers of anti-slavery feeling in Clarkson’s Preface, a 
twelve page addition to the original essay in which he lauds those individuals and 
groups who had shunned slavery in America, despite its economic advantages, and who 
had produced works which demonstrated the “immoral”, “cruel and disgraceful” traffic 
of slaves and the “tyranny and oppression” suffered by the “unfortunate Africans”.201 
Indeed, the terms “benevolence” or “benevolent” appear nine times in the Preface 
alone, while “humane”, “humanely” and “humanity” appear seven times. Other terms 
which highlight the sentimental ethics of the writer, and those expected in the reader, 
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are “virtue”, “piety”, “morality”, and “disinterested”. This last becomes an important 
term for abolitionists, a signal that their cause must be on the side of right because it is 
only someone who has no interest in the economic advantages of the trade that can 
speak with authority on the subject. As Clarkson states, “of all the publications in 
favour of the slave-trade[…]there is not one, which has not been written, either by a 
chaplain to the African factories, or by a merchant, or by a planter, or by a person 
whose interest has been connected in the cause which he has taken upon him to 
defend”.202 On the other hand, those “who have had as competent a knowledge of the 
subject, but not the same interest as themselves, have unanimously condemned it”.203 
Clarkson opens his essay with an argument that has its roots firmly in the moral 
sentiments: an opposition to slavery and the slave trade must arise in anyone who 
reflects on the people who have become subject to others and acknowledges that 
African slaves have “the same feelings with ourselves; […] the same propensities to 
pleasure, and the same aversions from pain”.204 For those who reflect on these things, 
an understanding is formed which is “deduced from our own feelings and that divine 
sympathy, which nature has implanted in our breasts, for the most useful and generous 
of purposes”.205 In other words, the virtuous will view the matter – when armed with 
the facts – as immoral, criminal, and unjust. This is a clear statement of his expectations 
of his audience. Clarkson is immediately demanding that his readers will react to the 
facts presented to them in the specified manner of the sentimental person of feeling.  
The “divine sympathy” which is natural to their dispositions will allow them to not only 
agree with Clarkson’s arguments, but will urge them to act on their benevolence.206 
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Sympathy is implanted in us “for the most useful and generous” purposes; benevolence 
must not only be present but useful. He is, then, asking his audience to become active 
reformers at a time when the abolition movement was yet to be formalised as a 
committee system. He is politicising the sentimental ethic of acting on one’s 
compassion. 
One of the principal methods of appealing to a person of sensibility was to use 
language which signalled to the reader or listener how they should be feeling. At 
several points in his argument Clarkson stops to remind the reader what their reaction to 
the information he supplies must be, professing that the “sighs and emotions of pity, 
[…] must now ever accompany” the perusal of the history of African slaves and that, if 
the facts were groundless, he would spare “the sigh of the reader of sensibility and 
reflection”.207  To induce such sighs Clarkson makes use of the stock of sentimental 
words and phrases used in the literature of sensibility that highlight the wretchedness 
and misery of the subject. Africans are “wretched”, “unhappy”, “unfortunate”, and 
“miserable”, and therefore entirely deserving of the compassion of the reader who, if 
truly virtuous, is sensible to the feelings they must experience.  The “sorrow” and 
“melancholy” of their loss of liberty, their inhuman treatment at the hands of plantation 
masters and managers, and the unnatural breaking of kinship and friendship bonds that 
the slave endures are all given in detail, their mental and physical sufferings 
accompanied with exclamations such as “Poor unfortunate men!” and “wretched 
slaves”.   
In the first chapter of Part III Clarkson presents part of his argument in the form 
of a short narrative in order to place the facts about the treatment of slaves “in the 
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clearest, and most conspicuous view”.208 The story he produces is a classic piece of 
sentimental narrative which asks readers to imagine they are on the coast of Africa, 
bearing witness to the chained Africans waiting to be boarded onto a slave ship set to 
depart for the colonies.209 We see them “wringing [their] hands in despair”, we hear 
their “dismal shrieks and yellings”, and we talk to a “melancholy African” watching the 
scene “whose heart, if we can judge from the appearance of his countenance, must be 
greatly agitated”.210 The audience is told to notice the African’s countenance in order to 
know what he is feeling. This witnessing of suffering, a technique of sentimental 
literature, asks the reader to use their sensibility to tune into the signals he is producing 
as an effect of his emotional experience. The African claims his own sensibility by 
stating that “the cries and yells of the unfortunate people” being loaded onto the ship 
“pierced [his] heart”, asking the European witnesses of the scene, “Have you not heard 
me sigh, while we have been talking? Do you not see the tears that now trickle down 
my cheeks?”211  His own compassion is compared to the insensibility of the slave-
drivers who are “unable to be moved at all” by the groans of the slaves.212  
This scene is produced with the intention of moving the reader to similar 
feelings.  There can be only one reaction to reading this narrative:  the treatment of 
slaves must “equally excite our pity and abhorrence”.213 If the reader is a humane, 
benevolent, and virtuous human being, naturally disposed to compassion and practised 
in being open to the feelings of others, they must oppose the conduct of their 
countrymen in Africa and the colonies and condemn those personally involved and who 
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sanction such cruelty. A passage earlier in the essay perfectly sums up how the reader 
must feel: 
We cannot sufficiently express our detestation at their conduct. 
Were the reader coolly to reflect upon the case of but one of the 
unfortunate men, who are annually the victims of avarice, and 
consider his situation in life, as a father, an husband, or a friend, 
we are sure, that even on such a partial reflection, he must 
experience considerable pain. What then must be his feelings, 
when he is told, that, since the slave-trade began nine millions of 
men have been torn from their dearest connections, and sold into 
slavery.214  
The reader must experience “considerable pain”, and that is upon reflection on the 
misery of just one slave. To help the reader along, Clarkson appeals to a personified 
“nature” who, recoiled from the horrors of slavery, applies a torch to the reader’s breast 
to kindle their resentment and indignation, and “awaken the sigh of sympathy, or 
seduce the tear of commiseration from his eye”.215 These are techniques that we see 
used in the verse of abolitionism two years later, which I discuss in chapter five. Calling 
upon a personified “nature” aids the communication of sentiments between the writer 
and reader so that the reader’s own nature can be affected by what he or she is 
witnessing. 
As well as the sigh and tear of sympathy, shame is also frequently mobilised by 
the author, as it was by many abolitionists, and communicated to the reader. References 
to shame and its physical reactions – the blush and the shudder – are frequent in the 
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essay as Clarkson pushes the point that a virtuous, benevolent person must feel ashamed 
at the actions of slave traders and owners who have abandoned any claims to decency 
and morality through their cruelty.216 However, shame is a good sign: it is a sign of a 
person of sensibility and one who is likely to act benevolently upon witnessing a scene 
of suffering. It is those who are without shame, like the slave traders and owners in 
question, who are the ones that bear the guilt. The “brutal receivers” of slaves in the 
colonies “examine and treat them with an inhumanity, at which even avarice should 
blush”.217 Their cruelty as they whip, beat, and often kill slaves bares the “inhuman 
marks of passion, despotism, and caprice”.218 Clarkson asks, “how much […] ought you 
receivers [of slaves] to blush? […] to be considered as abandoned and execrable”.219 It 
is he who is left to blush on their behalf at actions which ought to make them 
“shudder”.220  Clarkson, who is sensible to others’ pain and misery (as he hopes the 
reader is too), is able to feel both pity for the victim and the shame that ought to 
accompany the cruel actions of the perpetrators. Those who cannot do so “offend the 
dictates of nature”.221  
Shame is used, then, not so much with the aim of moving people to action, as 
their benevolent feelings should be enough to achieve this, but rather to cast aspersions 
on the character of those on the other side of the debate, particularly the merchants and 
planters directly involved in the trade. By pointing out that such actions would make 
him and “thousands of the enlightened” blush, he is setting himself and those who share 
his emotional norms apart, attempting to create an abolitionist identity based on those 
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norms.222 He is claiming that those who are on the right side of the debate – the 
abolitionists – have sensibility and the natural ability to feel for their fellow-creatures 
and act on those feelings in a charitable way by demanding an end to the slave trade. On 
the other hand, just as Shaftesbury had claimed that acts of torture and beholding 
another’s pain with pleasure are “unnatural” and “inhuman”, Clarkson asserts that those 
who do not feel for the slave “are monsters” and “out of the common course of 
nature”.223  Moreover, he makes the point that “when men once consent to be unjust, 
they lose, at the same instant with their virtue, a considerable portion of that sense of 
shame […] From that awful period[…]the heart is left unguarded[…] the 
vices[…]obtain an easy victory. […] There is nothing now too vile for them to 
meditate, too impious to perform”.224 Therefore, as with virtue and sensibility, so too 
the unnatural affections which lead men to wanton cruelty to others are practised habits 
and, for Clarkson, the ease with which a person can fall into a moral vacuum is 
evidence enough of the need to cultivate benevolence. Because, while virtue is achieved 
through constant effort, vice is the easy result of not trying hard enough to cultivate and 
practice the moral sentiments.  
So aside from motives of avarice and greed, Clarkson makes frequent mention 
of the fact that the behaviour of those involved in the trade, particularly on the 
plantations in the West Indies, is learned and practised over time. The “severity of 
masters, or managers, to their slaves, which is considered only as common discipline, is 
attended with bad effects”.225 These bad effects are an inability to feel for fellow human 
beings, hardening their hearts, and making “them insensible of the misery of their 
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fellow-creatures”: “It enables them to behold instances of cruelty without 
commiseration, and to be guilty of them without remorse”.226 Such effects can only 
beget “a turn for wanton cruelty”.227 As with the concern expressed by Warrington staff 
over students who were the sons of West Indian planters, there was a general disquiet 
among abolitionist activists about the way in which children were habituated in 
violence in the colonies. Clarkson gives an example of a boy who, on receiving six 
slaves from his father as a present, proceeds to slit their ears in order to claim them as 
his own. He states that “being trained up to scenes of cruelty from his cradle, he may, 
consistently with his own feelings, represent that treatment as mild, at which we, who 
have never been used to see them, should absolutely shudder”.228 Clarkson here is 
representing the emotional norms of colonial Britons on the plantations as other – as the 
direct opposite of his own and, he presumes, his British audience’s norms – because of 
their very different experiences and their daily encounters with torture and cruelty.  Just 
as there are emotional practices which enhance sensibility, there are practices which 
make one insensible to others’ feelings. The planters and managers who drive the slaves 
are habitually disposed to seeing the cruelties around them and are therefore practised 
in violence and oppression; “where men are habituated to a system of severity, they 
become wantonly cruel”.229  On the other hand, if the cries and groans of the Africans 
“could reach the generous Englishman at home, they would pierce his heart […] He 
would sympathize” with their distress.230  
Clarkson thus makes a clear distinction between colonial Britons and 
Englishmen “at home” who “are generous and brave”; who “support the sick, the lame, 
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and the blind”; who “fly to the succour of the distressed”; and, with reference to the 
number of charitable institutions which emerged during this century, who “have noble 
and stately buildings for the sole purpose of benevolence”.231 An Englishman, 
according to Clarkson, has a benevolent heart and acts on that benevolence by 
supporting those less fortunate through philanthropic good works, establishing hospitals 
and asylums like Percival and his friends in Manchester were accomplishing.  Such 
conviction in the supposed benevolent character of his British audience reveals the 
expectations of Clarkson as an emerging abolitionist. His confidence in the power of 
sympathy to engage people in benevolent actions is palpable across his essay and it is 
this confidence which drives him onto his political message. Encouraging the reader to 
be a true “Englishman”, making sure they sigh and weep for the subjects of his essay, 
and appealing to the active benevolence of people who he is sure share his emotional 
norms, Clarkson is persuading the public to reflect on the evils of the slave trade and 
perhaps start thinking about how things could be changed. While the essay does not 
contain a direct appeal to campaign against the slave trade, as the movement per se had 
not been formally founded until a year after its publication, its aim is clear.  
The Preface in particular hints at Clarkson’s dissatisfaction, at least, at his 
government’s hypocrisy in supporting the trade:  
I am sorry to add, […] that the reformation of an evil, and 
generally acknowledged to have long disgraced our national 
character, is yet left to the unsupported efforts of piety, morality 
and justice, against interest, violence and oppression; and these, 
I blush to acknowledge, too strongly countenanced by the 
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legislative authority of a country, the basis of whose government 
is liberty.232  
Clarkson is clearly stating his personal shame that a country which should be proud of 
its supposedly liberal ideals supports the acts of violence and oppression inherent in the 
slave trade. It is left to “unsupported efforts” to make small changes when what is 
required is a full-scale reformation of government policy. This statement points to 
Clarkson’s intentions of using his essay for a broader purpose. Its publication had a 
political function from the beginning. Clarkson, along with his publisher James Phillips, 
who was one of the group of Quakers responsible for the first petition for abolition in 
1783, spent a year distributing the essay among influential MPs, including William 
Wilberforce, in an effort to get support in parliament.  It was through the dissemination 
of his essay that he and his new Quaker friends in London recognised the extent of 
support an abolition of the trade would have, leading to the establishment in May 1787 
of the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.233 From there the essay was 
published again by the London Committee, printing and distributing over 5,000 copies 
around the country, to friends and other committees that were being established almost 
monthly, to newspaper editors, and to booksellers.234  
The essay’s continual use as a mobilising tool by Clarkson and the committee, 
republished several times over the course of their campaigns between 1787 and 1792, 
attests to their confidence in its argument and the power of the emotional appeal within 
it. According to Scheer, communicating emotions is a practice, and this is exactly what 
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Clarkson and the committee were doing. Through its wide dissemination as a 
publication aimed at drawing public support and changing public policy, they were 
communicating their emotional norms to a wide audience. In so doing, they were 
attempting to engage its readers in the practice of mobilising the moral sentiments so 
that, in time, “there can be no need, either of a single argument or a reflection; as every 
reader of sensibility will anticipate them in his own feelings”.235  Such certainty in their 
mission may have waned by the end of the century, as constant defeats of Wilberforce’s 
abolition bill in parliament set the abolition debate back, but their optimism in the 
power of their politics of sympathy is evident from the commencement of their 
campaign, beginning with Clarkson’s essay. By creating new emotional norms 
particular to the abolition movement, through a rescripting of sentimentalism, the first 
humanitarian social movement tried to create room for a politics of sympathy in the 
public sphere.  
Conclusion: 
The emotional practices within the culture of improvement emphasised the need for 
emotional cultivation. The enhancement of sensibility through practices of polite 
sociability and education were aimed at creating a society which privileged 
benevolence and compassion above other passions. Just by focusing on spaces of 
education and self-improvement we can begin to see how the emotional norms integral 
to sentimentalism were practised by many communities in eighteenth-century Britain.  
In the texts that emerged from these spaces we can see a common understanding of 
emotions and how they work, which came directly from contemporary ideas from moral 
philosophy, but also theology, natural philosophy, medicine, and literature, as will 
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become clear over the following chapters. It is an understanding that the abolition 
movement rescripted to create its own emotional repertoire. The emotional norms of the 
movement were grounded in the practical philosophy of the moral sentiments, practices 
of self-improvement and the understanding that particular emotions need cultivating 
through habituation. I am not stating that the Scottish schools of moral philosophy were 
necessarily seedbeds of antislavery sentiment just because of the system of ethics that 
they were teaching and the emotional practices that they were engaging in. While it is 
true that most of the Scottish moral philosophers wrote against slavery, it is not their 
opinions on slavery that matter.236  Rather, it is their engagement in a language of 
emotional practice that provides the crucial link between the moral philosophy of the 
early eighteenth century and the discourse the abolitionists adopted and adapted at the 
end of that century.  
Sociability was not, of course, an invention of moral sentiment philosophy. 
While the moral philosophers of the eighteenth century certainly helped to bring the 
ethics of sociability as an emotional practice into consciousness by naming sympathy as 
the central affective mode of human interaction, their philosophical discourse forms just 
one part of the process that produced sociability and social sympathy as defining 
features of improvement culture in Britain. Poovey points out that the social imaginary 
that emerged in this era was also “produced – and lived – by people at different points 
in the hierarchy of eighteenth-century British society”.237  Such practices as sociability 
which aimed to mobilise the moral sentiments “had come to seem, and therefore in a 
sense to be, natural” by the time writers like Hume were formulating their theories of 
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human nature.238 Thus philosophical theories were developed to some extent as a 
consequence of the world the moral sentiment philosophers found themselves in, the 
practices they were witness to and participated in themselves. The next chapter explores 
these practices of sociability as carried out in the spaces provided by the press, which 
can be seen as part of the complex of emotional practices which aimed to embody and 
make normative sentimentalism in eighteenth-century culture. The ways in which 
abolitionists used the same spaces to engage in their own politics of sympathy further 
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Chapter 3: Sociability and the Press: Disseminating a 
Politics of Sympathy 
 
When Joseph Addison reprised Aristotle’s maxim that “Man is […] a Sociable Animal” 
he was asserting people’s natural instinct for sociability, for “forming our selves into 
those little Nocturnal Assemblies, which are commonly known by the Name of Clubs”:  
When Men are thus knit together, by a Love of Society, not a 
Spirit of Faction, and don’t meet to censure or annoy those that 
are absent, but to enjoy one another: When they are thus 
combined for their own Improvement, or for the Good of others 
[…] by an innocent and cheerful Conversation, there may be 
something very useful in these little Institutions and 
Establishments.239   
While a good part of Spectator number 9 is taken up with making fun of the array of 
clubs that existed at the time Addison wrote his paper, he also points out an important 
use of these “little Institutions and Establishments” in his idea of a perfect society.240 
The significance of clubs and societies lay in their function as spaces in which people 
were supposed to generate that “Love of Society” which would foster social 
improvement. That “Love” was to be achieved through acts of sociability, the practices 
of which were meant to cultivate the moral sentiments and social sympathy. 
This chapter focuses on that sociability as a form of social improvement in the 
eighteenth century, specifically the ways in which it was played out in the periodical 
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and newspaper press. As we have seen, for those communities that cultivated a 
sentimental emotional repertoire, improvement relied heavily on one’s ability to 
improve the self through education and through the habitual practice of the necessary 
affections and sentiments that would lead one to live a moral and virtuous life.  Within 
this ideology, honing one’s sensibility was not meant solely for the enhancement of 
one’s own emotional repertoire but also to cultivate the capacity to sympathise with 
others, thus enabling the practice of polite conversation.  Many of the sociable 
gatherings in coffee houses and clubs were aimed at mobilising the moral sentiments 
not just for the self-cultivation of the individual but for the improvement of society at 
large, to generate among the population that “Love of Society” that Addison 
prescribed.241 The types of sociability that emerged in eighteenth-century Britain 
therefore reflected the dominance of sentimentalism for the communities that practised 
forms of improvement, from sociable gatherings to intellectual circles, and from 
philanthropic societies to reform institutions.   
The first section of this chapter centres on the role of the early periodical press 
in engendering practices of sociability, and the emotional ethics behind its practice, 
among its community of readers. For many scholars the press is the primary instrument 
of the new public sphere, helping to legitimise the codes of politeness and emotional 
cultivation that were deemed necessary to the process of improvement. 242 The public 
sphere, as Poovey points out, “was partly constructed by the shared understandings and 
images of itself that were generated through print and conversation, and partly by the 
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institutions that enabled these ideas about politeness to circulate and acquire social 
prestige”.243  Within Scheer’s theory, such mechanisms that inform a group or 
community of what is “proper” or “appropriate” in different spaces, like the press,  are 
crucial to the acquisition of emotional norms for that group.244 The acquisition of a 
normative emotional repertoire for a community occurs through a process of both “tacit 
socialisation as well as explicit instruction”.245  The early periodical press in Britain did 
both by supplying the images of politeness and conversational exchange central to 
notions of social sympathy to a broad public.  Men like Joseph Addison and Richard 
Steele, whose Tatler (1709-11) and Spectator (1711-14) papers had a wide influence 
across Europe, created periodicals that contained explicit instruction on how to conduct 
oneself emotionally in public and private in order to create social harmony and live a 
virtuous, benevolent life.246 At the same time, the manner in which the papers were 
produced and read offered people the opportunity to implicitly engage in the emotional 
norms of sociability simply by reading them. 
The aim of exploring these practices as carried out in the press is to demonstrate 
that the emotional repertoire of the abolition movement was adopted and adapted from 
a variety of already existing emotional norms which were being developed and 
practised by a multiplicity of communities over the course of the eighteenth century. In 
the second part of this chapter, I examine the beginnings of this rescripting in some of 
the antislavery newspaper correspondence which appeared in 1772. This 
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correspondence, which emerged in response to the widely reported legal trial between 
James Somerset, an escaped slave, and his former master, marks the beginning of 
popular antislavery agitation in the press. The arguments contained within the space of 
these letters use the language of sentimental humanitarianism. While their arguments 
are not political in the sense that they were not written in order to agitate for a specific 
movement, their use of the idea of a humanity based on fellow feeling and universal 
benevolence both carries on the tradition of the early periodicals and looks forward to 
the abolition campaigns of the 1780s.  
In the final section, I turn to that campaign and focus on the debate between 
abolitionists and supporters of slavery carried out within the pages of the London 
newspapers in 1788, the first full year of the campaign. I have limited my research, for 
both 1772 and 1788, to a select number of papers based in London for the main reason 
that these letters are often in reply to each other, or addressed and in response to 
political figures and events based in the capital. However, their arguments are by no 
means restricted to the papers I have chosen and similar correspondence can be found in 
newspapers from all around Britain in the same year. The sheer number and geographic 
diversity of newspapers that contain abolitionist opinions, and which express the same 
emotional norms, is an indication of a common abolitionist emotional repertoire. The 
use of newspapers as tools of both sociability and social reform demonstrates the way in 
which sentimentalism was rescripted within the abolitionist community into a 
politically driven set of emotional norms. The letters I explore here express a politics of 
sympathy, which focuses on compassion as an active sentiment and which creates a 
dichotomy between the feeling humanity of the abolitionist and the unfeeling 
inhumanity of the slaver. The sociability provided by the space of the newspaper can 
thus be seen to offer activists the opportunity to shape and practise the emotional 
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repertoire of the abolitionist community as well as set those apart who did not conform 
to their idea of a benevolent and virtuous society. 
3.1 Social Sympathy and the Periodical Press: Establishing “Rules of Practice” 
Any act of sociability is a practice, sought out and enacted as part of our daily habits. 
As an emotional practice it is an act which passively engages any number of emotions 
as people interact with others, whether family, friends, colleagues, or casual 
acquaintances. In a more active sense, it is also an act which is specifically sought out 
to mobilise those emotions that are central to the emotional norms of the group 
participating in it. For many communities in the eighteenth century sociability was a 
central practice to the mobilisation and regulation of those affections and feelings that 
were privileged as part of the moral sentiments. Being sociable, and practising 
sociability, was key to both one’s personal morality and the harmony of society in 
general, both at a local and national level, because it was dependent upon the proper 
communication of appropriate sentiments through channels of social sympathy.247  I 
talked of sociability in chapter two as a mobilising emotional practice for the cultivation 
of sentiments in the individual. Sociability, however, was not just about self-
improvement. Here, I focus on sociability as a practice of social improvement, as an 
imperative for the harmonious working of society.  
Scheer argues that emotional practices are learned, which means that feelings 
are transferred between people, not just intergenerationally from parents to children, but 
also through socialising processes between adults.248 Engaging in acts of sociability in 
the eighteenth century was not only about mobilising appropriate emotions but 
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regulating and managing them within specific spaces and communities. The 
management and regulation of emotions is a crucial element of practice theory. It 
explains how groups, communities, and whole societies acquire normative emotional 
standards which privilege some emotions while suppressing others. The emotional 
repertoire that the practice of sociability sought to produce and manage, as we have 
seen, was based on sensibility and the calm affections that would help one get along 
with others in the new spaces of public association that were emerging at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century.  It was a repertoire that depended on the workings of social 
sympathy between people and therefore on being sociable. 
The coffeehouse, the club, and the philosophical, scientific and literary society 
represented for many the new conviviality of eighteenth-century society and the mutual 
benevolence with which people were meant to interact in public spaces. The aim, 
according to Borsay, was to downplay conflict, particularly of the religious and political 
kind, in public life.249 For Borsay a great deal of civic investment took place in driving 
people into company with each other, an encouragement which was usually governed 
by the regulation of the passions and ordered by codes of polite conversation.250 Social 
harmony and improvement were to be realised through politeness and manners in public 
spaces; through a way of conducting oneself so as to reduce the possibility of friction in 
social intercourse.251 Thus Addison’s “Love of Society” was to be achieved through 
“innocent and cheerful Conversation” which left the “Spirit of Faction” outside the door 
of polite public sociability. The art of conversation was crucial to eighteenth-century 
practices of sociability, its uses becoming a key issue for inquiries into social sympathy 
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and the unity of the society many were hoping to build at the beginning of the century. 
As Mee points out, conversation in the polite spaces in which sociability was carried 
out did not just happen; “it was scrutinized, policed, promoted, written about, 
discussed,” and actively practised.252  George Drummond’s essay on the Rules of 
Conversation (1740), for example, emphasises the need for sympathetic contact with 
others.253  In order to thrive in the “conversable world” individuals needed to engage a 
number of emotional practices to control their passions, abide by rules of civility and 
render themselves agreeable to others to avoid conflict.254    
Many attribute the move to establish politeness and conversability in spaces of 
public sociability to the ascendency of the Whigs and their project of consolidating the 
values of progress and improvement won in 1688.255 As Bowers points out, writers who 
advocated social manners and politeness in conversation, such as Shaftsbury, Addison, 
and Steele, often betrayed a Whig agenda despite supposedly eschewing politics in their 
works on principle.256 For Bowers, Shaftesbury, whose moral philosophy may well 
have been founded on his upbringing within a strong Whig family, “sought to 
consolidate the post-1688 Whig regime by establishing a gentlemanly mode of political 
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rule founded on the principles of sociability and politeness”.257 In Shaftesbury’s view, if 
virtue is connected to our social nature, then our practices of association, modes of 
communication, and spaces in which we socialise become central ethical concerns.  The 
new institutions set up for the practice of sociability can thus be seen to have developed 
to “enable gentlemen to assert their liberty, cultivate virtue, and interact peacefully so 
that they could govern effectively as a group”.258  The success of Whigs in establishing 
their values as dominant norms within society “hinged on developing not only new 
institutions, but also new communicative procedures and norms of behavior that would 
substitute a culture of politeness for the authoritarian sociocultural system of the old 
regime”.259 Many would argue that this was achieved, the move away from civil strife 
proof of the success of the Whig modernising mission.  
However, as Clark points out, it would be a mistake to consider the practice of 
polite sociability “as an inevitable development – simply the sociable face of the Whig 
oligarchic ascendency”.260 Tories had their clubs and societies too and took as great a 
part in the polite sociability advocated by prominent Whigs like Shaftesbury. With the 
resurgence of party conflict between the Tories and Whigs, organised political clubs 
were a major feature of the political landscape, especially in London.261 It would also be 
a mistake to consider British society at this time as one of overflowing social sympathy 
between fellow men. Public life still had its conflicts and controversies, riots and public 
disorder, religious intolerance, and a press that often encouraged violent acts.  As Mee 
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states, “intolerance and exclusion – supported by the coercive power of the law and the 
military – were part of the day-to-day life of this modern commercial society”.262  It is 
for this reason that many societies chose to ban politics as a topic of conversation. As 
Clark suggests, in a period when party faction was liable to spill over at any given 
moment and threaten to disrupt civic unity, either a ban on political discussion or a 
restriction on membership according to political allegiance may have been the most 
effective methods of ensuring harmonious conduct within a society or club.263 We 
cannot say whether such bans and restrictions were successful; party faction was strong 
and political tensions and conflicts continued to occur throughout the century. Yet, at 
the same time, the very attempt to conduct sociability without political argument 
causing rifts among members of a society suggests that the will to put aside political 
differences in an effort to improve society was there. Indeed, one of the key features of 
the abolition movement was the ease with which people from diverse political, social, 
and religious backgrounds put aside loyalties and differences (to a certain extent) in 
order to push for reform of the slave trade.  
Thus, while not always possible, most clubs and societies were established to at 
least encourage “mutual consideration” and “fellow-feeling”.264 Against the turbulent 
background that party political conflict produced, along with continued exclusion of 
non-Anglican religious communities from public life, the wish to create public spaces 
that fostered social sympathy is not an unreasonable one. Klein sees the use of 
politeness in clubs and societies as an attempt to establish “a norm in a world of often 
wild and incoherent sociabilities”.265 In the politeness paradigm, the key values of 
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“moderation, mutual tolerance, and social comity” which were practised in spaces of 
sociability “concretized […] the high esteem for conversation and conversability” for 
large sections of the British population in the eighteenth century.266 The point of 
establishing such norms was the improvement of the world around them. As Barker-
Benfield points out, the culture of sensibility and sentimentalism that came to dominate 
the emotional norms of British society in the eighteenth century was also a culture of 
reform, and it was the possibility of reform that gave sociability much of its drive as an 
emotional practice. 267   Whether we attribute it to progressivist Whig ideology or to a 
general shift away from the pre-modern era that involved people putting politics aside 
(if only nominally) within certain spaces, the practice of improving or reforming 
sociability became a dominant feature of eighteenth-century society and culture.  
Many scholars have pointed out that the pamphlets and periodicals of the 
popular press, in particular those produced by Richard Steele and Joseph Addison, were 
distinctive for the way in which they elaborated polite sociability through their very 
existence.268 It has been shown how, within their periodicals, Addison and Steele 
encouraged politeness in order to modify norms of gentlemanly behaviour, “from a 
primarily courtly and aristocratic code, given to the display of power and wealth, to a 
more bourgeois, commercial, and feminised code, given to the display of benevolence, 
and sensibility”.269 Both the periodicals’ subject matter and the way in which they were 
                                                          
266 Ibid. 
267 Barker-Benfield, Culture of Sensibility. 
268 See Richmond P. Bond, The Tatler: The Making of a Literary Journal, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971); Terry Eagleton, The Function of Criticism: From The Spectator to Post-
Structuralism, (London: Verso, 1984); Stephen Copley, “Commerce, Conversation, and Politeness in the 
Early Eighteenth-Century Periodical”, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 18, (March 1995): 
63-77, doi: 10.1111/j.1754-0208.1995.tb00182.x ; Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite, eds., Romantic 
Sociability: Social Networks and Literary Culture in Britain, 1770-1840, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
269 Ellis, Politics of Sensibility, 188 (see chap. 1,n. 12). See also Andrew Lincoln, “War and the Culture 
of Politeness: The Case of The Tatler and The Spectator”, Eighteenth-Century Life 36, no.2 (2012): 60-
79, doi: 10.1215/00982601-1548036. 
91 
 
written, distributed, and read, highlight the close relationship between spaces and the 
practices carried out within them. Spaces are social products and, as Broomhall 
suggests, the spaces used for sociability in the eighteenth century, whether physical or 
textual, reflected “contemporary understandings and experiences of social relations and 
identities”270.  Spaces are thus shaped by the emotional practices of the individuals and 
communities using them. At the same time, practices are also developed, shaped and 
made normative as a consequence of the space in which they are carried out. Addison 
and Steele created their papers in response to the spaces they found themselves in and 
in which they themselves socialised with others. But they also, in turn, shaped and 
helped to normalise, through their productions, the very practices they were engaged in 
and which continued to be practised over the course of the century. 
Written from the coffee-houses in which their creators reported on the sociable 
world they saw, heard, and took part in, Steele’s Tatler (1709-11) and Addison and 
Steele’s co-produced Spectator (1711-12, 1714), were composed literally of papers that 
were circulated within the actual sites of sociability frequented by these men. Within 
their papers they reproduced sociability by using a loose, conversational style, bringing 
the reader into the exchange. Steele’s pseudonym of “Isaac Bickerstaff” in his Tatler 
papers presented the news and gossip he and his “reporters” allegedly overheard in 
some of the most popular coffeehouses across London. The Spectator, more or less the 
continuation of The Tatler with the additional input of Joseph Addison, was likewise 
created to re-enact sociability in print. The character of the “Spectator” claimed to 
record the conversations of a “society of gentlemen” overheard in his coffeehouse, a 
“Looker-on” to the conversations carried on around him. He remains removed from the 
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action and is thus better able to report “without ever medling” and “to observe an exact 
Neutrality between the Whigs and Tories, unless I shall be forc'd to declare myself by 
the Hostilities of either side”.271  
The journalism of Addison and Steele was a conscious attempt to elaborate 
polite conversation as the prime mode of human interaction. Through characters which 
represent the different strands of both urban and rural social life, the papers present 
social sympathy as a bonding force that enables society to get on with the daily 
transactions of civic and commercial life in relative harmony, without the dangerous 
passions flaring up between religious or political factions. After all, too much “Party 
Spirit”, according to Mr. Spectator, “fills the Nation with Spleen and Rancour, and 
extinguishes all the Seeds of Good-Nature, Compassion and Humanity”.272 Referencing 
the violence and bloodshed of the Civil War of the previous century which arose out of 
a “Spirit of Division”, Addison reports that it is “with a real Grief of Heart, that the 
Minds of many good Men among us appear sowered with Party-Principles, and 
alienated from one another in such a manner, as seems to me altogether inconsistent 
with the Dictates either of Reason or Religion”.273 Thus the periodicals of Addison and 
Steele enjoin their readers to avoid the party politics that divide society and ask that 
people no “longer regard our Fellow Subjects as Whigs or Tories, but should make the 
Man of Merit our Friend, and the Villain our Enemy”.274 
Creating men and women of merit was thus the professed mission of both The 
Tatler and The Spectator in order to improve society’s morals, manners and taste; “to 
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expose the false arts of life, to pull off the disguises of cunning, vanity, and affectation, 
and recommend a general simplicity in our dress, our discourse, and our behaviour” by 
“setting forth the Excellence of Virtue and Knowledge”.275  Benevolence occupies a 
central role in this effort to improve society. For Steele, people in positions of authority 
have a duty of care towards those under their power and it is the benevolence shown 
towards those less fortunate which marks the virtuous gentleman from those “savages, 
that know no Use of Property but to be Tyrants; or Liberty, but to be unmannerly”. 276 
Steele’s perfect landlord is a man whose benevolence distinguishes his superiority: 
“Benevolence, civility, social and human virtues” are “the accomplishments of a 
landlord”.277  As Rumbold points out, this is a figure whose authority over others is 
justified by his care for others.278   
Addison’s Mr. Spectator also identifies the moral sentiments as central to his 
reform program, highlighting the need for mutual compassion in society and for the 
cultivating of “Good-nature”:  
Half the Misery of Human Life might be extinguished, would 
Men alleviate the general Curse they lie under, by mutual 
Offices of Compassion, Benevolence, and Humanity. There is 
nothing therefore which we ought more to encourage in our 
selves and others, than that Disposition of Mind which in our 
Language goes under the Title of Good-nature.279 
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Like Shaftesbury, Addison supports the idea that such sentiments are natural to human 
beings, yet also need to be cultivated through practice:  “Good-nature is generally born 
with us” but “Education may improve” it.280  The Tatler and Spectator papers were 
offering such an education to their community of readers, one which was based on good 
sense, virtue, religion, and the moral sentiments, and which was intended to promote 
civility, sociability, and charity to the deserving.281 As Newman points out, their papers 
were a practical guide for living in eighteenth-century Britain, providing people “with 
rules for conducting themselves properly – with due attention to social decorum and a 
sensitivity to the feelings of others – in virtually every imaginable personal encounter, 
from the drawing room to the stagecoach”.282  
As such, The Spectator and Tatler acted as tools of the emotional practices 
which they were advocating. In other words, they were texts which were specifically 
used as guides and stimulants of the emotional practice of sociability. The 
communication of emotions and emotional norms is a crucial emotional practice.283 The 
use of media, in this case the printed page, helps to transmit emotions from one person, 
or one community, to another. The way in which the papers of The Tatler and The 
Spectator were used by those who subscribed to them indicates the importance of 
having tools which assist in the habituation of emotions within a community. These 
papers were purchased and read, often aloud to the company, inside coffeehouses, the 
very spaces in which they were created. Moreover, the papers often provided space for 
reader’s contributions and input to those conversations, creating an informal club or 
society within the space of the printed page, as well as within the physical space around 
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them.284  The issues for discussion and moral tales contained in the papers, supposedly 
gleaned from conversations within the coffeehouse, became, in turn, the subjects of 
debate among the patrons of that and other coffeehouses. This circular re-production of 
sociability and exchange – the middle classes holding up a mirror to themselves, as 
Habermas termed it – was aimed at making the practice normative to its community of 
readers over time.285 
The extent to which this occurred may be judged by the popularity of the papers 
and the way in which they were used by readers. Steele published his Tatler “every 
Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, in the Week, for the Convenience of the Post,” 
thereby strategically making use of the postal system in order to facilitate a regional 
readership.286 Clubs and societies in regional towns were thus able to make use of the 
papers in their own spaces of sociability. From the very beginning of their run, various 
clubs around Britain subscribed. One example is that of the Spalding Gentlemen’s 
Society in Lincolnshire, whose founder Maurice Johnson recorded its uses for the 
papers: 
These papers [The Tatler] being universally approved, as both 
instructive and entertaining, they ordered them to be sent down 
thither […] and they were accordingly had and read there 
ever[y] post-day, generally aloud to the company, who would sit 
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and talk over the subject afterwards. This insensibly drew the 
men of sense and letters into a sociable way of conversing.287 
The Tatler papers were a tool of the emotional practice of the Society in Spalding, a 
starting point for their sociable conversation as well as a method of improving 
themselves as individuals and as a community. Johnson states here that the use of the 
papers “insensibly” drew the men gathered there into conversation, but this belies the 
active efforts of the men to engage in the practice. This was no casual gathering in a 
coffeehouse but a strategic effort to put sociability into practice.288  
In addition to subscriptions to the papers themselves, Addison and Steele’s 
periodicals were republished in sets of volumes almost as soon as publication of The 
Spectator ended in 1712. Cheap editions of the volumes meant that both periodicals had 
an extended life and increasingly wide circulation beyond their initial runs right through 
into the nineteenth century.289  A sub-genre in which the original periodical papers were 
abbreviated, adapted or repackaged also emerged along with regularly released editions 
of Addison and Steele’s other works.290 The continual reproduction of their papers 
helped guarantee its use as a tool of emotional practice over the course of the century. 
As Bowers points out, when people purchased the books, they were not simply buying 
works of moral instruction or entertainment; they were also buying into a cultural 
system which was organised around a particular set of social institutions, practices, and 
norms.291 As a tool of practice, a copy of the periodicals allowed people to effectively 
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operate within that system while also acting as proof of the endorsement of that system 
over a long period of time.292 
Such endorsement was so widespread that these editions were not just used as 
conversation starters in gentlemen’s clubs but also as educational matter in academic 
spaces, including the Dissenting schools in the north of England like the Warrington 
Academy. In her own edition of the papers published in 1804, Anna Laetitia Barbauld 
states that “no books were so popular, particularly with the female sex [...] From the 
papers of Addison we imbibed our first relish for wit; from his criticisms we formed our 
first standard of taste; and from his delineations we drew our first ideas of manners”.293  
Clearly, for Barbauld, the periodicals of Addison and Steele were foundational texts 
which intervened in the culture of British society at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century to help construct new cultural and emotional norms, so much so that she 
considered it “probably the very first [book] that, after the Bible, [a young lady] would 
have thought of purchasing”.294 Elizabeth Montagu, the centre of the bluestocking 
circle, perhaps agreed as she is known to have copied out the entire Spectator for her 
own edification as a young girl. Moreover, the attraction to the periodicals remained 
strong for many years, as Hester Piozzi, a member of Montagu’s circle, attests in her 
diary in the 1790s, stating that she was still turning to Addison’s works “for mental 
Food”.295   
As a point of reference on taste, manners, and improvement, it seems the 
periodicals of Addison and Steele attracted women as much as men and in this point 
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their papers can be seen to have furthered the emotional norms and practices within 
them to spaces well beyond the closed and restricted membership of coffeehouse clubs. 
Men and women were the targets of the improving program of Addison and Steele, and 
their papers were as much directed towards a female readership as a male one. Steele’s 
Bickerstaff declares in his first Tatler paper that “I resolve also to have something which 
may be of Entertainment to the Fair Sex, in Honour of whom I have invented the Title 
of this Paper”.296 Mr. Spectator likewise states that:  
there are none to whom this Paper will be more useful, than the 
female World. I have often thought there has not been sufficient 
Pains taken in finding out proper Employments and Diversions 
for the Fair ones. Their Amusements seem contrived for them 
rather as they are Women, than as they are reasonable 
Creatures.297  
In this vein he promises to “always endeavour to make an innocent if not an improving 
Entertainment” of his work.298 Some have argued that this form of “improving” 
translated into a scheme for domesticating women during this century, restricting their 
activities to the private domestic sphere.299  Steele’s declaration that he will “lead the 
young through all the becoming Duties of Virginity, Marriage, and Widowhood” 
certainly suggests that female domestic duties were of utmost importance in the 
improving scheme of the periodicals and his hope that “among reasonable Women this 
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Paper may furnish Tea-Table Talk” gives a hint at the type of spaces in which females 
were meant to conduct their sociability.300 
However, it can also be said that Addison and Steele were broadening the scope 
of polite sociability beyond the traditional public sphere of male-centric coffeehouses 
and clubs. The periodicals were as much critical of coffeehouse culture as they were 
approving of it, often making fun of the ridiculous or immoral nature of many of the 
existing clubs at the time. 301 As Klein points out, according to the periodicals, “when 
clubbability malfunctioned, it became a cover for human vapidity and even 
malevolence: clubs narrowed as well as broadened horizons”.302 Mackie argues that in 
their critique of traditional coffeehouse culture Addison and Steele were trying to 
present an alternative realm of polite sociability, enlarging the public sphere itself to 
include spaces “that stood at a critical distance outside any actual coffeehouses, 
periodicals, or town talk”.303  In Spectator 10, Addison states, “I shall be ambitious to 
have it said of me, that I have brought Philosophy out of Closets and Libraries, Schools 
and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, at Tea-tables, and in Coffee-
houses”.304  Not only is Addison staking his claim as a social improver by claiming his 
papers as facilitators of conversation and education in spaces not traditionally 
associated with education and “Philosophy”, he is also hinting at the appropriate spaces 
for practising polite sociability. The tea-table, located within the private space of the 
home, and presided over predominantly by women, was considered just as important to 
                                                          
300 Steele, Spectator, no. 4, 5 March 1711. 
301 See Addison, Spectator, no.9, 10 March 1711.  
302 Klein, “Figure of France”, 34. 
303 Erin Skye Mackie, “Being Too Positive About the Public Sphere”, in Newman, Emerging Discourses, 
82. 
304 Addison, Spectator, no. 10, 12 March 1711. 
100 
 
the practice of sociability, with its focus on emotional and moral cultivation, as the 
public domain of the coffee-house and the gentlemen’s club.  
Over the course of the century, as the practice of sociability grew to incorporate 
a wider range of communities across a wider range of spaces, the emotional practices 
taking place within these spaces became increasingly difficult to define as either class- 
or gender-centric. As Rumbold points out, many societies aspired to a sociability that 
was more compatible with the new forms of polite mixed society, unlike the hard 
drinking, whoring, and politically factious societies caricatured as immoral in The 
Tatler and Spectator.305  Spaces of mixed membership occurred more frequently than 
we might think from our standpoint three hundred years later. Literary societies and 
circles, of which both men and women were members, and which attracted intellectuals 
from both the nobility and middle classes, often gathered in the homes of central 
figures, the drawing room acting as both a private and public space of sociability. 
Examples of literary and philosophical societies meeting in private spaces, the most 
famous of which was probably that of Lady Elizabeth Montagu, can be found all across 
Britain from the middle of the century. 306 Such spaces were not exclusively male or 
female, but they were often, as Richardson points out, “female-managed” and offered 
the women hosting them an opportunity to exercise influence over their guests and 
participate in intellectual, and sometimes political, debate.307  
Many saw the company of women as a sign of Britain’s progress into civility 
and improvement. Hume, for instance, compares the “barbarous nations” of the world, 
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where polygamy is practised and women are reduced to “abject slavery”, to the 
“civility” and “respect” that women “among a polite people” enjoy.308  Women are held 
up by Hume as prime examples of manners and virtue, and are therefore welcome 
additions to spaces of sociability as agents of improvement: “what better school for 
manners, than the company of virtuous women; where the mutual endeavour to please 
must insensibly polish the mind”.309  As Mee states, “feminized domestic virtues were 
an important part of the configuration of conversation in The Tatler and Spectator” as 
well.310 The aim of Addison and Steele to improve and cultivate women’s sensibilities 
and virtue as well as men’s was a crucial element in their scheme of social 
improvement, establishing the domestic circle as an essential “laboratory of character 
formation”.311 Women, whose sensibilities were supposedly naturally more acute, were 
given moral authority in the private sphere and their influence would “melt” and 
“soothe” the violent passions in men, making them more “agreeable”.312  
The development of polite sociability was thus as much about an injection of 
feminine emotional norms into public spaces as an actual broadening of the public 
sphere.  There was an integral connection between the intimate space of the family 
home and the practice of sociability in the public sphere. As White puts it, “eighteenth-
century culture projected sensibility, the essence of humanity inherent in idealized 
familial relationships, out from the home as a civilizing force of sympathy that would 
bind together otherwise unconnected individuals”.313 For the proponents of a sociability 
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based on natural affections and sympathy, the aim was to inject the values and 
emotional norms of the private, domestic sphere into the public sphere of society at 
large.314 The periodicals of Addison and Steele were particularly important in 
elaborating this movement of norms from the private to the public. As Rumbold states, 
“The Tatler presented a pervasive revaluation of social and family relationships, not as 
dull and oppressive alternatives to the glamor of unfettered appetite, but as attractive 
opportunities”.315 Bickerstaff presents family life as one of mutual appreciation and 
compassion, emotional norms that are to be carried through into social life and public 
spaces.316 Mr. Spectator’s recommendation of his own “Speculations to all well-
regulated Families that set apart an Hour in every Morning for Tea and Bread and 
Butter”,  highlights the author’s hopes that his papers will be a central tool of the 
practice of sociability within families and a model of improvement through his 
advocacy of social sympathy and compassion.317 It is “for their Good” that he “would 
earnestly advise them […] to order this Paper to be punctually served up, and to be 
looked upon as a Part of the Tea Equipage”.318 
An example of the compassion Mr. Spectator is trying to exemplify comes out 
in Spectator 11 in his relation of a story that would become popular during the abolition 
campaign later in the century.319 In a piece written by Steele, the narrator hears from a 
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woman of “good Sense” the tale of “Inkle and Yarico”, the supposedly true story of an 
English trader shipwrecked in the West Indies who seduces an “Indian maid” and then 
betrays her when offered the chance to recover his financial losses by selling her into 
slavery:  
Mr. Thomas Inkle, now coming into English Territories, began 
seriously to reflect upon his loss of Time, and to weigh with 
himself how many Days Interest of his Mony he had lost during 
his Stay with Yarico. […] Upon which Considerations, the 
prudent and frugal young Man sold Yarico to a Barbadian 
Merchant; notwithstanding that the poor Girl, to incline him to 
commiserate her Condition, told him that she was with Child by 
him: But he only made use of that Information, to rise in his 
Demands upon the Purchaser. 320   
The young man may be “prudent” and “frugal” in his decision to sell Yarico but these 
are not commendable qualities in the situation being related. At a point he should relent 
in his scheme and “commiserate” with the girl’s condition, he is only made even more 
greedy in his demands for her price. Steele is clearly presenting the story as a moral 
tale, not one that necessarily warns against greed but which nonetheless casts the 
character of the Englishman into question. Steele frames it in such a way as to give the 
reader no doubt as to the appropriate reaction to such a piece. When the story is 
finished, Mr. Spectator says that “I was so touch'd with this Story […] that I left the 
Room with Tears in my Eyes”.321  Here is a clear example of Mr. Spectator, or Steele, 
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producing a paper which not only reflects the emotional norms of the polite society of 
which he is a member, but in which he also gives a clue to his readership on how to 
practise those norms. Compassion is felt on hearing the sad case of Yarico and his tears 
are the physical embodiment of that sentiment. As I discuss in chapter five, reading a 
text for its emotional content and its ability to communicate sentiments through somatic 
language became central tenets of sentimental literature in this century. 
This is one of the earliest uses of the Inkle and Yarico story as a tool of 
emotional practice. It puts emphasis on the unfeeling nature of the greedy merchants 
and traders in the colonies while it urges a feeling, somatic response from the reader. 
While it is not an abolitionist piece, it provided a model for its community of readers – 
who, as we have seen, existed well beyond the lifetime of its authors – of the emotional 
response required on being presented with such a story. Examples of Mr. Spectator’s 
discourses on benevolence and compassion run throughout the 635 papers of Steele and 
Addison’s periodical, not to mention those of The Tatler and their other works.322 
Through these papers the authors “seek to make people not only morally better but also 
civically functional by instilling within them the proper temperament of fellowship 
needed for participation” in society.323 For Addison and Steele, “doing Good” to others 
is “the Exercise of the noblest Power”; their idea of the virtuous person is abundantly 
clear: “mild, good, and benevolent, full of a generous Regard for the publick Prosperity, 
compassionating each other's Distresses, and relieving each other's Wants”.324 
The commitment of Addison and Steele to such principles had remarkable 
influence on social and emotional practices for many communities in the eighteenth 
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century. Some scholars have argued that their papers were largely “significant in 
attesting to the importance of sociability as a fact in eighteenth-century public culture, 
and in producing this sociability as a value”.325  As vehicles of polite conversation, 
Addison and Steele’s periodicals “popularised the philosophical ideals of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, self-consciously promulgating sociability as a virtue” and enacting in 
print the ideals of polite and sociable interchange based on mutual sympathy and 
affections.326  At the same time, the polite sociability advocated and reproduced in 
papers like The Tatler and Spectator was only normative to specific kinds of people and 
consisted of very controlled emotional practices within tightly held spaces in terms of 
who could take part in them.  As Broomhall states, “implicit in the rules of these 
communities or styles are acceptable forms of emotional control and expression for the 
particular individuals who are their adherents”.327 Spaces of polite sociability could thus 
be very exclusive of people who did not conform to the emotional repertoire practised 
within those spaces.328 Standards of sociability were often used, as Rumbold points out, 
to condemn those who were represented as other, often “an unsocialized anomaly 
within the lower orders, dangerously exempt from the expectations imposed by a 
hierarchically ordered community”.329 In the antislavery and abolitionist arguments 
which adopted notions of social sympathy, this other took the form of the proslavery 
opposition. 
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Other fields of inquiry and discourses were also working towards the same goals 
as the periodicals of Addison and Steele. As Mee points out, the numerous examples of 
conduct and advice manuals available at the time “should correct any idea that Joseph 
Addison and Sir Richard Steele somehow invented the discourse of politeness”.330  
Nevertheless, The Tatler and The Spectator did have a significant impact and influence 
on generations of readers throughout the century as tools of their emotional practice. In 
Mr. Spectator’s own words, so that “Virtue and Discretion may not be short transient 
intermitting Starts of Thought, I have resolved to refresh their Memories from Day to 
Day”, because “The Mind that lies fallow but a single Day, sprouts up in Follies that are 
only to be killed by a constant and assiduous Culture.”331 His use of “Culture” here is in 
the sense also used by Hutcheson in 1755, that is, the habitual self-cultivation necessary 
for social improvement. Addison is explicitly staking his claim for his papers to be used 
as a tool of practice as, indeed, Samuel Johnson declared them to be in 1776: “it has 
now for more than half a century supplied the English nation with [...] rules of 
practice”.332  Addison and Steele’s program for social improvement through emotional 
practices was consistent and clear, and when we look at the activities and emotional 
norms displayed by many members of the abolitionist community at the end of the 
century, we can see the same values repeated and rescripted in order to drive their own 
reform agenda.  
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3.2 “Callous to Every Humane Feeling”: Antislavery Sentiment during the 
Somerset Trial 
The improving program carried out in the newspapers and periodicals of the press 
opened up the space, both literally and metaphorically, for the coupling of the idea of an 
emotions-based social reform with new political agendas that emerged towards the end 
of the century. Through stories like Steele’s Inkle and Yarico and other reports from 
Africa and the West Indies published in newspapers and in pamphlet form, the British 
public were becoming increasingly aware of the conditions on slave plantations and the 
mode in which the slave trade was carried out. The emotional response expected of 
Steele’s readers to his tale of European greed at the cost of African lives was clear and, 
with depictions of slave suffering becoming increasingly available through the press, 
the linking of a humane and morally virtuous sensibility with an antislavery stance 
started to emerge by the second half of the century. Pamphlet writers and newspaper 
correspondents began to question the validity of slavery in terms of the emotional effect 
it had on victims, on perpetrators, and on themselves as witnesses to the crimes. For the 
most part these were more or less sporadic efforts to gain a public ear. However, in the 
1770s, one particular story was picked up by the newspapers which opened up the 
debate around the question of the inherent inhumanity of the institutions of slavery and 
the slave trade. While this debate did not have the clear sentimental or political agenda 
as the one conducted almost two decades later during the abolition campaign, an early 
link between antislavery and “humane” feelings is evident in the reportage and 
correspondence of newspapers which covered the story. 
The story in question was the legal trial between James Somerset, an African 
slave, and his former owner, Charles Stewart. After coming to England with his master 
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in 1769, Somerset escaped and sought the help of Granville Sharp who had been 
making a name for himself by helping slaves pursue their owners through the courts.333 
In 1771 he intervened in Somerset’s recapture by obtaining a writ of habeas corpus, 
allowing for a trial to establish whether Somerset was a free man. After six hearings 
over the course of seven months Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, ruled on June 22, 1772, 
that there was no authority under English law to take a slave out of the country by force 
and Somerset was discharged. Many interpreted the ruling as an acknowledgment that 
English law did not allow for slavery and that, once a slave set foot on English soil, he 
or she was free.334 However, as Carey states, while Mansfield’s decision empowered 
slaves in England to emancipate themselves by running away, he did not actually rule 
that slavery was illegal.335 Nevertheless, in the debates that were carried out in the 
pages of the press around the case, we can see a burgeoning antislavery identity being 
expressed which founded its arguments on a capacity for feeling while positioning its 
opposition as an inhumane other.  
As I noted above, the practice of polite sociability often made an other of groups 
that did not share the same emotional repertoire as those middle class communities 
which privileged social sympathy, whether for reasons of social status, education, 
gender, religion, or any other factor which set a group outside of their norms. For those 
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who took an antislavery, and later abolitionist, position this included people who did 
not share their views on slavery. Antislavery reformers placed the proof of their 
sentimental emotional repertoire in one’s ability to sympathise with the sufferer and to 
practise benevolent actions towards aiding their suffering. Those who supported 
slavery, or had a personal interest in it and who were thus blind to the suffering of 
slaves, could not fit into their idea of a feeling, virtuous community according to their 
emotional norms. Such othering became a useful political technique for the abolition 
movement, allowing them to claim a position of moral superiority by casting their 
opponents as unfit for the emotional community of the nation, or at least the version of 
the nation that they advocated.  We can first see this othering take shape much earlier 
than the abolition campaigns, in the newspaper debates which emerged around 
Somerset’s case.  
Several London newspapers covered the case widely, publishing both reports of 
proceedings and readers’ letters on the subject. For the most part, court proceedings 
were not reported in particularly sentimental terms. However, some of the arguments 
from Somerset’s counsel were clearly based on notions of humanity and the idea of 
emotional cultivation.336 William Davy’s speech relies on the sentimental image of 
slaves being “torn from their nearest and dearest” in order to conclude that slavery “was 
pregnant with every thing shocking to the ideas of honour and humanity, and therefore 
hoped it would never be adopted in a free country.”337 His fellow counsellor Allen, 
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meanwhile, reportedly framed Somerset’s owner Stewart and others “who arrogated 
such” a “dangerous Dominion over a Man” as “inhuman”.338 It was also reported that 
Allen “remarked upon the great danger of familiarizing the most distant idea of slavery 
here, as though it may shock one of us, at present, to see a man tied to a tree, and 
undergoing whatever punishment the avarice, ambition, or revenge of a master might 
dictate, in time it would grow as familiar, and perhaps as little disgusting, as seeing a 
parcel of slaughtered sheep hanging up at Whitechapel”.339   Allen, or the reporter, is 
clearly alluding to the idea that practice in cruelty makes people “familiar”, or used, to 
witnessing scenes of suffering and pain so that they become unfeeling towards its 
victims. This idea – the practice of cruelty as opposed to the moral sentiments – is one 
that will be repeated in abolitionist texts across many genres. Casting their case as an 
act of humanity and their opposition as men who take part in inhuman practices sets up 
the terms in which the ensuing debate about slavery takes shape.  
Readers’ letters carry on the debate using the same basis for their arguments 
against slavery in which the slave owner is cast as the “cruel West-Indian” and the 
antislavery position is one of “common humanity”.340  The nature of the men who “do 
the work of Infamy” in taking part in slavery is seriously questioned by antislavery 
letter writers, one letter stating that it is a “wonder such a Band of prostitute, voluntary 
Slaves are not ashamed to look one another in the Face; much more their injured 
Country[men]”.341 According to this writer, such men have “sunk” so low and 
“degraded” themselves to such an extent that they must, if they were men of feeling, be 
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ashamed of their actions.342 Even Lord Mansfield came under fire as unfeeling and 
callous for seemingly sitting on the fence for some time before his ruling. Before 
adjourning for deliberation, which took him a month, Mansfield addressed Stewart and 
advised him to discharge Somerset and have the matter settled out of court, in order to 
avoid a definite decision on his part which could set “dangerous” precedents.343  An 
antislavery correspondent to the Public Advertiser expressed his disgust at Mansfield’s 
apparent vacillation, calling the judge “callous to every generous Sentiment – dead to 
every Feeling, but the base Passions of Avarice, Fear, or Lust”.344 In this writer’s 
estimation, anyone who did not avow themselves as taking a strong position against 
slavery could not claim to have “generous” sentiments or be a man or woman of 
feeling. 
A similar letter in the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser casts the proponent 
of slavery as “callous to every humane feeling”.345 “Humanity”, according to this 
writer, is not “confined to any particular country” and men are not “to be excluded from 
it, whose crime is to have been born with a darker skin (but perhaps with not a blacker 
heart) than their fair complexioned tyrants”.346 In the clearest terms this writer states the 
case for the antislavery position, a position which continued to be taken over the course 
of the next few decades as abolitionism took hold. It was a position which was based on 
the dichotomy between humanity and cruelty and antislavery writers in the press were 
clear on which side their arguments lay. Slavery is founded on “the most base and 
contracted selfishness that ever hardened the human breast” and, in an echo of 
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Somerset’s counsel, if Britain was tolerant of slavery “we should insensibly become 
callous to every humane feeling, and be as little shocked to see a fellow-creature flea’d 
[sic] alive as if we were viewing a beast’s carcase hanging in a butchers shop”.347 
Practices of cruelty, in other words, habituate a population in violence and oppression. 
Many proponents of slavery who were beginning to come under fire for their 
practices towards the end of the century, and who were particularly targeted during the 
debate over Somerset’s case, showed that they were not entirely pleased with their new 
label of “inhumane”. A tactic many use is to praise the “humanity” of the writers who 
express themselves against slavery and even go so far as to say they too wish slavery 
did not exist. A letter from “Caius” in reply to an antislavery letter begins with stating 
that the arguments made by “A Friend to Mankind” are “humane, but not convincing”, 
and goes on to state that “I am as little an advocate for slavery as the Friend to 
Mankind; I wish it was never legal, nor now necessary.” 348 The italicised words here 
are the crux of the proslavery argument, emphasising the legality of slavery under 
English law and its necessity to the prosperity of the kingdom. After all, “the master has 
a right to the labour and service of his servant during the life of the latter, according to a 
purchase made in the course of law”, made by “Acts of Parliament”.349  While the 
“municipal laws” which are a “necessity, arising from the disproportion of numbers 
between Blacks and Whites,” have “an air of oppression”, they are aimed at “nothing 
but the immediate safety of the King’s subjects”.350 The writer is clearly worried about 
the consequences of the Somerset case should it be decided that slaves are not subject to 
the same colonial laws when in England. He states that it would not be “just” to 
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“deprive a man of property”, “of his purchase”, simply “from a pretended distinction 
between the constitution of the different parts of the English dominions”.351   
The idea of humanity and of acting humanely was not given up easily by the 
proslavery side. As well as their legal and economic arguments for the continuation of 
slavery they often tried to prove in their letters that they could act out of ideals of 
humanity as much as any “Friend to Mankind”. One writer, calling himself 
“Benevolus”, argues for the expulsion of the African population from England and for 
those who are unwilling to leave to “remain here subject to the wills and commands of 
their masters and mistresses, as abroad, without any pretence to a benefit from our 
laws”.352 “Thus”, he or she states, “this difficult and important matter may be settled 
upon just and equitable principles, constitutionally with the laws of the land and those 
of humanity”.353 It seems humanity here is thrown in for good measure. “Caius” states 
that “the statutes made [in the colonies] for the regulation and government of slaves 
refrain masters from too great an exercise of their power, and oblige them to acts of 
humanity in properly feeding and cloathing [sic] their Negroes.”354  The proslavery 
letter writers clearly did not want to be labelled as inhumane by their opposition even 
though their practices were. Although the fact that they were “obliged” to act humanely 
because of “statutes” placed upon them to do so somewhat diminishes any argument 
based on humanity.  
The terms of the debate had already been set by antislavery writers and it was 
very difficult for those with an interest in a practice inherently cruel and inhumane to 
attempt to argue the opposite. Professing to be a humane, morally virtuous man or 
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woman of feeling was one thing but, if feelings were restricted to one’s own family, 
community or nation, or blinded to the suffering of slaves through personal interest in 
the trade, then one could not belong to the emotional community that antislavery 
reformers were shaping towards the end of the century. The crux of the antislavery 
arguments used in the press during the Somerset case lay in the essential difference 
between the feeling and the unfeeling, linking feeling with humanity and lack of feeling 
with the inhumane. This argument was re-emphasised again and again during the later 
abolition campaigns of the 1780s and 90s. The newspaper debates of the 1770s may not 
clearly express the politics of sympathy which became central to abolitionist arguments 
in the future, but they nevertheless helped to lay the emotional foundations of 
abolitionist rhetoric nearly twenty years before the emergence of the movement. 
3.3 “Humanity-Mania”: Newspaper Debates during the Campaign for Abolition  
Letters to newspapers by abolitionist writers can be examined not just as useful pieces 
of political agitation during the campaigns to end the slave trade, but as performances 
of their abolitionist emotional repertoire. Building on the arguments used by antislavery 
writers before them, abolitionist newspaper correspondents in 1788 used the space of 
the newspaper column to establish the identity, and hence emotional repertoire, of the 
abolitionist community. This was perhaps done in a more combative way than other 
types of texts I look at in this thesis, as their correspondence often takes the form of 
debate with opposition writers and rebuttals of previous letters. Newspaper 
correspondence often therefore contains stronger statements of indignation and anger, 
yet the tenets of their arguments remain the same as their counterparts in pamphlet or 
sermon literature, or even poetry. Humanity and the cultivation, or practice, of moral 
sentiments are central to abolitionist newspaper correspondence during the first years of 
the campaign, while an othering of inhumanity and cruelty establishes the dichotomy 
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between the two sides of the debate. There is thus a sense of a shared community 
created amongst abolitionist letter writers as they refer back to each other and to the 
committees and activists working on getting the abolition bill passed in parliament. 
Because they are speaking to each other through the page, the newspaper becomes a 
tool of their practice, engendering their emotional repertoire and abolitionist identity 
through repetition of arguments which emphasise their own capacity for feeling against 
the incapacity of their opposition to feel at all. 
As we saw above, the page of the newspaper or periodical acts as a space in 
which the practice of emotions is carried out by communities. Addison and Steele had 
created “papers” which not only aided conversation between the writers and their 
community of readers but also mobilised and regulated the practices central to the 
emotional repertoire of their community. Social sympathy was thus practised and 
reinforced as an emotional norm through the use of their conversational papers. The 
newspaper columns that abolitionists wrote to express their views and feelings on the 
slave trade and to mobilise public support for the movement were used by that 
community in a similar way. As Scheer argues, “media use is an extremely important 
emotional practice” as it aids the mobilisation and regulation of emotional norms.355 
Just as the periodical papers were used to engage in the emotional practice of sociability 
through the space of the text, the newspapers in 1788 were used by the abolitionist 
community (and the proslavery community) to engage with others in their community 
and establish their own emotional norms.356 The nature of the debate they were 
engaging in, moreover, meant that those norms were rescripted into their political 
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agenda as they used their sentimental arguments for the politics of sympathy adopted by 
the abolition movement. 
Building on the ideas expressed by antislavery writers during the Somerset case 
decades earlier, abolitionists argued their case for political reform of the slave trade on 
the basis of humanity. For abolitionists writing to newspapers during the first political 
campaign of 1788, the word “humanity” is laden with emotional meaning. They tie it 
firmly to their own emotional practices and repertoire, whereby a person of humanity or 
a humane act requires the activation of the moral sentiments. Being humane is 
equivalent to being compassionate, benevolent, and sensible of another’s feelings.  
These are active feelings – compassion must lead to humanitarian action – and they are 
actively cultivated through the practice of engaging in reform and political debate. 
Thus, most abolitionist letter writers use the language of the moral sentiments and base 
their arguments firmly on the principles of compassionate humanitarianism.  Many, if 
not most, claim these arguments as based in their Christian faith, drawing on 
sentimental doctrines made popular by Latitudinarian divines in the eighteenth 
century.357 The Morning Chronicle of 9 April 1788 includes a letter which states that 
“The Slave Trade is totally inconsistent with the benign spirit of the gospel, which 
breathes peace on earth, and good will unto men; and I must confess I am not a little 
surprized that any benevolent and disinterested man, should endeavour to justify the 
inhuman traffick”.358 Similar sentiments are expressed in a letter in the Public 
Advertiser that same month, declaring that “The glorious system of the Gospel […] 
makes us citizens of the world, by obliging us to profess universal benevolence; but 
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more especially are we bound, as Christians, to commiserate and assist, to the utmost of 
our power, all persons in distress, or captivity”.359  
This letter is signed Gustavus Vassa, the pen name of African ex-slave, Olaudah 
Equiano, whose autobiography The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah 
Equiano (1789) became a popular abolitionist publication.360  His letter is interesting 
for its assertion of “our” duty as Christians and “our” “charity”, which is owed “to all 
the rest of mankind”. Equiano counts himself as a member of the abolitionist 
community and also of the wider community of the nation.  He belongs, not through 
citizenship, but through the sharing of emotional norms with these communities or, at 
least, with the norms that the first community wished to impart to the latter. Thus he is 
able to state that “We must not for the sake of Old England, and its African trade, or for 
the supposed advantage or imaginary necessities of the American colonies, lay aside 
our christian charity”.361 He is not preaching as an African to the British but as a 
member of a prominent emotional community in Britain, asking fellow members of his 
society to act “according to the law of Nature” and bestow “universal love” on “all 
persons in distress”.362  
The appeal to a sense of Britishness based on their own sentimental emotional 
repertoire was a common tactic used by abolitionist activists. A vicar from 
Warwickshire addresses his letter directly to the Abolition Society, stating that “No 
Briton who feels for […] the misery of his fellow-creatures, can hear of the benevolent 
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purpose for which your Society is instituted, without approving of the undertaking.”363 
He states that slavery “is inconsistent with every idea of justice and humanity” and  
We are taught by reason and religion to consider every man as 
our brother, and to regard him with the same degree of affection, 
with which we regard ourselves. Not to confine our benevolence 
to those of our own colour, country, or kindred, but to extend it 
unto all who are endowed with the same common nature.364 
These are clear sentimental arguments, affirming the natural rights of all humanity and 
thus the extension of social sympathy to the African slaves on the basis that they are 
“fellow-creatures”. Moreover, by stating that slavery is “inconsistent” with “humanity”, 
a humanity that is imbued with all the moral sentiments privileged by the abolitionist, 
and by claiming that “No Briton who feels” for the suffering of fellow human beings 
can possibly accept the institution, he is challenging anyone opposed to abolition. 
Because no true Briton could possibly see the suffering inflicted on slaves and not feel 
compassion for their pain, the efforts of the Abolition Society must be approved of by 
all.  
These letters are clearly setting up a dichotomy between the humane British 
abolitionist and the inhumane un-British supporter of slavery, thereby establishing their 
own emotional norms as the right ones. The trade is “inhuman”, it induces “misery” on 
“fellow-creatures”, and so its perpetrators and supporters who conduct and condone the 
business must inevitably be as cruel and unfeeling as the acts they carry out. The 
Morning Chronicle of 22 August includes a piece which at once directly shames the 
                                                          





insensitivity of slavers and masters and challenges the sensibility of the reader. 
Although not a letter, it is an item which was most likely sent in by an abolitionist 
activist or, indeed, included for activist purposes by the editor himself. Headed as a 
piece from the Virginia Gazette, it tells the sentimental story of “A remarkable Instance 
of Friendship between two Negroes”, whereby two Africans for sale at a market in 
Santa Cruz appeared to be closely tied: “there appeared in every look and action the 
tenderest affection and heart-felt attachment to each other”.365 The two begged to be 
sold together but “even this poor request” was refused “through the brutality of their 
salesmen”.366 The story reports that the two slaves later ran away from their respective 
plantations and were both found hanging from the same tree branch “locked fast and 
folded in each other’s arms, embracing and embraced”: 
Such was the attachment, even in death, of mortals formed like 
ourselves, with souls informed with every noble and generous 
sentiment, and capable of cultivation like our own; but whom 
with the most barbarous oppression, we, at our pleasure deprive 
of liberty, of life, and even of the advantages of common brutes 
– the horse and the ass. Hear this, ye Christians, and blush! 367 
Here is a sentimental piece of rhetoric in which the African is depicted as equal to the 
European based on his ability to feel “generous sentiment”. The affection the two slaves 
demonstrate towards each other proves that they are more human than the “brutal” 
slavers who tore them apart, breaking their social bond. The final line, moreover, 
challenges the reader on their own feelings, demanding that they blush and feel the 
                                                          





shame that a true Christian and man or woman of feeling must on witnessing a scene of 
misery that has only taken place through the oppressive practices of their own society. 
The use of shame as a sign of a person of sensibility is a tactic used by many 
activists across abolitionist materials. A lack of shame equates to a lack of feeling on 
the part of the reader and this would suggest affinity with the inhuman slaver. In 
newspaper debates, writers are often fairly direct in their abuse of the “unfeeling”, a 
result perhaps of the argumentative nature of debate within the space of the newspaper, 
as well as the anonymity with which writers could express their views. Thomas Cooper 
was clearly not concerned with having his name known, however. Cooper, a member of 
the Manchester Committee whose outspoken political radicalism worried his fellow 
abolitionists in London, writes to the Morning Chronicle to criticise the intelligence of 
Samuel Estwick, MP, for his recent proslavery pamphlet.368 In a letter full of scorn for 
the “marplot” who wrote the “absurd” pamphlet, he states that if Estwick “is not 
ashamed, however, for himself, I am greatly mistaken, if his friends are not ashamed for 
him.”369 It is men like Estwick who sanction the actions of the “unfeeling” slavers and 
“doom” the slaves to “unlimitted labour and unlimitted punishment”.370 
A letter signed “M” in the St. James’s Chronicle is similarly critical of a 
previous letter sent in by “N” which argued that Africans are not fellow humans and 
therefore no better than animals who do not need any better treatment than the horse or 
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the ass. “M” states, “I hope, for the Honour of the human Species, that this Writer’s 
Sentiments are more the Result of Ignorance than Inhumanity: […] I will so far 
subscribe to this Opinion, as to allow that he may be no better than one of these 
Animals”.371 This writer turns the argument of the proslavery letter around by arguing 
that he is in fact the brute for his lack of humanity, not the African slave. After 
attacking the nature of the “Gentleman (I forget, I do not mean Gentleman)” who wrote 
in with such claims, he or she praises “those who follow the Dictates of Humanity” and 
states “that our Fellow-Creatures in the Torrid Zone have a greater Claim to our 
humane Exertions, than the Fellow-Creatures of N”.372 In other words, Africans “have 
Feelings as well as other Men” and have a right to expect the benevolent actions of men 
and women “of Humanity” to aid their suffering.373 Anyone who agrees with “N” 
simply prove themselves to be inhumane and less deserving of such compassion. 
The supporters of slavery and the slave trade are seen by abolitionists as people 
who are directly interested, or directly involved, in the slave trade and that is why they 
do not wish to see a stop to it. Indeed, most pro-slavery letters predominantly focus on 
economic arguments, claiming that abolishing slavery would ruin the empire. “Valerius 
Publicola” states, “my defence of [the slave trade] arises entirely from a conviction of 
the necessity of it to support the cultivation of the Islands, and as I consider the Islands 
as the main sinew of the commercial and naval strength of the Empire, I cannot but 
dread the adoption of any plan which may tend to lessen their importance”.374 A writer 
to the The World argues that “It will be a very difficult matter to induce the Legislature 
of this country to conceive it so inhuman a traffick as has been represented by the 
                                                          
371 St. James’s Chronicle or the British Evening Post, 20-23 December 1788, 17th and 18th Century 
Burney Collection, Gale (Z2001310765). 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Morning Chronicle, 22 January 1788, 17th and 18th Century Burney Collection, Gale (Z2000881177). 
122 
 
enthusiastic few” and is angered by those who “assume the mask of humanity, liberty, 
and religion” and “brandish the name of Slavery, (ever much sharper than a serpent’s 
tooth, to the feelings of a Briton)”.375 He or she is clearly disparaging of the “humanity” 
of abolitionists and of their adoption of the language of feeling for their cause. This 
writer’s argument is based purely on the economic effects on Britain should the 
abolition be carried and his fear of abolitionists comes through in his depiction of them 
as underhanded radicals: 
The annual produce of these Colonies to British subjects, 
owners of estates in them, is at a moderate computation, 
£3,500,000 per annum, which this country must lose, if she 
suffers herself to be misled by the mistaken infatuation of those 
enthusiasts, who daily endeavour to inflame the minds of the 
people, and under the mask of humanity, have surreptitiously 
obtained the signatures of those more ignorant than themselves, 
to petition the Legislature for an abolition of a trade, which 
would totally ruin our West India settlements, and a commerce 
of the utmost importance to the welfare of this country.376 
Humanity, for this proslavery writer, is the mark of an “enthusiast”, a political agitator 
who could ruin the country. This stance was taken by many on the proslavery side of the 
debate, accusing their opposition of indulging in a “Humanity-mania”.377  
Not all proslavery writers were happy to be cast as the inhumane monsters that 
abolitionists claimed them to be, and many used the idea of humanity for their own 
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arguments, claiming that slaves were far worse off in their native countries and the 
inhumanity lies in them being left there rather than taken under the “care” of British 
masters. The writer of the above letter in The World states that “the emancipation of 
Slaves in our islands, would be the utmost cruelty to them, because they are not capable 
of providing for themselves”, while the Rev. John Duke, from Barbados, argues that 
“Much, you may suppose must depend upon the humane dispositions of those into 
whose hands they may fall; and, as the minds of those are civilized by an intercourse 
with the world, and the benefits of education, so are their hearts open to the feelings and 
sufferings of their fellow-creatures.”378 This turns the abolitionist argument that a 
cultivated sensibility leads to compassion and benevolence to his own purpose, 
claiming that cruelty could not be performed by “civilized”, “educated” British men. As 
men of feeling they are aware of the “sufferings of their fellow-creatures” and therefore 
must treat their slaves humanely. It is more inhumane, Duke states, “that they should 
remain in their own country, the prey to merciless and savage conquerors”.379  
Attempts to prove their own humanity by claiming the practice of slavery is, in 
fact, benevolent rather than cruel, are met largely with scorn by abolitionists. In the 
Morning Chronicle “Factum” protests the use of humanity as an argument for the 
continuance of slavery, stating that the opponents of abolition are “men immediately 
interested” in the trade and “who, by a constant practice in this inhuman traffick, are so 
bigotted, that they call upon Government to countenance them, for the sake of 
humanity! […] Every honest feeling must take the alarm, and arouse our indignation at 
the endeavour, which is not maintainable by any law, religious or moral.”380 For the 
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abolitionist it is the “constant practice” of cruelty inherent to the “inhuman traffick” 
which has made supporters of slavery so “bigotted” and unfeeling. He calls on fellow 
activists – people of “honest feeling” – to take alarm at proslavery arguments which try 
to commandeer humanity for their own purposes. A letter signed “Philanthropos” 
similarly states, “That the African Trade cannot be stopped, is evidently false – that it 
would be inhuman to stop it, is a gross Misrepresentation”.381  To counter the 
proslavery use of humanity, “Philanthropos” expresses his “trust and hope that the 
Spirit of Christian Charity will not be discouraged by such childish Arguments from 
Exertion.”382 It is this “trust and hope” that abolitionists were counting on in their use of 
a politics of sympathy within the space of newspaper debate: that the spirit of “Charity” 
and benevolent action would be “exerted” by the public in the cause of the African 
slave.  
While many of the letters written by abolitionists were preaching to the 
converted and simply engaging in an emotional practice with already existing members 
of their own community, there is no doubt that their aim was to increase the 
membership of the abolition movement. By rescripting the emotional norms of 
sentimentalism, they urge political action through an appeal to common humanity and 
to those shared norms which they hoped had cultivated the moral sentiments. The 
following letter sums up this appeal: 
I do not indeed suppose that my Argument will induce any 
Persons to alter their Opinion upon this Subject, for those who 
argue in Favour of it are too strongly influenced by worldly 
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Motives to be convinced by any Reasoning against it, and those 
that think as I do, being misled by no Views of Interest, want no 
further Conviction. I write then merely because I think it the 
Duty of a free Man and a Christian, to contribute what lies in his 
Power, towards the Relief of so many unhappy Fellow-
Creatures, and shall think myself amply rewarded if this Letter 
can make even one Convert to the Cause of Humanity.383 
While casting the supporter of slavery as being too interested in the trade to be able to 
change their opinion, this writer is hopeful that he can call on those who have feelings 
to support a cause which springs from no other motive than to relieve the suffering of 
fellow human beings. The politics of sympathy being exercised by newspaper 
correspondents relies on the idea that readers will become fellow activists through the 
social sympathy of the letter. By engaging the readers’ moral sentiments, asking them 
to feel pity, compassion and shame, the abolition movement used the space provided by 
newspapers as tools of their sentimental mobilisation of public support. In doing so, 
they were adopting existing emotional norms in use by certain elements of the press 
over the course of the eighteenth century and adapting them to suit their own emotional 
repertoire, one which relied on the sentimental appeal of mutual sympathy to urge 
political reform. 
Conclusion 
Though it may be too much to affirm that forms of sociability like those provided by the 
early periodicals of Addison and Steele had a direct influence on later eighteenth-
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century emotional norms, it is possible to see in their works, and the way they were 
used for so many decades as tools of sociability, an emphasis on self- and social 
improvement. Through their critical discussions of the modes of behaviour and 
emotional norms relevant to such behaviour, their works formed a vital part of the 
habituating practice of everyday sociability that polite, virtuous middle class people 
were meant to engage in. Sociability was an emotional practice which aimed at 
cultivating sensibility and the moral sentiments.  The use of the printed text of 
periodicals as tools of this practice continued to inform the way in which many reading 
communities mobilised and regulated their sentimental emotional repertoire throughout 
the century. It was to this repertoire, and the practices which maintained it, that 
abolition activists turned towards the end of the eighteenth century in order to argue the 
case for a political solution on the slave trade. By rescripting the emotional norms 
found in the sociability of the early press, abolitionists used the space of newspapers to 
establish their community as one which privileged the moral sentiments over 
commercial interest and which adapted earlier antislavery arguments found in the press 
of the 1770s into their own politics of sympathy. 
As one abolitionist writer in the Public Advertiser put it, abolitionism “is a cause 
of humanity against oppression – it is a cause of public virtue against public sin – of 
honour against cowardly treachery – of truth against falsehood – of Englishmen in their 
true character against men in the disguise of Englishmen!”384  Arguments which 
distinguished “us”, the abolitionists, as humane, compassionate and actively 
benevolent, and “them”, the proslavery supporters, as inhumane, monstrous, unfeeling, 
uncultivated, and shameful, set up a dichotomy that would last throughout the campaign 
and that was used in all sorts of materials aimed at mobilising public and parliamentary 
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support for the movement. They were testing the “true” character of the Englishman, 
promoting their own emotional repertoire as the appropriate one that all Britons should 
practise. Once this was achieved, they argued, charitable and philanthropic practice 
would be second nature and an abolition of the slave trade, an inherently cruel and 
inhumane practice, would be willingly abolished despite its commercial profitability. 
The next chapter demonstrates that the emotional practices used and the emotional 
repertoire evident in the letters explored here were not confined to the space of political 
debate in the newspapers of the day, but were central to the abolitionist appeal in 




Chapter 4: Mercy Recommended: Philanthropy, Tears, and 
Preaching for Abolition 
 
Since the first account of British abolitionism was written by Thomas Clarkson in 1808, 
the links between its emergence and the spiritual reformist zeal of British Protestant 
communities in the eighteenth century have been the subject of much scholarship.385 
Anstey, for example, argues that while Enlightenment philosophy fostered critiques of 
slavery, it was the evangelical impulse that converted anti-slavery sentiment into 
political action.386 Turley, likewise points out that the varying denominations of English 
Christianity all articulated a powerful abolitionist appeal.387  Yet, the “terminological 
swamp” of eighteenth-century religion in Britain, as Page describes it, has made it 
difficult for scholars to pin down which aspects of theology were important to the 
emergence of abolitionism, which denominations of Protestantism were key to the 
creation of the so-called reformist zeal, or, indeed, which religious communities were 
responsible for the transformation of Christian beliefs and practices in general that 
occurred over the course of the long eighteenth century.388  This chapter offers an 
account of the religious context from which abolitionism emerged with particular focus 
on the emotional practices which suggest a link between the emotional norms of several 
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religious communities that existed in Britain during the eighteenth century and those of 
the abolitionist community that emerged in the 1780s. 
I examine two related emotional practices that were central to several Protestant 
communities during the eighteenth century – acts of “doing good” and compassionate 
weeping – and suggest a link between these practices and the sentimental discourse that 
abolitionists used to mobilise public opinion.  This is not to say that religious emotional 
practices led directly to either the emergence of abolitionism as a movement or to 
sentimentalism as an emotional style. Rather, in a close relationship with other 
discourses, religious norms and practices that were inherently emotional and 
sentimental contributed to the way in which many communities went about improving 
their society, morally, spiritually and materially. The first section focuses on this 
improvement. The idea of “doing good” was a crucial practice which spanned 
denominational sects; I argue that these acts of charity are emotional practices because 
they engaged feelings of pity, compassion and benevolence and allowed people to act 
on those feelings by helping others. The regular performance of good works for many 
religious communities was a method of cultivating benevolence through the 
mobilisation of the moral sentiments. I examine the philanthropic reform agendas for 
some of these communities and demonstrate that antislavery activism formed a central 
part of their programs of “doing good”. 
The second section explores compassionate weeping as an emotional practice. 
My focus here is on expressions of weeping and tears in religious texts by both High-
Church Anglicans in their privileging of sentimental parables from the New Testament 
and by Methodists in their passionate displays of lachrymosity. While each sect has a 
different style of weeping, both have the same purpose: tears are specifically mobilised 
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in texts and rituals in order to produce a feeling congregation, members of which 
cultivate benevolence through the practice of compassionate weeping. In the texts of 
both Laurence Sterne and John Wesley, among others, tears are used as a mobilising 
tool for compassion and their early discussions of slavery in this context highlights the 
emerging link many made between sentimentalism and humanitarianism. I examine 
John Wesley’s use of sentimental language in particular, in his antislavery tract 
Thoughts Upon Slavery (1774), in order to suggest a link between practices surrounding 
the Christian maxim “weep with them that weep” and the sentimental use of tears in 
antislavery literature.  
In the final section I consider examples of abolitionist sermon literature which 
make use of sentimental arguments for reform based on cultivated benevolence and 
tearful compassion. Sermons were one of the largest types of mobilising material for 
abolitionists which enjoyed large audiences, both as listeners within the space of a 
congregation and as readers of the published manuscripts. With examples taken from 
different denominations, I show that the sentimental language in sermons highlights the 
relationship between religious emotional norms and practices and sentimental 
abolitionism. The discourse they contain can tell us much about the emotional 
repertoire of these communities. Religious leaders made a distinction between 
cultivated benevolence, which is the mark of a virtuous Christian, and cultivated 
cruelty, which is the effect of slavery. By emphasising compassionate tears, they can 
claim that those who are capable of shedding them are truly virtuous while those who 
do not cry when confronted with the miseries of slavery have an insensibility to the 
suffering of others, thus casting the slave trader and owner as unchristian. Through their 
pulpits and influential published manuscripts, priests and ministers linked the active and 
tearful compassion of Jesus with the political urgency of campaigning for abolition, 
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thus rescripting their emotional norms by politicising their sentimentalised language 
and arguments for a morally improved, benevolent society.  
4.1 “Doing Good”: The Cultivation of Benevolence through Charitable Practice 
There may have been differences between certain elements of doctrinal belief, in the 
emphasis put on passion and enthusiasm, and in the aims and forms of religious 
worship of the many Protestant denominations active in Britain during the eighteenth 
century. However, the practice of “doing good” was promoted and encouraged as a 
moral and religious duty in most religious discourses across the spectrum of beliefs. 
“Doing good” entailed acting on one’s compassionate feelings towards suffering and 
distress through charitable works.  For evangelical Christians, the view that through 
divine grace and re-birth they were freed from sin gave them “the assurance that they 
could overcome the sin of and in other men” by performing good works.389 Methodists, 
following Wesley, did not perform good works in order to be saved, but rather in 
thankfulness for salvation.390 Quakers, on the other hand, believed in a God that 
governs the world and directs all the concerns of human beings, and the possibility, 
therefore, of being rejected for salvation depended on the personal responsibility of 
every human being to act morally. This imposed the duty of good works because 
benevolence and charity contributed to God’s order.391 An urgent commitment to moral 
life through advocacy of universal principles of religion and natural laws was shared 
among all dissenters. The common imperative to activism amongst Rational Dissenters, 
meanwhile, drew upon the conviction of an ordered universe revealed progressively 
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through rational investigation and scientific enquiry.392 The revelation of an ordered 
universe convinced most Rational Dissenters that greater understanding brought them 
closer to God and, like the Quakers and evangelicals, they relied on human benevolence 
to underpin this belief and to act it out.393  
The importance of benevolence as a practice was explicated early in the century 
by Latitudinarian Bishop Joseph Butler in his Analogy of Religion (1736). Butler 
advised that the repeated exercise of compassionate responses to suffering had an effect 
on moral action; that is, habitually engaging the feelings of pity and compassion in 
everyday life strengthened the habit of providing relief. This is the result, as Fiering 
points out, of the general rule elaborated within discourses on moral sentiments that 
“repeated action tends to form indelible habits”.394 In Butler’s view, “perception of 
distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it”.395 
Once again the close relationship between self-cultivation and social improvement is 
evident here. A central part of the practice of sentimentalism for any kind of community 
participating in it was the idea that virtue comes from acting on benevolent feelings; 
simply feeling sorry for someone is not enough. Performing acts of social improvement 
through philanthropic and charity work provided the means for members of religious 
communities to cultivate one’s inner virtue while doing disinterested good to society – 
an emotional practice central to both their sentimental ethos and their religious 
principles.  
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Like the acts of sociability that I described in the previous chapters, seeking out 
spaces in which people can act on their feelings of compassion and experience the 
pleasure of helping others becomes a “mobilising” practice, in Scheer’s terms, for 
religious communities.396 According to practice theory, once communities are 
habituated in a certain emotional repertoire – in this case, one based on the moral 
sentiments – and the emotions within that repertoire have become normative, members 
of that group seek out ways to further engage similar experiences.  Philanthropy was a 
practice that gave people the opportunity to experience the moral sentiments and that 
“fusing of pain and virtue” so central to the idea of honing one’s sensibility and 
benevolent feelings towards others.397 In this sense, acts of social reform were also 
“regulating” practices, that is, they allowed communities to manage their emotional 
norms through activities that explicitly engaged the emotions privileged within that 
group.398 Taking part in an act which was aimed at the improvement and benefit of 
others engaged the sensibility and provided opportunities to experience feelings of 
compassion and benevolence. 
As Borsay points out, there was a strong religious dimension underpinning 
improvement culture as a whole.399 In fact, the majority of charitable institutions 
founded in the period emerged from within particular religious communities and were 
often contributed to by a number of different denominations working together. 
Fashionable culture fed on this stream of religious piety among the British upper and 
middle classes. London’s Foundling Hospital, for example, was founded and kept 
running by frequent benefit concerts given by Handel, who became one of its 
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governors, in the institution’s chapel.400 Leading artists such as Thomas Gainsborough 
and William Hogarth also contributed works of religious scenes to the hospital for free. 
As Borsay argues, this close association of fashionable leisure, piety, and charity was 
frequently repeated during the eighteenth century and greatly reinforced the moral and 
religious function of improvement culture.401 This perhaps answers for the fact that we 
so often see the combination of religious doctrine and sentimentalism in the discourse 
of philanthropy and reform, particularly in abolitionist material. The men and women 
writing such material were for the most part deeply entrenched in their religious 
communities. Moreover, they were also involved in a variety of reform institutions, 
campaign groups, and charitable societies. 
Evangelical reform interests were primarily concerned with moral welfare. The 
theological framework of evangelicalism steered them towards reforms which fit their 
view of how society should be and this required a general improvement of manners and 
morals. The Proclamation Society, for example, was established in 1787 in order to 
solicit a royal proclamation from George III against the dangers of vice and immorality 
and for the encouragement of piety and virtue.402 But perhaps even more important than 
the suppression of vice to evangelicals was their wish for spiritual reform and to spread 
their brand of Christianity, both to the upper ranks of society as well as the lower. 
Evangelicals were especially critical of the lifestyle of the ruling classes and hoped “to 
make them better exemplars to their social inferiors through the work of Bible Societies 
as well as the production and general distribution of religious tracts”.403 Prominent 
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evangelicals thus became involved in the founding of Sunday Schools and Bible 
societies, as well as missionary societies to spread Protestant Christianity beyond 
Europe and into the colonies.404  
The theological and emotional ethos of evangelicalism which facilitated their 
antislavery activism equally directed them to a wider moral reform program. Founded 
in the same year as the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, the Proclamation 
Society was established by two men who were to become prominent abolitionists, 
William Wilberforce and his close friend Beilby Porteus, Bishop of London, and was 
supported by many evangelicals involved in abolitionism.405 According to Owen, many 
of the core group of evangelical abolitionists in London subscribed to at least fifteen 
other societies for social reform and, at one stage, Wilberforce alone gave away a 
quarter of his annual income and subscribed to about seventy different societies.406 
Prominent evangelical abolitionists like Granville Sharp, secretary of the London 
committee, and Hannah More were involved in the founding of the British and Foreign 
Bible Society and of several Sunday schools, respectively. Common to the set of 
evangelicals based around Clapham – often known as the “Clapham Sect” – of which 
Wilberforce, Sharp and More were members, was an ambition to spread their brand of 
Christianity, improve the morals of their society and participate actively in charities 
which improved the conditions of others.407  Tomkins describes the Clapham Sect as “a 
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network of friends and families […] who were powerfully bound together by their 
shared moral and spiritual values, by their religious mission and social activism”.408 
Inherent in their mission was the exercise of their emotional repertoire: their 
performance of charitable works an act of emotional cultivation which worked to 
maintain benevolence as a privileged sentiment within their community. Abolitionism 
presented evangelicals with another opportunity to mobilise and regulate their 
emotional repertoire by acting on the imperative to “do good” to society, both at home 
and abroad.  
This philanthropic aspect of evangelicalism was also adopted early by Quakers, 
a sect which most evidently displayed “in practice the social and moral obligations that 
followed from these values”.409 By and large Quakers did not, like many evangelicals, 
restrict themselves to spiritual reform. A belief in working towards a righteous world 
and a duty to “do good” incorporated many reform issues for Quakers and, indeed, it 
was the Society of Friends who first took action against slavery by banning members 
from taking part in it.  The special interests of the Society of Friends included prison 
reform, the education of the poor, and improving conditions in lunacy asylums. Quakers 
were also active during the years of the war with France in aiding the labouring poor. 
Members of the London abolition committee, Samuel Hoare and William Allen, for 
example, worked together on a “soup society” which organised the supply of food to 
the starving and out-of-work silk-weavers of Spitalfields.410 Dissenting reform interests 
thus reached across a very broad range of movements and organisations and were, for 
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the most part, more liberal than other religious communities. This can be explained in 
some part by the fact that, although becoming increasingly affluent members of the 
middle classes, as a community dissenters were in many ways placed outside 
mainstream English society.411 The social and political status of Quakers in particular 
has been used to explain the opposition of the Society of Friends to a number of social 
injustices, including its role as the first religious community to widely condemn 
slavery.412 
Quakerism has been described as a “practical theology” rooted in the divine 
injunction to “do unto others as you would have others do unto you”.413 This injunction, 
common to Christian sects, is based on the understanding that compassion and 
sympathy must rule one’s actions towards others. Their attempts at reform, beginning 
within their own community and filtering out towards society at large, can be seen as 
performances of benevolence which mobilised their emotional repertoires.414  Anthony 
Benezet was one of the first members of the Society to push an agenda of active charity 
beyond his own community. Through his antislavery works and in his letters to 
associates in America and Britain he preached that it was not enough to turn away from 
the world in order to nurture godliness but, rather, a complete suppression of sin and 
human pride could only be fully achieved through a commitment to do good to 
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others.415 “Charity would be the most likely way to remove that selfishness which is the 
parent of obduracy of heart”, he wrote to fellow Friend John Smith in 1760.416 He 
laments that avowals of sympathy often superseded true benevolence and that 
“doctrines declared in the gallery are too much contradicted in practice”.417 Charity, 
then, must be a daily practice to cultivate benevolence and compassion and to avoid 
Christianity becoming “more a matter of opinion than a fructifying root”.418   
Through duty to their faith in charity and neighbourly love, the Society of 
Friends was a sect which renounced, in principle, all forms of violent coercion and one 
which encouraged the performance of good works as a necessary emotional practice 
among its members.419 The conclusions the Quaker community made about slavery and, 
in turn, the decision to act against it as a group, can thus be seen as an extension of their 
religious and emotional practices. Many scholars have noted the pivotal role of Quakers 
to the rise of British popular support for abolition of the slave trade.420 No other group, 
according to Brown, “labored with comparable intensity” for political action before 
1787.421 The emergence of a formally organised expression of abolitionism did indeed 
begin in 1783 with a petition to Parliament by the Quaker community. Signed by 273 
members of the Quaker Society of Friends, the petition expressed “regret, that a nation 
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professing the Christian Faith, should so far counteract the principles of humanity and 
justice as by a cruel treatment of this oppressed race” and called “for the humane 
interposition of the Legislature”.422    
Rational Dissenters (later Unitarians) shared a similar impulse to practise good 
works and encourage social reform. According to Page, the involvement of Rational 
Dissenters in abolitionism is unsurprising given the fact that their religious views were 
based on a commitment to spiritual equality, individualism, sociability and humane 
treatment of others.423 Rational Dissenters rejected much of the “theological 
superstructure” of orthodox Christianity as irrational superstitions.424 They did not 
believe in the divinity of Christ but, rather, in the humanity of Jesus the man, thus 
placing him at the centre of their faith as the supreme role model for humankind. I 
demonstrate below that this focus brought with it an emphasis on the compassion of 
Jesus and his demonstrative weeping. As Webb puts it, “their insistence on His full 
humanity enhanced” the role of Jesus because “a man who had learned to be perfect 
was far more telling, as teacher and as example, than a god who had temporarily taken 
on human form for a morally loathsome sacrifice”.425 Rational Dissenting preachers like 
Joseph Priestley argued that theirs was an active faith, stressing that all people must 
take part in the “delightful employment” of “exerting ourselves, by every means in our 
power, to remove the distresses of our fellow creatures”.426 Rational Dissenters were 
thus often employed in reform associations which sought not only to better their own 
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position in society, but also that of other persecuted groups in Britain. As well as being 
prominent in the anti-slave trade campaigns, they sought both the repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts as well as emancipation for Catholics and Jews; they led the anti-war 
petitioning of the Napoleonic years; and they took central roles in the founding of local 
institutions for the improvement of hospitals, asylums and prisons.  
The commitment to reform among Rational Dissenters is evidenced by the 
activities of the men in William Roscoe’s tight-knit circle in Liverpool, who were 
involved in multiple politically-driven reform movements throughout their years of 
abolitionist agitation. Staunch supporters of the revolution in France, they also raised 
agitation against the monopoly of the East India Company, while Roscoe and his friend 
William Rathbone sparked controversy when they distributed their pamphlet entitled 
Equality in 1792 in their struggle for parliamentary reform. 427 This liberal spirit can 
also be seen in the largely Unitarian and dissenting activist community living in 
Manchester. Close examination of the range of reform campaigns and anti-
establishment movements makes it clear that anti-slave trade activity was only one 
element in a far-reaching culture of reform within the manufacturing town. As I 
discussed in chapter two, Thomas Walker, chairman of the Manchester anti-slave trade 
committee, particularly exemplified the spirit of reform.  Alongside being a founding 
member of the Manchester Constitutional Society, which advocated parliamentary 
reform and equality for Dissenters, he worked with fellow member of the Manchester 
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committee, Thomas Percival, on the Board of the Manchester Infirmary to campaign for 
hospital reforms and improvements to sanitation.428  
Such activity, in which multiple religious communities took part across Britain 
during the eighteenth century, formed a vital part of the middle-class philanthropic 
“reform complex”, as Turley calls it, encompassing missionary activity, temperance, 
calls for peace and free trade, limited political reform, religious freedom and, 
eventually, a commitment to abolition of the slave trade and slavery, to animal rights 
and to the rights of children.429  While it would be too simplistic to claim that all of 
these reform movements and associations necessarily emerged out of a combined sense 
of religious duty and a benevolent compulsion to “do good” by those involved, there 
can be no doubt that religious communities founded a large number of the philanthropic 
institutions and reform movements of the eighteenth century. The Wesleyan maxim that 
“if works without faith were in vain, faith without works was impossible” held true for 
many Protestant sects and communities in the eighteenth century, not just 
evangelicals.430  
It is no coincidence that much of the reform activity of men like Walker in 
Manchester and Roscoe in Liverpool took place within the dissenting chapels that they 
frequented. Sites like the Cross Street Chapel in Manchester were not just spaces of 
worship; they also provided those within the dissenting community possibilities for 
self-improvement and sociability as the home of the Literary and Philosophical Society 
and the centre of organisation for the reform program of its members, including the 
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committee for abolition. Such a space is evidence of the fundamental link between 
improvement and the religious emotional norms which had their foundations in the 
culture and emotional practices of sentimentalism for the communities that engaged in 
that particular emotional repertoire. Habits which privileged the moral sentiments, like 
active participation in doing good for the benefit of others, were part of the everyday 
practices of a space like the Cross Street Chapel and countless other spaces of faith 
across the country. These practices that take place within spaces of worship, whether 
that space is a physical site or a religious text, give insight into the emotions that are 
privileged by the community to which they belong. The practice of weeping that I 
examine in the next section highlights the importance placed on cultivation of 
benevolence within these communities through their incorporation of compassionate 
tears into the ritualistic performance of religious practice. 
4.2 Compassionate Weeping: Mobilising Tears in Religious Communities 
The texts written by religious leaders, whether sermons, jeremiads, or treatises, were 
important tools of the emotional norms and practices of their communities. These texts 
can be examined as spaces which sought to communicate and mobilise sentiments 
particular to the emotional repertoires of the religious communities from which they 
emerged. Sermons are particularly useful sources when examining the emotional 
practices of religious communities in the eighteenth century. The eighteenth-century 
sermon was not only the central feature of religious services but it was also published 
and widely read as popular literature. Throughout the period, sermons were best-sellers, 
publishers vying with each other for copyrights to the discourses of some of the more 
celebrated divines, like Butler and Sterne.431  Sterne in fact found his sermons to be 
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more lucrative than his novels, writing to Garrick that while “Shandy sells well”, his 
two volumes of sermons “will more than double” its gains.432 The religious minister 
was therefore, according to Seed, an important type of intellectual in the eighteenth 
century and the sermon a significant genre of writing.433 Scholars explain the demand 
for sermon literature as a consequence of its protean nature: not strictly religious in their 
discourse, the sermons of the eighteenth century had “firm and conscious ties with 
secular society”, expounding on issues of politics, philosophy, education, literature and 
social mores.434 The eighteenth-century sermon thus had considerable power which 
reached well beyond the spaces of worship in which they preached. 
The space in which the sermon was heard was, nevertheless, a vital element to 
its use as a tool of practice. The preacher giving the sermon had an extraordinary 
amount of influence over his or her congregation, which for the most part could be 
counted on to listen to their words attentively.435 The way in which these words were 
read tells us something of the change in direction of eighteenth-century Protestant 
religion in England. According to Downey, preachers were no longer admonishing their 
flocks, raining hell and damnation on their listeners; rather, the new wave of moralistic 
and ethical preaching brought with it a calmer, softer mode of proselytising.436 
Meanwhile, the Methodists were eschewing carefully prepared manuscripts for the 
gesticulatory, outwardly emotional preaching they were to become known for. Overall, 
then, the content of the sermon affected the way in which it was delivered and how it 
                                                          
432 Laurence Sterne to David Garrick, 16 March 1765, quoted in Downey, Eighteenth Century Pulpit, 5. 
His Sermons were indeed popular: they had a subscription list of over 661 names and it had gone through 
eleven editions before 1769. See Ellis, Politics of Sensibility, 56 (see chap. 1, n. 12). 
433 Sermons were regularly reviewed and discussed in the pages of the Monthly Review and Gentleman’s 
Magazine among others. See Seed, “Gentlemen Dissenters”, 318. 
434 Downey, Eighteenth Century Pulpit. See also Seed “Gentlemen Dissenters”; and Carey, British 
Abolitionism (see chap. 1, n. 12) 
435 Quakers had many women preachers. 
436 Downey, Eighteenth Century Pulpit. 
144 
 
was received by audiences. Like the secular spaces of sociability that the members of 
religious communities also no doubt attended, religious spaces were becoming spaces 
of improvement wherein the sermon was used both as a way of advocating practices 
that fit in with that particular community’s emotional repertoire and as a means of 
garnering an emotional response from the listeners in that moment. For Latitudinarian 
preachers this involved a calm approach to preach ideas about compassionate weeping, 
while for evangelicals an enthusiastic and passionate mode was required to wring the 
tears from their audiences’ eyes. 
According to Dwyer, Christianity in Britain was redefined in the eighteenth 
century “in terms of the highly cultivated social disposition” that was, at the same time, 
being promoted and practised in spaces of philosophical inquiry and polite sociability. 
437 High-Church Anglican divines, as well as preachers from many of the dissenting 
Protestant sects, such as the Rational Dissenters, turned away from overtly passionate 
sermonising in favour of more moderate methods of encouraging virtue in their 
congregations.  With the new focus on the natural affections in Anglican theology, the 
sermons from within that community in particular became increasingly centred on 
sentimental ethics. Butler’s sermons, for example, were essentially essays on moral 
philosophy. His Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1726) are an account of 
human nature based on benevolence and virtue. His sermons “Upon Humane Nature”, 
“Upon Compassion”, and “Upon the Love of our Neighbour” are centred on preaching 
both the natural existence of benevolence and social sympathy as well as the necessity 
of acting on these sentiments and thus cultivating them to achieve Christian virtue. In 
“Upon Compassion” he writes that, “Men in Distress want Assistance, and Compassion 
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145 
 
leads us directly to assist them”.438 Benevolence is an active sentiment: it requires a 
performance of charity to aid the suffering.  
For Butler, it is not “Reason alone” that is “a sufficient Motive of Virtue” but 
rather “Reason joined with those Affections which God has impres’d upon his 
Heart”.439 These affections require constant practice: “when these are allowed Scope to 
exercise themselves, but under strict Government and Direction of Reason, then it is we 
act suitably to our Nature.”440 Affections such as compassion, governed by reason and 
“direction”, that is, actively mobilised and habituated, must drive our actions: “The 
Exercise of these Affections, in a just and reasonable Manner and Degree, would upon 
the whole increase the Satisfactions, and lessen the Miseries of Life”.441 Those who do 
not put compassion into practice are in danger of becoming cruel: “Without the 
Exercise of these Affections, Men would certainly be much more wanting in the Offices 
of Charity they owe to each other, and likewise more cruel and injurious, than they are 
at present”.442 This, as we have seen, is the characterisation later given to slave traders 
and owners by abolitionist activists in the latter half of the century. The necessity of 
emotional practices which cultivate compassion is clearly central to the emotional 
repertoire developing among some religious communities in the eighteenth century. 
One important practice aimed specifically at the cultivation of compassion is the 
mobilisation of tears that is communicated in these sermons.443 The text Butler uses for 
                                                          
438 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel upon the Following Subjects. Upon 
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While I focus on specifically sentimental forms of weeping in the eighteenth-century, the mobilisation of 
tears has a long history in religious texts, particularly in the medieval period, as the Book of Margery 
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his sermons on compassion is from Romans xii. 15 - “Rejoyce with them that do 
rejoyce, and weep with them that weep”.444 Jesus is presented as “the Example of all 
Perfection in Human Nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a 
litteral [sic] Sense, weeping over the Distresses of his Creatures.”445 Jesus’s 
compassionate nature is evident in the somatic signals which prove his ability to 
sympathise with the distressed – his tears. New Testament texts that highlight the gentle 
tears of lamentation wept by Jesus and his apostles were becoming popular for many 
Protestant communities at this time.446 Philip Doddridge, an Independent minister, 
sermonised in 1750 that Jesus, through allowing “a Set of Sorrowful Ideas arise and 
lodge in his Mind”, had “set himself to practise that Lesson, which he afterwards taught 
by his Apostle, of weeping with them that weep”.447  As Dixon points out, there was a 
consensus that Jesus’s tears “were tokens of tenderness and compassion which should 
be seen as a divine pattern for those who would imitate Christ”.448 In other words, the 
figure of Jesus Christ was held up as the original “man of feeling.”449  Such texts, 
according to Dixon, “provided opportunities for reflection on the religious duty to 
weep, as well as opportunities for readers and hearers of the texts […] to emulate 
                                                          
Kempe attests. This fourteenth-century autobiography features excessive weeping as an embodied display 
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them”.450 Thus the space of the text acted as a tool of the practice of weeping, 
communicating the tears of compassion felt by Jesus to the reader through sympathy. 
As I will discuss in chapter five, the hero of sentimental fiction embodied the Christian 
injunction to “weep with them that weep”, as did the readers who were encouraged to 
do the same.  
As Dixon states, weeping was both “a moral and religious activity; something to 
be cultivated, tutored, practiced, learned, performed”.451 Sentimental language which 
highlighted scenes of distress and suffering, and which encouraged readers and listeners 
to weep in sympathy with the victims of that suffering, emerged in religious sermons 
and texts alongside similar discourses in other forms of literary and cultural production. 
Sentimental literature was particularly concerned with both the emotions of the 
characters portrayed and with the emotions of the reader who, it was hoped, would be 
reduced to tears of pity by the descriptions of distressing or tender scenes.452 Sermons 
were, after all, a major part of literary culture in the eighteenth century and were 
generally subject to the same fashions.453 Eighteenth-century sermons were thus 
increasingly written in a style to match the themes of natural affection and moral 
sentiments that they often preached. Parables from the Bible which highlighted the 
benevolent and sympathetic nature of people, in particular the text of the Good 
Samaritan, became popular in the sermon literature of multiple communities. The 
sermons of Laurence Sterne, perhaps more than those of any other divine, can be 
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regarded as sentimental moral essays which highlight the importance of cultivating 
benevolence through acts of philanthropy and through compassionate weeping. 454 
Sterne’s published Sermons often lack any discussion of doctrine while stressing 
the need for compassion in human relationships.455 His design in publishing his 
sermons was similar to that of his novels: “to teach us to love the world and our fellow 
creatures better than we do – so it runs most upon those gentler passions and affections, 
which aid so much to it”.456  Philanthropy and compassion are thus central to his 
collection. The preface to the first volume states, “as the sermons turn chiefly upon 
philanthropy, and those kindred virtues to it, upon which hang all the law and the 
prophets, I trust they will be no less felt, or worse received, for the evidence they bear, 
of proceeding more from the heart than the head.”457 In “Philanthropy Recommended”, 
Sterne uses the parable of the Good Samaritan and the maxim of “love thy neighbour” 
in order to preach the virtue of cultivating compassion through good works. In 
describing the disinterested benevolence shown by the Samaritan towards the suffering 
Jew, Sterne uses the language of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments to explain 
the impulse to act in people who have a cultivated sensibility:  
In benevolent natures the impulse to pity is so sudden, that like 
instruments of music which only obey the touch – the objects 
which are fitted to excite such impressions work so 
instantaneous an effect, that you would think the will was scarce 
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concerned, and that the mind was altogether passive in the 
sympathy which her own goodness excited.458 
We are to understand, however, that this is only the case for those with “benevolent 
natures”: “sudden as the emotion is represented, you are not to imagine that it was 
mechanical, but that there was a settled principle of humanity and goodness which 
operated within him, and influenced not only the first impulse of kindness, but the 
continuation of it throughout the rest of so engaging a behaviour”.459 Such “settled 
principles” as “humanity” and “goodness” in benevolent characters are achieved 
through constant practice of compassion so as to make the instinct to pity natural.  
This is not so great an achievement because, as he states in his sermon on the 
“Vindication of Human Nature”, “the miseries of this world are so constant an exercise 
of [compassion], as to leave it in no one’s power (who deserves the name of man) in 
this respect, to live to himself”.460  The opportunities to exercise compassion are ample 
in a world full of miseries, so that no humane person - deserving of the name “man” - 
could help but have benevolent natures. This is not always the case, however. He uses 
the idea of practice to explain that, like the priest and the Levite who pass the sufferer 
by, there are some who act “as if they were not partakers of the same nature, or had no 
lot or connection at all with the species”.461 Therefore, while “one would think it 
impossible for man to look upon misery, without finding himself in some measure 
attached to the interest of him who suffers it”, there are some whose characters are 
“formed either of such impenetrable matter, or wrought up by habitual selfishness to 
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such an utter insensibility of what becomes of the fortunes of their fellow-creatures”.462 
Thus the Levite’s refusal to help the victim “had all the aggravation of a deliberate act 
of insensibility proceeding from a hard heart.”463 In a foreshadowing of the arguments 
used in abolitionist sermons discussed below, people without compassion for the 
distress of others have, through “habitual selfishness”, hardened their hearts and 
become insensible of others’ pain. 
For Sterne “it is painful to dwell long upon this disagreeable part of the 
story”.464 He instead turns to weeping as a way of mobilising the compassion of the 
reader. In an extended scene in which the thought processes of the Samaritan are 
imagined as he comes across the victim, he supposes the benevolent man saying “if I 
can do nothing else, – I shall soften his misfortunes by dropping a tear of pity over 
them”.465 By referencing the bodily act of crying during a scenario in which pity is felt 
and benevolence is acted out, Sterne is signalling to the reader or listener of the sermon 
that tears are the required emotional response to all such situations. His sermon on the 
Good Samaritan is an example of reading “for the sentiment”, a practice of reading 
which emphasises the emotions in the piece and the communication of them from writer 
to reader.466 Given the fact Sterne was also a writer of sentimental novels this is perhaps 
not surprising. The majority of his sermons in this collection use weeping to mobilise 
compassion in scenes of distress. Even Old Testament stories are reimagined through 
this sentimental view. Sermon 12, which is based on the story of Joseph from the book 
                                                          
462 Ibid. 
463 Ibid., 55. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid., 65. 
466 I discuss this in the following chapter. 
151 
 
of Genesis, presents Joseph as a “man of feeling”, able to sympathise with his brothers, 
despite their betrayal of him. He portrays this through tears:  
the historian says, he wept. Sympathy, for the sorrow and 
distress of so many sons of his father, now all in his power […] 
– concern and pity for the long punishment they must have 
endured by so stubborn a remorse […] The affecting idea of 
their condition, […] so many tender passions struggling together 
at once overcame him; – he burst into tears, which spoke what 
no language could attempt.467  
Tears are also used in this particular sermon in an early condemnation of slavery. For 
Joseph’s brothers, selling him into slavery rather than simply killing him outright was 
deemed a more compassionate act. Yet, “to be sold for a slave”, according to Sterne, 
was a fate “worse than death”: “it was not compassion which then took place, for had 
there been any way open to that, his tears and entreaties must have found it when they 
saw the anguish of his soul when he besought and they would not hear.” 468 Sterne is 
casting the characters of Joseph’s brothers, that is, men who sell fellow human beings 
into slavery, as unfeeling and insensible to another’s pain. If compassion was at all 
engaged in this scenario, they would have seen Joseph’s tears and pitied him.  
Sermon 10, on “Job’s Account of the Shortness and Troubles of Life, 
Considered”, also condemns slavery and is often quoted as an early instance of 
antislavery sentiment from Sterne.469 He states: 
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Consider how great a part of our species in all ages down to this, 
have been trod under the feet of cruel and capricious tyrants, 
who would neither hear their cries, nor pity their distress. – 
Consider slavery – what it is, – how bitter a draught, and how 
many millions have been made to drink of it; – which if it can 
poison all earthly happiness when exercised barely upon our 
bodies, what must it be, when it comprehends both the slavery 
of body and mind?470  
What kind of slavery Sterne is talking about here is unclear. He mentions the “tyrants” 
of the “Romish church”, “who seem to have taken pleasure in the pangs and 
convulsions of their fellow-creatures”.471 As Ellis states, he could also be talking about 
“the older sense of being without liberty”, or some other “metaphoric extension” when 
he asks his readers and congregation to consider slavery.472 Nevertheless, it can be 
interpreted as a reference to the system of slavery being carried out at that time between 
Britain, Africa, and the colonies.  For Ignatius Sancho, an ex-slave living in Britain, this 
is exactly what he gained out of reading Sterne’s sermons and, in his letters to Sterne, 
his tears are given as a sign of the effectiveness of them:  
Your Sermons have touch’d me to the heart, and I hope I have 
amended it, which brings me to the point. - In your tenth 
discourse […] is this very affecting passage – […] ‘Consider 
slavery’ […] Of all my favourite authors, not one has drawn a 
                                                          
470 Sterne, Sermons, 2:71-2. 
471 Ibid., 72. 
472 Ellis, Politics of Sensibility, 56-7. 
153 
 
tear in favour of my miserable black brethren – excepting 
yourself, and the humane author of Sir George Ellison.473 
Sancho has found the piece to be so “affecting” that tears have been drawn on behalf of 
those currently suffering under the “cruel and capricious tyrants” that Sterne describes. 
Not only this, but reading the sermons, he states, has “amended” his heart. The sermon 
has done its job as a tool of Sterne’s emotional practice, mobilising tears of compassion 
in his reader and amending, or cultivating, his virtue. 
Many religious communities had their own emotional norms which privileged 
weeping. While gentle tears of lamentation and compassion, particularly those wept by 
Jesus and his apostles, were privileged within Anglican texts and sermons, evangelical 
practices of compassionate weeping were somewhat more passionate, driving many 
contemporaries to view the presumably uncontrolled “enthusiasm” of evangelicalism 
with contempt.474 Dixon points out that the difference between Anglican and 
evangelical forms of weeping can best be envisaged as that between New Testament 
and Old Testament styles, the one a gentle form of lament and the other an overtly 
passionate and often public form of sobbing over sin and salvation. 475 However, despite 
such differences in method, the evangelical revival which began with George 
Whitefield and John Wesley was heavily influenced by much of the early Latitudinarian 
focus on feeling and the heart.  While some of the passion of evangelicalism was 
directed at sinners and focused on the shame and guilt that should lead to repentance, 
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much of the focus of revivalist faith was on joy and love. Thus the term “heart religion” 
that is used to describe evangelical theology.476 Wesley argued that true Christians need 
an emotional commitment to God, calling for a love of God “as engrosses the whole 
heart, as takes up all the affections, as fills the entire capacity of the soul, and employs 
the utmost extent of all its faculties”.477  In matters of doctrine, Wesleyan theology was 
not very different to that of the Latitudinarians with its focus on the affections.478 As 
Barker-Benfield states, in Anglican religious thought, Wesley was certainly “heir to the 
Cambridge Platonists”.479 Where he and, to a greater extent, George Whitefield differed 
most from their Anglican counterparts was in their method of preaching. Through direct 
appeals to the emotions of their listeners, evangelical preachers elicited tears, fainting, 
and cries of joy from their congregations. Such passionate forms of worship became 
ubiquitous to Methodism, the open-air congregations that came to define the revivalist 
approach, creating spaces “for direct and intense kinds of religious experience”.480  
As an emotional practice, weeping was especially privileged, both by audiences 
and preachers alike. As Dixon states, “Methodists wept actively and often: as they 
prayed, wrestling with God and their own souls; as they preached, enacting and eliciting 
penitence for sin; and as they listened, in shame or in love and joy.”481 George 
Whitefield became known as the “Weeping Prophet” for his tendency to break down in 
copious tears during sermons and it was a practice which became exemplary to his 
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followers. In his open-air sermons in the fields and on hillsides in rural towns he 
demonstrated how to weep, giving his listeners the opportunity to follow suit.482 One 
observer wrote of his preaching:  
I hardly ever knew him go through a sermon without weeping, 
more or less, and I truly believe his were the tears of sincerity. 
His voice was often interrupted by his affection. […] I could 
hardly bear such unreserved use of tears, and the scope he gave 
to his feelings, for sometimes he exceedingly wept, stamped 
loudly and passionately, and was frequently so overcome, that 
for a few seconds, you would suspect he never could recover.483 
Whitefield’s passionate displays seemed to have a contagious effect on his 
congregations wherever he preached, and if he wept so too did his listeners. During a 
sermon to a group of coal miners near Bristol, it was reported that Whitefield’s “words 
seemed to cut like a sword upon several in the congregation, so that whilst he was 
speaking they could no longer contain, but burst out in the most bitter piercing cries. At 
this juncture Mr Whitefield made an awful pause of a few seconds – then burst into a 
flood of tears”.484 Whitefield himself noted of one of his congregations that “the first 
discovery of their being affected, was, to see the white gutters made by their tears, 
which plentifully fell down their black cheeks, as they came out of their coal pits”.485 
The men and women who wept with Whitefield were joined together not just as an 
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audience for his sermons, but as communities who shared a faith and an emotional 
repertoire that held feelings as important vehicles to knowledge of God.  
The practice of weeping, either in lamentation or in joy, was a bodily 
manifestation of the intense feelings experienced and shared by preacher and 
congregation. It became almost ritualistic: a required act that demonstrated the strength 
of one’s emotional connection to the religious experience. As with any type of space in 
which a community chooses to practise its emotional norms, the spaces in which 
Methodists chose to worship gave members the opportunities to learn, practise, and 
perform, time and again, the emotions which they believed to be important to their faith 
and their spiritual and moral well-being. Such spaces were many and varied due to the 
itinerant nature of evangelical preaching. Often taking place in the open-air, evangelical 
spaces did not necessarily have physical borders or stationary locales. The important 
feature of evangelical spaces was not, then, their physical structure or location but the 
nature of what was taking place within them. As members of their congregations 
gathered and performed their rituals, they developed a shared set of emotional norms 
which would come to characterise their faith. Public weeping became a habituated and 
embodied form of emotional responsiveness which emerged from the spaces in which 
Methodists and other evangelical communities worshipped.  
While such overtly passionate practices seemingly stood apart from the calm, 
reasoned religious experience that was being advocated within the established Church 
and in other areas of Enlightenment society and culture, it would be a mistake to regard 
the rise of evangelicalism as a separate and curious anomaly. Hempton makes an 
important point when he states that a figure like Wesley was as much a man of the 
Enlightenment as a man of enthusiasm: his explanation of spiritual rebirth relied on 
Locke’s account of the operation of the senses, while his advocacy of religious 
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toleration, abolition of slavery, and the improvement of manners and social order in 
general, hint at a man much interested in Enlightenment ideas, moral sentiment 
philosophy, and sociability.486 Enlightenment rationalism and religious enthusiasm both 
existed in eighteenth-century Britain, not necessarily as conflicting opposites, but as 
two sets of norms and practices which often informed and defined each other.487 
Therefore, while Methodism has often been seen as a counter-culture in eighteenth-
century Britain, it shares many of the features of other emotional repertoires extant at 
the time, particularly with the sentimental discourses being used within works of moral 
philosophy, the popular press, literature, and, of course, by other religious communities 
. As Carey states, while Wesley’s sermons were “not unequivocally sentimental”, and 
indeed quite often displayed far stronger passions than was usually found acceptable by 
advocates of sentimentalism, the preacher was “quite able to draw attention to the 
‘tender emotions’ that interested sentimental writers”.488 His religion of the heart “was 
in accord with the prevailing mood of the ‘age of sensibility’”.489 Compassionate tears 
were also a feature of Methodist practice and Wesley’s use of them in relation to 
slavery demonstrates his faith’s understanding of emotional cultivation. 
Wesley may have stated that he was opposed to sentimental literature, but this 
did not preclude him from using the same discourses and techniques in his own 
writing.490 In fact, his 1774 pamphlet Thoughts Upon Slavery is one of the first major 
works on slavery that frames abolitionist arguments in sentimental terms. The majority 
of the pamphlet, using the information in Benezet’s Some Historical Account of Guinea 
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(1772), sets out legal and moral arguments against slavery and the slave trade in largely 
unemotional language.491 In the final eight pages, however, Wesley moves away from 
the evidence he gleaned from Benezet’s work and his tone shifts towards an emotional 
language which matches both his feeling religion and sentimental literature. With anger 
and admonition he addresses the following passage to the slave trader in the manner of 
a passionate evangelical, while also making use of sentimental conventions about 
compassion: 
Are you a man? Then you should have an human heart. But have 
you indeed? What is your heart made of? Is there no such 
principle as Compassion there? Do you never feel another’s 
pain? Have you no Sympathy? No sense of human woe? No pity 
for the miserable? When you saw the flowing eyes, the heaving 
breasts, or the bleeding sides and tortured limbs of your fellow-
creatures, was you a stone, or a brute? […] Did not one tear drop 
from your eye, one sigh escape from your breast? Do you feel 
no relenting now? If you do not, you must go on, till the measure 
of your iniquities is full. Then will the Great GOD deal with 
You, as you have dealt with them, and require all their blood at 
your hands.492 
The weeping, the sighing, and the bleeding – all hallmarks of sentimental literature, 
demanding an emotional response in the reader – are utilised by Wesley in this passage. 
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At the same time, his accusatory tone and threats of eternal damnation to the slave 
traders sit comfortably within the tradition of his Methodist preaching.  
By pointing out the lack of feeling in slave traders and owners and their inability 
to shed tears over scenes of distress, Wesley is expressly accusing those involved in the 
slave trade of being without natural affection and having an uncultivated sensibility. He 
questions if these men are human since they cannot “feel another’s pain”. Furthermore, 
his italicising of words like “man”, “human”, and “feel” are signals to the reader of the 
connection between humanity and feelings of compassion and pity, qualities which 
slave traders must lack if they can witness the miseries of their cargo, squeeze “the 
agonizing creatures down in the ship”, and throw “their poor mangled remains into the 
sea” without any sign of relenting shame or compassionate tears.493 Wesley is setting up 
a dichotomy between the humanity of people who oppose slavery and the inhumanity of 
those who support and are involved in it directly. This dichotomy became central to the 
way in which abolitionists identified both themselves and those opposed to them in 
their mobilising materials, making sure they were seen as firmly on the side of 
humanity and Christian duty. 
Carey suggests that, on the evidence of his Journal, “Wesley’s opposition to 
slavery derived from, rather than preceded, his spiritual mission”.494 This is possible 
given that his evangelical conversion occurred in the 1730s, while any mention of his 
opposition to slavery does not enter his Journal until the 1770s.  However, such 
spiritual conversions did not guarantee an opposing opinion on the legality or morality 
of trading or owning slaves.  While Wesley states that “ever since I heard of it first, I 
felt a perfect detestation of the horrid Slave Trade”, Whitefield was an avid proponent 
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of slavery and in fact owned a plantation which was worked by slaves. 495 Against the 
ill-treatment of slaves, he nonetheless argued the scriptural justification of slavery and 
campaigned for its legalisation while living in the colony of Georgia.496 When 
comparing these two men, who belonged to the same religious community, practised 
the same religious rituals, and engaged in the same, or at least similar, emotional 
repertoire, it is clear we cannot definitively say that sentimental religious practices had 
a central role in developing humanitarian or abolitionist principles.  The opinions about 
the humanity of African slaves, or on how far Christian duty to aid the suffering of 
others should extend, differed markedly between these two men. It leads us to ask, what 
was the significant difference between the two for one to feel so strongly against 
slavery and for the other to participate in and defend it? One possibility could be 
personal interest: Whitefield clearly gained materially from slavery while Wesley did 
not.  Another could lie in looking at the other communities with which they had contact: 
Wesley carried on a correspondence with men who were involved in fighting against 
slavery from early on, like Benezet and Sharp, while there is no evidence Whitefield 
was connected with anti-slavery figures in any way. Whatever the cause for their 
differing views, it is evident that practice theory, when looked at against a single 
community, cannot answer for individual motivation and action. This does not mean, 
however, that it is invalid as a method of exploring how particular emotional repertoires 
become normative among communities and groups of people, and how those repertoires 
can change over time. 
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Of course there will be sub-cultures or counter-cultures within communities 
where norms and values differ or even clash. No one individual is the same as another, 
after all. As Scheer argues, it would be a mistake to assume that practice theory leaves 
no room for individual agency, however socially conditioned a body is.497 Multiple 
factors, such as contact with different people and different communities and institutions 
over the course of a lifetime, produce an individual habitus which, although “dominated 
by earliest experiences, of the experiences statistically common to members of the same 
class,” is nonetheless “a unique integration”.498 Wesley’s individual experiences over 
the course of his life led him to very different conclusions about the inhumanity of 
slavery than his fellow Methodist preachers and he may well have been an anomaly in 
his own community. Clarkson points out in his History that Wesley’s supporters were 
not so much abolitionists as merely promoters of “a softness of feeling” towards 
slaves.499 Their benevolence, in other words, did not stretch so far as to become 
demonstrably active as a community in the abolition campaigns. This, however, did not 
prevent Wesley himself from preaching an abolitionist sermon in Bristol in 1788 or 
from offering to republish his Thoughts for the benefit of the Society for the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade.  
The point of equating “emotional communities” with social groups is to show 
that people negotiate the gamut of emotional norms that exist in their society. Being a 
member of one community does not exclude one from also taking part in other 
communities whose emotional norms may differ.  Rosenwein shows that people can 
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move continually from one “emotional community” to another, adjusting their 
emotional displays and evaluations to each environment: “not only does every society 
call forth, shape, constrain, and express emotions differently, but even within the same 
society contradictory values and models, not to mention deviant individuals, find their 
place”.500 The mobility of people in eighteenth-century Britain and their involvement in 
multiple communities which used multiple spaces meant that emotional norms could be 
shared, practised and developed among a variety of different communities as people 
moved from group to group. It also meant that norms and values could vary greatly, not 
just from group to group, but even within groups. The differences between Whitefield 
and Wesley in terms of their positions on slavery are evidence of this.  
Nevertheless, a focus on shared practices and norms are still important to a 
study of communities like social reform movements. It is the norms and practices that 
are shared across different communities that can elucidate how a movement emerges 
out of seemingly nowhere and gains momentum as it mobilises public support. What 
connects members of a movement across geographical and temporal space are the 
shared norms and practices which bring them into that community of activists and 
supporters. The appearance of tears in both evangelical and high Church sermons, 
whether done enthusiastically or calmly, highlights the importance of weeping and 
sensibility to the emotional repertoires of both communities in the eighteenth century. 
Through ritualistic performance and through emotional communication between the 
writer or speaker and audience, depending on the space, the aim of mobilising tears was 
to cultivate compassion and benevolence in people, thus attempting to make the 
Christian maxim of “doing good” a natural compulsion. When abolitionism became a 
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popular movement in 1787, preachers from these Protestant communities adopted and 
adapted this idea in their own sermons written in support of political reform of the slave 
trade, their texts rescripting their sentimental norms into a politics of sympathy.  
4.3 “On the Subject of the Slave Trade”: Abolitionist Sermons and the Politics of 
Sympathy 
The point of highlighting natural affections and sentimentalised images of 
compassionate tears within sermons was to urge congregations to philanthropy and 
social reform: acts which engaged and mobilised the emotional repertoire of 
sentimental communities. The preacher’s influence, via the sermon, was vital to the 
process of making moral sentiments normative to whole communities and to the 
formation by these communities of the countless charitable and reforming institutions 
described above. Flogging, torture, slavery, ill treatment of children, of animals, of the 
sick and mentally ill, all came “under powerful condemnation in the name of plain 
feeling” within sermon literature, both preached and published.501  It is to feeling that 
the sermons I discuss here direct their pleas for action on the slave trade.  
While much sentimental sermon literature proselytised on the social and moral 
benefits of philanthropy, when ministers turned their attention to abolition this message 
was coupled with a sustained political call to action. Religious leaders, through the use 
of their pulpits and influential published manuscripts, were rescripting the emotional 
norms of their communities by politicising their sentimentalised language and 
arguments for a morally improved, benevolent society. Peter Peckard, whose influence 
is well known, was one of the most outspoken Anglican ministers to attack the slave 
trade in numerous sermons given to his school and congregation in Cambridge and to 
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readers across Britain.502 In his Justice and Mercy Recommended, a sermon preached 
before the University of Cambridge and published in January 1788, Peckard pointedly 
states that he has written this piece with the purpose of aiding the political movement 
for the abolition of the slave trade which had formed the previous year.503 In his 
dedication to Beilby Porteus, Bishop of London, whom he describes as “the Patron of 
Benevolence and Humanity”, Peckard offers himself as a “volunteer” to the cause, 
announcing that his motive is “an impulse of Conscience to contribute my feeble 
endeavours, but principally an earnest desire to incite some more able advocate”.504  
His course of action is to use his position as educator and church minister to 
influence those around him. Underplaying his “sphere of action”, he states that “My 
efforts, probably, can reach little farther than to infuse into the minds of the young men 
committed to my care, principles of reverence for […] Universal Benevolence: and thus 
on the solid foundation of true Virtue eventually serve the good Cause, to which I most 
devoutly wish all possible success”.505  We know that he strongly influenced at least 
one important activist in Thomas Clarkson, as Peckard points out himself in his Preface: 
“I gave the Indefensibleness of Slavery as a subject for the Public Exercises of the 
Batchelors; and Mr. Clarkson’s performance which gained the Prize, has been laid 
before the world in more than one edition”.506 Through the example of his prize student, 
Peckard is able to support his attempt at influencing others at this crucial point in the 
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campaign: “through him, I look upon myself as in some small degree a Promoter of the 
glorious attempt to set the Slave at Liberty”.507   
Education is evidently of vital importance to Peckard’s emotional norms. He 
begins his sermon with a typically Latitudinarian discourse on the positive features of 
human nature and a divinely gifted moral sense, claiming “that the Social Affections of 
Compassion and Love for our fellow creatures are as much a part of our Nature, as 
those of a more selfish sort, and much more so than those which are mixed with 
malignity towards others”.508  To therefore engage in acts of cruelty towards others, as 
slave traders and slaveholders do, would “seem to sin against Nature as much as against 
the Commands of God”.509  He blames “Education”, or practice, for the perverseness of 
people who go against nature in inflicting pain on other human beings: 
Education hath its Effect much sooner than is generally thought. 
It is seldom what it ought to be, and is sometimes so pernicious, 
that at length the whole order […] of nature is perverted. And 
thus by degrees it comes to pass that we see men with 
deliberation of mind, approve what is abominably Evil; approve 
even of Cruelty, and the sight of Human Misery.510 
A lack of cultivation of the moral sentiments is to blame here for the perversities of 
human nature that allows some people to subject fellow beings to slavery. This 
argument is an echo of the one used by Clarkson in his Essay on the Slavery and 
Commerce of the Human Species which blames the existence of cruelty on the practice 
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and habituation of unnatural affections.511 The wrong sort of education (practice) results 
in the wrong kind of human being, one who “with coolness, with apathy and fraudful 
circumvention oppress, enslave and torture their fellow creatures”.512 The action taken 
by members of his University in signing an Address to the Legislature as part of the 
petition campaign is proof to Peckard of the effects of an education based on moral 
sentiments: “the precepts of moral instruction have not been thrown away upon us.”513  
Peckard’s spiritual rhetoric is also grounded on consideration of the moral 
sentiments. The sermon preaches Christian duty and gratitude to God for bestowing 
benevolence in our Nature. These should inform our actions and justice and mercy 
should be foremost in people’s motivations. Action against the slave trade is therefore 
considered a “truly Christian Charity” because it allows Christians to perform their duty 
to God and to their fellow human beings, while it also gives people the opportunity to 
engage their benevolent sentiments by putting them into practice through involvement 
in a charitable cause. 514 Carrying on with the slave trade, on the other hand, is a 
“deliberate perpetration of a Crime against God under all the most horrid circumstances 
of cruel aggravation: it is therefore a transgression of the command, To Love 
Mercy.”515  However, the principal argument which carries through the whole sermon, 
draws on the commonly used distinction that abolitionists made between themselves 
and the slave traders. Peckard states, “it is to be hoped there will not be either places or 
persons in whom the mercenary gripe [sic] of self-interest will totally eradicate the 
generous emotions of Philanthropy”.516 Yet, of course, the nature of the slave trade and 
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of the institution of slavery itself is mercenary and not at all executed with any 
“generous emotions” towards the enslaved. He is setting up the opposition as the 
unfeeling other in the abolition debate, drawing on the idea that their greed and self-
interest must have eradicated any moral sentiments that may have existed in them from 
nature.  
Slavery, then, is caused by a failure of sensibility as much as by the drive for 
economic and imperial growth. He labels it as “a Systematic Institution of hardness of 
heart” and its operators as “unfeeling task masters” and “hard-hearted tyrants”.517 Those 
who have had the wrong emotional education, those who are practised in cruelty 
towards others, lack the capacity to feel for others, thus making it possible for them to 
participate in an act of gross inhumanity. It is left to those who have sensibility to force 
a political change and abolish the institution. But they must actively engage their 
sensibilities in order to do so. He therefore asks his listeners and readers to “look with 
an eye of Pity upon those who are fast bound in misery and iron” and to “contemplate 
those circumstances which else must hurt every one endued with sensibility and 
benevolence”;518 in doing so they must, as people with sensibility, be able to activate 
their moral sentiments and join the cause. Such an act would be the mark of “true and 
tenderhearted Christians”.519  
Peckard’s tract on the subject, entitled Am I not a man? and a brother? With all 
humility addressed to the British legislature (1788), argues the same case as his sermon, 
exclaiming on the “hardness of heart” displayed not just by those directly involved in 
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the trade but also by the nation as a whole for allowing its continuance for so long.520 
This time addressing members of the legislature itself, rather than his own congregation 
and readers, he uses the pronoun “we” instead of “they” in order to ensure they share in 
the guilt of the slave trade’s existence. He uses tears, or rather, a lack of tears, to 
connect the slave trade with inhumanity and insensibility:    
[O]h! hardness of heart beyond imagination! it is said that 
Nature gave Man the most compassionate heart when she gave 
him the power of Tears. […] but we are estranged from our 
Nature; we have no tear to bestow, no heart to feel the sufferings 
of these our fellow-creatures: oh! shame that such reproach must 
rest upon us without possibility of refutation.521 
Tears are the embodiment of one’s compassion. In this affective appeal to those in 
power, Peckard is thus equating a lack of tears with a lack of compassion amongst them 
and amongst society. Through habituation in cruel practices which disregard common 
humanity they have become “estranged” from their natures, unable to feel for the 
sufferings of their “fellow-creatures”. By shaming the legislature through claims of a 
general lack of feeling amongst them, he is demanding that each of them prove that they 
have, indeed, sensibility and that they act on the compassion that is natural to everyone.  
As the abolition movement gathered momentum in 1788, many preachers used 
the same arguments as Peckard with the hope that they too could have some influence 
over their congregations and community of readers. Joseph Priestley, a Rational 
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Dissenter who had once taught at the Warrington Academy, preached and published his 
Sermon on the Subject of the Slave Trade in Birmingham in 1788.  Priestley noted the 
fact that abolitionism was an opportunity for denominations to work together for the 
cause – a cause “of humanity, and our common christianity.”522 Almost the entire 
Preface is given over to these sentiments, stressing the shared values between sects 
who, after all, share “true Christian principles”.523 It shows a willingness, by Priestley at 
least, to acknowledge the shared norms and practices among the denominations and put 
aside differences in order to act on the principles which are common to all Christians. In 
the “delightful employment” of improving society we: 
ought, as his own children, to act like God; exerting ourselves, 
by every means in our power, to remove the prejudices, correct 
the errors, cure the vices, and relieve the distresses, of our 
fellow creatures. In exertions of this kind, our motives are pure, 
pious, and benevolent. We feel as we are conscious we ought to 
do; and with whatever success it may please God to crown our 
endeavours, we shall enjoy the satisfaction of having 
endeavoured, and our labour will not wholly be in vain.524  
Priestley was a firm believer in “doing good” for the betterment of both society 
and the self. In an echo of Shaftesburian moral sentiment philosophy and Latitudinarian 
theology, for Priestley virtue was defined as “that disposition of mind, and that course 
of conduct arising from it, which is best calculated to promote a man’s own happiness 
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and the happiness of others with whom he is connected”.525 He therefore takes the 
sentimental parable of the Good Samaritan as his text for the sermon. He combines this 
with the sentimental argument that society is held together through social sympathy and 
benevolent acts. He addresses his listeners and readers in the following terms: 
I do not know whether it be more in the character of men, or in 
that of Christians, that I shall now take the liberty to address 
you. But if you feel as becomes either, you cannot but 
sympathize with the miserable and oppressed of the human race, 
how remote soever they be from yourselves in every other 
respect. […] And as we ought to feel for our fellow men, we 
ought, to the utmost of our influence, to exert ourselves to 
relieve their distresses.526  
Whether one is listening to these words as a Christian or simply as a human being, the 
matter of the slave trade must be seen in its proper light by people of sensibility. 
Priestley is making a point of the fact that current religious discourse and discourses on 
the nature of man have the same emotional norms: sensibility and the moral sentiments 
are considered by both as central to humanity. Whether Christian or not, man must “feel 
as becomes either” and sympathise with the miserable. The crucial part of this address, 
however, is the last line – feeling for others must move us to action, to provide relief for 
their distresses. Priestley is signalling to his followers “the political tenor of his sermon 
from the start”.527 
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He frames his call for action as a “friendly interposition” in support of those 
who “have been made to suffer numberless miseries” and who thus “deserve our 
compassion”.528  Coming in 1788 at the height of the first petition campaign, this is not 
just a call for philanthropic aid but a political call to act from someone with ties to the 
movement. Speaking to his parishioners in Birmingham, he asks them to become 
politically engaged and involved in petitioning: “let not us be the last, though we cannot 
have the honour of being the first, to join heartily in the measures that are now taking 
for their relief; it being proposed to recommend their case to the consideration of 
parliament the present session, and the friends of the measure thinking that a general 
application from all parts of the country, and especially from towns of note like this, 
will tend to promote it, and almost ensure its success”.529  Universal benevolence is 
used as an argument to move people to act:  
If we have any sentiments of benevolence […] we shall wish to 
see every thing extended to others that we covet for ourselves. 
[…] remote as they are from us in situation and condition, we 
should consider them as brethren and neighbours, and therefore 
exert ourselves to the utmost for their relief.530 
This passage also stresses the Christian maxim of the “obligation to do to others as we 
would that they should do to us, in the same circumstances”, highlighting the relation 
between all humans and the re-emphasising the moral of his chosen text, the Good 
Samaritan.531 It is thus, by linking sentimental and spiritual arguments for philanthropic 
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compassion to political action that he engages in the politics of sympathy that 
abolitionists were creating to mobilise for their cause.  
This is repeated again and again in the sermon literature in 1788 through to the 
second campaign of 1792. James Dore, a Baptist minister, appeals to the social 
sentiments of his audience and their natural feelings as human beings. He states that 
“whatever is human should interest your feelings” and thus he asks his readers and 
listeners to “consult your feelings and let them speak” before he begins recounting the 
misery of slavery.532 Describing the breaking of family ties that slaves endure, Dore 
emphasises the tears of the suffering: 
Here you behold daughters clinging to their mothers, and 
mothers to their daughters, in all the agonies of grief, bedewing 
each other with their tears, and pouring out their unavailing 
sorrows. – There you see father, mother, and children, locked in 
each others [sic] arms, praying never to be separated. Here the 
husband and the wife, in the most suppliant manner, earnestly 
entreat not to be torn asunder. There are others still weeping for 
their native shore, and for their endearing connexions whom 
they have left behind.533  
Dore’s appeal demands a transfer of the tears shed by slaves to his congregation, asking 
readers and listeners to imagine their own families being torn apart. He uses a story told 
by John Newton in his Thoughts Upon the African Slave Trade (1788) about a slaver 
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who threw an infant into the sea because of its constant wailing.534 Dore lays emphasis 
on the weeping of the baby’s mother, stating that, while the “child was soon silenced 
indeed”, “her lamentations” did not cease.535  At this point he addresses the women 
listening to and reading his sermon: “Ye affectionate mothers, when you feast your eyes 
on your little infants in your arms, think of this story: and if you CAN, justify the 
practice of trading the persons of men”.536 As Carey states, Dore has transformed 
Newton’s eyewitness tale into a sentimental parable, asking, once he has reduced the 
mothers in his audience to tears, that they turn their attention to political action.537 Dore 
is so certain that his sermon will affect the women in his audience that he claims, “if 
females only were to contribute, on this occasion, a liberal collection would be 
raised”.538 But his appeal is to everyone and he actively asks his congregation and 
readers to give money to the newly formed Abolition Society, stating that “they 
earnestly and respectfully solicit the assistance of ‘every well-wisher’ to their cause”.539 
In his final appeal to act, the compassion of Jesus is connected to political action: “In 
the person of our great Redeemer benevolence was the most prominent feature; and in 
his life, the most pure, active, and extensive benevolence was displayed”.540 He thus 
encourages his audience, “in the language of my divine Master, GO, AND DO THOU 
LIKEWISE”, the conclusion of the parable of the Good Samaritan.541  
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This parable, and its ethic of compassion, also forms the central argument of 
fellow dissenting minister John Liddon’s 1792 sermon, which begins with an emphasis 
on the “practical side” of their religion – to do good:  
Christianity is a system of pure benevolence. Its origin is the 
love of God; and its end is human happiness […]. To 
accomplish this end, all the doctrines and actions of Jesus Christ 
were directed. He went about doing good.542 
The title of Liddon’s sermon – Cruelty the Natural and Inseparable Consequence of 
Slavery – hints at the minister’s belief that slavery as a practice cultivates cruelty and 
violence, whereas the aim of a Christian is to cultivate compassion through good works. 
Slave traders and owners, “accustomed to cruelty”, “are not only callous to the cries of 
the wretched, but take an infernal delight in the miseries of mankind”.543 Such men are 
“the disgrace of human nature” for suppressing the compassion that is inherent to 
humankind.544 He thus exhorts his audience to: 
Copy the example of the good Samaritan. Exert all your talents 
and all your influence to dry up the tears of the Africans, to 
meliorate the condition of those already enslaved, and to prevent 
the continuance of the abominable traffic.545 
By claiming that “Every christian ought to do all in his power to put a stop to the 
infernal traffic”, Liddon is pointing to the power of Britons to dry up the tears of slaves 
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and go to their aid, linking the active duty of a Christian to a politics of sympathy.546  
He states that there are “means” of performing charitable acts to aid slaves that “are 
peaceable and constitutional”, but are nonetheless political.547 The first “is by 
petitioning the legislature to interpose its authority, and to put an end to a traffic which 
wounds the feelings of humanity”.548 The other way of getting involved “is the 
conscientious disuse of West India produce, till the Slave-trade be abolished”, which he 
stresses is a method of protest that can be adopted by “every Christian”, whether rich or 
poor, male or female.549 He states that “many poor Christians, if they were to see a man 
robbed and wounded, might pity him, but could not administer relief. But here, they 
may prevent the wounds of many by rendering their labour useless.” In other words, 
involvement in political protest to abolish the slave trade is an opportunity for any 
Christian who has sensibility to put their religious, moral, and emotional norms into 
practice. 
Conclusion: 
In terms of practice, acts of reform had become more than simple acts of charity to 
many within religious communities by the end of the eighteenth century. An 
examination of the variety of institutions and reform causes set up and participated in 
during the course of the century attests to the fact that the so-called “reform complex” 
encompassed much more than simple charity for those less materially fortunate, but 
ranged from social welfare to political rights, from moral welfare to religious 
freedoms.550 The sermon literature of abolitionist ministers and divines shows that, to 
an increasing number of people in Britain, philanthropy was an important emotional 
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176 
 
practice with the specific aim of mobilising the moral sentiments of compassion and 
benevolence. It was a practice aimed at habituating compassion so that it became an 
immediate, “natural” response to aid suffering and improve society. In the act of 
helping those less fortunate one’s sensibility is engaged, the feelings of others are 
received through sympathy, and, in turn, compassion and pity compel one to improve 
the situation of the distressed. It is also conceived as an act of religious duty, framed as 
a necessity of Christian virtue if one was to follow the guidance of Jesus, the prime 
example of active and tearful compassion.  
While the dynamics of the different religious traditions differed on various 
points, the deployment of particular arguments by members of religious communities 
reveal, as Turley points out, “a family resemblance in fundamental ideas”.551 The 
important issue here is that large sections of the Anglican, Quaker, evangelical, and 
dissenting communities could all reach a similar commitment to abolitionism through 
their own intellectual, theological, and personal beliefs, and they could also agree on the 
fundamental arguments they were to use in their mobilising rhetoric. The moral 
sentiments of compassion and benevolence, the cultivation of sensibility, the moral 
imperative to do good to others, and ritualistic practices of weeping, inform their 
abolitionist texts and are made political through the insistence on active participation in 
the movement by writers and preachers. The enjoinder at the end of each abolitionist 
sermon to participate in political action demonstrates the rescripting undertaken by 
religious communities of their emotional norms. By linking Christian duty to good 
works with political involvement, via the compulsion of a cultivated compassion, 
religious ministers and preachers adopted the sentimental arguments already in use 
                                                          
551 Ibid., 17. 
177 
 
within their communities and adapted them to suit the politics of sympathy that 
abolitionists developed to argue their case. 
It could be said that, with the majority of the British population belonging to 
some Christian denomination or other, the link scholars have made between religion 
and philanthropy is perhaps not surprising.552  Charity for the poor had always been a 
part of Christian practice, yet antislavery opinion did not emerge in any meaningful way 
until the eighteenth century, so there was clearly more to people’s decisions to become 
involved in abolitionism than just their religious moral duty.  As with any community in 
the eighteenth century, religious communities were not isolated entities with 
impermeable borders. Members bring to religious communities the norms and practices 
from all the other communities and groups they may belong to, and vice versa.  
Religious ideas about performing good works for the improvement of others fit in easily 
with the growing interest in self and social improvement which was occurring in other 
communities, in both public and private arenas of sociability.  
As we have seen, the chief aim of self-improvement was the cultivation of virtue 
through the habitual practice of appropriate sentiments and affections, such as 
compassion and benevolence. Social improvement gave people the opportunity to do 
so, through charitable acts towards those in need of food, shelter, education, religious 
freedom and political representation. We cannot solely focus, therefore, on the religious 
element in the practice of philanthropy and reform in Britain during the eighteenth 
century, just as we cannot focus solely on moral philosophy or sociability as sources of 
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change in this era either.  The emotional repertoires of eighteenth-century Protestant 
communities emerged alongside other communities which shared membership and 
which, therefore, shared similar convergent emotional practices. Some of these 
communities, to which I will turn in the next chapter, were the literary and reading 
communities of Britain which elaborated the practice of moral sentiments in the 
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Chapter 5: “The Kind Contagion” of Abolitionist 
Sentiment: Adopting and Adapting Sentimental Reading 
Practices 
 
We have already seen how the abolitionist debate played out within academic essays, 
newspaper correspondence, and religious sermons. These were the tools of practice 
with which abolition supporters engaged in the new politics of sympathy, using the 
texts to carry out emotional practices which came to define the abolition movement and 
its emotional discourse. This final chapter pays attention to one of the most studied 
aspects of abolitionism in recent years: sentimental literature.554  The bonds of fellow-
feeling and social sympathy that were promoted in texts produced by those groups and 
communities which privileged sentimentalism were reinforced within the works of 
sentimental fiction which emerged in the 1740s. In the novels and poems of sentimental 
writers, sensibility is represented as the ideal human virtue and acts of benevolence as 
the natural end of social sympathy.555 Indeed, it was perhaps due to the growing success 
and popularity of the sentimental style in literature that sensibility, and the practices 
which came to define it, became such a widespread cultural and emotional 
phenomenon. 
The close relationship between inner experience and outer bodily manifestations 
of emotions theorised by Scheer, is closely tied to the function of sentimental literature. 
Attention to the ways in which sentimental texts represent feelings highlights the 
importance of the body in eighteenth-century notions of emotional experience. The first 
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Affect and Abolition (see chap.1, n. 13). 
555 On sensibility and sentiment in eighteenth-century literature see Todd, Sensibility (see chap.1, n. 21); 
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section of this chapter examines the act of reading as an emotional practice meant to 
engage the sensibility and cultivate the moral sentiments through somatic language 
which signified the emotional moment. Sentimental literature had a very specific 
function and it is important to understand how it was read and the relationship between 
the writer, the text, and the reader within the practice of sentimental reading. These 
were works that needed to be read “for the sentiment”, to use Johnson’s phrase.556 The 
aim of doing so was always, initially at least, to achieve the emotional and moral 
education of its audience. 557  Sentimental fiction aimed to show its readers how to 
express themselves and how to respond to life’s experiences.558  
It has been argued that, by focusing on the miseries of the less fortunate and by 
encouraging compassionate responses to those miseries, sentimental fiction had a 
central role in cultivating sympathetic benevolence and philanthropic practice among 
many communities in Britain in the eighteenth century.559 With this in mind, section 
two of this chapter focuses on how sentimental literature was used by some to ask 
questions about the validity of slavery in light of what they understood about social 
sympathy and the moral sentiments. In order to follow the abolitionist rescripting of 
sentimental literary rhetoric into a political instrument, I examine early forms of 
antislavery literature written in the decades before the establishment of abolitionism, 
including Sarah Scott’s novel Sir George Ellison (1766) and poetry by William Cowper 
and Thomas Day published between 1773 and 1782. These works are examined to see 
how sentimental fiction was beginning to be enlisted for a specific political purpose, 
even if they were not explicitly advocating for a stated reform.  
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The final section focuses on abolitionist verse written between 1787 and 1796 
and discusses the techniques used to mobilise public opinion and political action. As 
Carey points out, these poems were addressing an audience “experienced in sensibility; 
an audience which not only found itself capable of being moved by sentimental writing, 
but which demanded to be so moved.”560  It is true these poems work from a purely 
sentimental understanding of how to read a text, yet they also display a rescripting of 
the practice by injecting a political edge to their sentimental verse. I explore the links 
abolitionist writers made between emotional cultivation and political action by 
examining two main strategies. The first is their argument that habituation in the moral 
sentiments leads to virtue and benevolent humanitarian action, and the second is their 
use of apostrophic verse to enact the sympathetic contagion of sentiments between the 
writer, or the text, and the reader. While Anna Barbauld’s work is examined as an 
antithesis to the other poems explored here, even in her less sanguine view of the utility 
of sentimental language in effecting political change, the contrast between a good 
emotional education, which defined the virtuous benevolence of the abolitionist 
movement, and a bad one, which defined the cruel tyranny of the pro-slavery position, 
is still evident in her poem. Even after continual political defeats, the abolitionist 
emotional repertoire remained tied to the language of humanitarian benevolence.  
5.1 Sentimental Literary Practice: Writing and Reading “For the Sentiment” 
With the vital role that philosophers, theologians, and other writers were placing on 
social sympathy and the moral sentiments, sentimentalism became linked not only to 
very specific ways of expressing and responding to emotions, but also to very specific 
ways of writing and reading emotions.  Dr Johnson’s summation, when reading Samuel 
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Richardson’s Pamela (1740), that “you must read him for the sentiment” has been taken 
as a disparaging comment on the lack of plot in what is considered the first example of 
a modern novel.561 However, as Mullan points out, Johnson in fact meant this as praise 
for the elevation of “sentiment” over mere “story” as the prime purpose of the novel.562 
The practice of reading that Johnson was implying, and that Richardson was 
advocating, centred on the emotions of not just the characters within the novel but also 
those of the reader, or often listener, of the story. In terms of sentimentalism, the novel 
was crucial to the development of a practice which explicitly targeted the cultivation of 
sensibility in a mass audience. Richardson presented his novels as moral guides which 
explored the virtue of sensibility and the practice of benevolence and social sympathy. 
They were not conduct books in the traditional sense, in that readers were not asked to 
follow particular actions but rather to feel particular emotions. As Todd states, 
characters in a sentimental novel “should teach through their gestures and responses”, 
and the “reader should be moved less by identification with the characters […] than by 
contemplation of” their emotional displays.563 In other words, the feelings created 
within the novel should be “sentimentally contagious” to the reader.564 
Throughout the eighteenth century, those who copied Richardson and who 
promoted his works as models of respectable and virtuous writing emphasised the 
relationship between distress, compassionate feeling, and morality. Later works by 
Laurence Sterne and Henry Mackenzie were designed to be read so as to instruct 
audiences through sentimental feeling. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sterne 
wrote that the purpose of A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768) was 
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“to teach us to love the world and our fellow-creatures better than we do”, much as his 
sermons aimed to do as well.565 Meanwhile the reviewing magazines were also 
promoting an image of appropriate reading practice. The Critical Review, for example, 
stated that Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling (1771) must be read with “satisfaction” by all 
“those who have feeling hearts”, while the Monthly Review declared that “the Reader, 
who weeps not over some of the scenes it describes, has no sensibility of mind”.566 The 
reviewers of sentimental fiction thus helped to reinforce this key link between 
sensibility, sentiment, and moral improvement.  
Other interpretations of sensibility and the role of sentimental literature were 
made at the time. Novels were always problematic in terms of their respectability as a 
form of entertainment and instruction, as was the reliance on sensibility itself as a 
central tenet of moral virtue. As Goring argues, the literary form of what we now know 
as the novel was considered by many throughout the eighteenth century to be “morally 
dubious”, its consumption “regularly condemned as anything from an idle waste of time 
to a deranged and corrupting indulgence in fantasy”.567 In a review of Sterne’s work, an 
anonymous critic writes that A Sentimental Journey “is the work of an unprincipled 
man of feeling, whose nerves with peculiar irritability, can tremble every hour at the 
touch of joy or woe; whose finely-fibred heart would thrill perhaps with horror at the 
sufferings of – a fly”.568  Sensibility itself is being made fun of here, casting the over-
sensitive “man of feeling” as irrational, weak, and too fixed on the sensations of 
emotional experience. Todd points out that critics of sensibility judged that aesthetic 
                                                          
565 See chap. 4, n. 72.  
566 Critical Review, Or, Annals of Literature 31 (June 1771), 482, ProQuest, (4336118); Monthly Review, 
Or, Literary Journal 44 (May 1771), 418, ProQuest, (4619625). On the importance of review magazines 
as promoters of sentimental reading see Frank Donoghue, The Fame Machine: Book Reviewing and 
Eighteenth-Century Literary Careers (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
567 Goring, Rhetoric of Sensibility, 166. 
568 “On Sensibility, or, Feeling, as Opposed to Principle”, quoted in Sterne, The Critical Heritage, ed. 
A.B Howes (London: Routledge, 1974), 308. 
184 
 
experience obscured the moral imperative of emotions and that it too often had a 
decadent, effeminate quality about the way it was expressed, particularly in literature.569 
If taken too far, sensibility could disqualify men from worldly business, while also 
leading to melancholic debility, hypochondria, and hysteria in women.570 In such cases, 
the result was isolation and solipsism rather than the ideals of sociability and social 
sympathy.571 Sentimental fiction was thus always open to interpretations that bypassed 
the moral intent of the works.  
However, what was aimed at and how it was interpreted by individuals are 
entirely different matters. The purpose of writing for the novelists of sentimental 
literature was clear. In order to distance themselves from the category of “romance” and 
its associations with the scandalous and titillating fiction of early writers like Aphra 
Behn and Eliza Haywood, the sentimental novelists, beginning with Richardson, set out 
to make the novel respectable by attempting to control its interpretation.572 This 
involved transforming not only the way it was written but also the way it was read. 
Warner sees the so-called “rise of the novel” as a project of reform; an attempt to 
transform readers by writing didactically and by conceiving exemplary models of 
virtue, politeness, and sensibility.573 Richardson actively sought out different ways of 
showing his readers and friends how his books were to be read and interpreted, heavily 
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editorialising his works throughout his life. In introductions, notes, and appendices, 
Richardson pointed to the moral didacticism of his own fiction. In Pamela, for instance, 
his pseudo-editor promotes the novel as one that will “instruct and improve the minds 
of the YOUTH of both sexes” and one which “shall engage the passions of every 
sensible reader”, a guarantee produced “from his own passions, (which have been 
uncommonly moved in perusing it) to the passions of every one who shall read with 
attention”.574  This reading “with attention” is the crucial point. “Sensible” readers are 
those who pay attention to the sentiment of the novel and who respond to that sentiment 
appropriately.  
In order to respond appropriately both the writer and the reader were relying on 
the dual working of sensibility and sympathy. As Carey states, “almost all genuinely 
sentimental arguments in eighteenth-century writing revolve around the central 
relationship between sensibility, the capacity to feel, and sympathy, the capacity to 
imagine another’s feelings as one’s own”.575 Without sympathy sensibility would be 
pointless: its properties as a tool of emotional communication allow sentiments to flow 
between people and enable the capacity to tune into another’s feelings. Whether 
conceived as a contagion or as an imaginative process, writers of sentimental literature 
were using contemporary understandings of how sympathy worked in their fiction. In 
order to move the reader and transfer the emotions they implanted within their works to 
a wider audience, they developed a specific language of sentiment that drew on the 
imaginative process of witnessing, as well as the symptoms and manifestations of 
emotions on the body.  Physical and emotional suffering are thus placed at the centre of 
the story and a common strategy is to focus on a single figure in distress. As Ahern 
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points out, directing readers’ attention to a specific scene or a particular character 
“could make real a problem that afflicted a whole population, by allowing the reader to 
visualize the scene of suffering and engage in imaginative identification with the plight 
of the victim”. 576   
In Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey, the narrator, Yorick, ruminates on his 
inability to imagine the miseries of many and his failure to tune his feelings into the 
“multitude of sad groups” in the world who were poor, imprisoned, or sick.577 Yorick 
tries to give “full scope” to his imagination by beginning “with the millions of my 
fellow creatures born to no inheritance but slavery”.578 He however finds that, even 
though the picture is “affecting”, he could “not bring it near” him enough to be truly 
given over to sympathetic compassion. In fact “it did but distract” him from the goal of 
exercising his sensibility.579  Instead, by focusing his imaginative capacities on “a single 
captive”, Yorick is able to describe in detail the miseries of the captive’s experience and 
bring the picture nearer to his mind’s eye until his “heart began to bleed” in pity for the 
victim.580 Thus, by zooming in on the “multitude” and looking at a “single” figure in 
despair, Sterne highlights the importance of imaginative identification which allows his 
character, and the reader, to witness pain and feel compassion. Yet, while this scene 
clearly asks the reader to enter into an imaginative identification with the sufferer, it 
also reveals some of the limits of sympathetic imagination, at least in regard to the idea 
of the proximity of the suffering. In a sign that it is perhaps too early for some to 
consider the Atlantic slave trade in terms of its abolition at this stage, Yorick is unable 
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to focus on the multitude of distant slaves that must at that moment be suffering, instead 
having to look “closer” to engage his sensibility and exercise his moral sentiments. He 
is perhaps acknowledging that we sympathise more easily with those who are literally 
nearer to us than with the very distant and very different African slaves.581 
Nevertheless, as scholars like Goring, Van Sant, and Carey have argued, 
“witnessing” or “gazing on suffering” is central to the function of the character of the 
“man of feeling”.582 The way in which writers engage sympathetic identification is to 
“convert an audience into spectators,” offering visual tableaux of highly emotive 
situations, making the injustices of the world present through vivid images and 
particularising language.583 Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey, written less than a decade 
after Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments appeared, put imaginative sympathy into 
literary practice more than any other novel by using visual tableaux of suffering. Yorick 
goes on a journey driven by sensibility, encountering various unhappy, oppressed, or 
miserable people over whom he can pity and shed a tear. As Chandler points out, in the 
movement from one emotional episode to the next, “Sterne managed to find a conceit in 
which he could figure the practice of sympathy as a kind of imaginative mobility – the 
capacity, as Adam Smith had suggested a few years earlier, of passing into points of 
view not one’s own”.584 The story has no plot other than to follow Yorick’s emotional 
itinerary as he is propelled further on his journey of witnessing and feeling along with 
those he encounters. Yorick’s sympathetic encounters occur through the witnessing of 
bodily communication rather than words. Looking into tearful eyes, for example, 
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Yorick “sees” what they are feeling which leads to an instantaneous transmission of 
their emotion to his: after wiping away their tears of melancholy he then needs to wipe 
away his own tears of sympathy. Therefore, as well as witnessing emotion, the 
sentimental hero suffers and feels concomitant emotions of pity and compassion stirred 
through sympathy.  
The importance of making the sentiments of distressing situations central to the 
work lies in the relationship between sensibility, sympathy and active benevolence. Just 
as Shaftesbury and Butler had advocated for social sympathy and benevolence as 
harmonising forces in their philosophical and theological treatises, respectively, so 
Richardson’s heroines and Sterne’s heroes were promoters of the sentimental 
imperative to sympathise with others and act to benefit those in distress.585 This lesson 
was not necessarily to be learnt from the actions of the central characters but, rather, 
through exciting the reader’s pity and compassion. 586  While these novels do not, as 
Csengei states, “directly draw up any agenda for the reformation of social ills,” they do 
in fact demonstrate the writer’s position on social issues via emotional response and 
performance.587 It is the reader who must interpret the text on the level of emotions and 
who must, through the practice of reading, cultivate their own sensibility and moral 
sentiments through the emotional contagion of sympathetic communication. As Todd 
points out, “Since virtue could be generated through an exciting to compassion, that 
reader would be most improved who had been most deeply affected”.588 In order to 
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achieve this and engage the imagination and feeling capacities of their readers, 
sentimental writers needed to convert their audience into spectators through a specific 
language that engaged the moral sentiments. The work of fiction must exercise the 
sensibility of the reader, that is, it must act as a tool of emotional practice.589 Writers of 
sentimental fiction therefore used a somatic language of emotion which highlighted the 
body’s feeling responses.  
The sentimental moment is characterised by the physical and legible emotional 
responses, usually to distress, that are displayed on the body, such as tears, blushing, 
fainting, sighing and palpitations. Mullan calls these displays “symptoms” because “it is 
according to an idea of the body (and particularly the female body) as a visible and 
describable register of effects that these signs appear”.590 The most obvious symptom of 
being moved is crying, and tears form a large part of the symptomatic language of 
sentimental fiction. Pamela is “overwhelmed with tears” at instances of distress, sorrow, 
joy, and compassion for others, evidence of her sensibility to both her own feelings and 
to those of the people around her.591 Tears therefore indicate, as Todd points out, a 
“correct response”, denoting a feeling and benevolent heart.592 The gestures and 
postures related to overwhelming moments of feeling, including falling to the knees, 
fitting and trembling, and even fainting, indicate the reaction of “the sanguinary 
indices” to emotional states and enhance the sentimental moment.593 The quickening of 
the pulse and the reddening of the face are particularly prevalent in sentimental fiction. 
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Blushing often signifies guilt and shame, but it also reveals innocence, purity and 
virtue. It reveals sensibility. 
In Henry Brooke’s The Fool of Quality (1765-70), for example, blushing 
“demonstrates his sensibility; and his sensibility demonstrates some principle within 
him, that disapproved and reproached him for what he had committed”.594 A 
spontaneous rush of blood to the face thus reveals an emotional state of mind of a 
person who feels guilty over an action or is faced with a situation that society would 
deem improper or shameful. Brooke is clear on the meaning of seeing a woman blush. 
It is not necessarily out of personal guilt or shame at wrongdoing, but the mere 
apprehension that wrong has occurred: “A woman therefore, who blushes at what she 
disapproves, blushes not for herself, but for the faults of her rude and ill-mannered 
company, who have not the grace to blush for themselves.”595 Women who do not blush 
are usually depicted as vulgar and unvirtuous.596 The ability to flush, that is, to feel 
shame, is an indication of moral virtue.  For Brooke, it is “from the fountain of virtue 
alone, that this flush of shamefacedness can possibly flow”.597 As we have seen, 
abolitionists would later come to use the blush, alongside all the other gestures and 
bodily symptoms typical of sentimental fiction, in order to promote their moral stance 
against the slave trade. In abolitionist verse there is a fundamental difference between 
those who can blush out of shame and those who ought to blush at the cruelties they 
inflict on African slaves.  
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Sensibility is, as Mullan points out, “not so much spoken as displayed” in works of 
sentimental fiction.598 Its power lies in the fact that it is not spoken; the system of 
bodily signs and symptoms indicates feeling beyond words and therefore suggests 
sincerity because they are automatic responses to emotional states.599  They are the 
supposedly “natural” signifiers of virtue. The body, and embodied emotion, thus play a 
vital role in the emotional practice of reading sentimental texts.600 However “natural” 
these symptoms seemed to be, or were promoted to be, these writers understood that 
they were at once automatic and habituated movements of the body. Similar to the way 
in which Scheer historicises the body by emphasising “the mutual embeddedness of 
minds, bodies, and social relations”, so writers of sentimental fiction were tying the 
body to inner thought processes and outer perceptions, creating works that used the idea 
of the learned experience of emotion – through the practice of reading for the sentiment 
– to shape and mould not just the body/mind of the reader but also social relations as 
well.601 They were relying on the understanding that the cultivation of specific 
emotional states and sentiments would habituate the body’s emotional processes and 
inform moral thought and action.  
Novels of sensibility positioned each reader within a community of like-minded, 
and like-feeling, members; members that were capable of the sensibility of the central 
man or woman of feeling, and open to the sympathetic contagion of the sentiments 
presented within it. The reader is thus connected to the work, and fellow readers, 
through the sociability provided by the text. For Mullan, the sentimental text implies a 
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social contract, “by the terms of which a reader was set apart from the anti-social vices 
or insensitivities which the novels were able to represent”.602 The act of reading a 
sentimental work, then, created an imagined, or emotional, community in which readers 
shared in the prescribed emotional norms of the writer.603 If read correctly, that is, “for 
the sentiment”, the practice of reading could enact sociability in any space a work of 
fiction was being read, not requiring physical contact to enable the practice and 
engagement of social sympathy. Like the periodical journalism of previous decades, the 
sentimental fiction of writers like Richardson reproduced sociability, with its focus on 
moral sentiments and social harmony, within the novels. Reading together, using the 
text to cultivate their sensibilities and embody the emotional experiences within the 
text, no matter how distant in time or place, allowed individuals to become part of a 
polite reading public engaged in the same emotional practice. 
Reading “for the sentiment” was also practised as a social activity, reinforcing 
the sociability of the text. In a letter to Richardson, Aaron Hill describes the scene in 
which he reads his friend’s Pamela aloud to “some Company”.604  As we have seen, 
this image was repeated in a number of spaces across the country: communal reading 
took place in educational spaces like that at Warrington, as well as in public spaces like 
the coffeehouse and literary and philosophical society. Hill goes on to give of the effect 
of reading on his son: 
[W]e heard a Succession of heart-heaving Sobs; which while he 
strove to conceal from our Notice, his little Sides swell’d, as if 
they would burst, with the throbbing Restraint of Sorrow. […] 
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his Eyes were quite lost, in his Tears: which running down from 
his Cheeks in free Currents, had form’d two sincere little 
Fountains, on that Part of the Carpet he hung over. 605   
The body of Hill’s son marks the correct response to a reading of sentimental fiction. 
The lasting effects of the novel on the little boy are highlighted to demonstrate that 
reading sentimental fiction is an improving activity. Not only are his tears given 
approval by the company – the ladies present “were ready to devour him with Kisses” 
– Hill links his son’s emotional response with a change in his overall behaviour.606 He 
has become a more studious pupil, “fond of his Book which (before) he cou’d never be 
brought to attend to”.607 The boy has learnt from the approval of his community that 
his embodied emotional response to Pamela was the correct one and has been 
transformed into a virtuous member of his family. As Goring argues, Hill shows that 
both Pamela the character and Pamela the novel have the power to move, transform, 
and moralise those who engage with the text.608  
For Csengei, a novel like Pamela “demonstrates a belief in the ability of 
sentimental fiction intensively to form and reform the reading public, self-consciously 
acting out how such an education in feeling is brought about”.609 She suggests that 
both the sentimental novels themselves, and their success at the time of publication, 
demonstrate how a practice of reading that interprets texts through affective response 
“has the potential to connect fiction and life, and thus instantiates how reading that is 
performed in the private sphere also has public, social and political stakes”.610 The 
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connection between sentimental reading practice and the reformist intent of later 
abolitionist literature is founded on the idea that reading sentimental works, whether in 
fictional novels, verse, or even in periodicals and sermons as previously discussed, was 
an act that engaged the moral sentiments. The practice of reading was thus aimed at 
being an act of self and social improvement, the text used as a tool of emotional 
practice designed to cultivate and socialise the reader into a community of men and 
women of feeling. The antislavery texts I examine in the following section draw on 
this understanding to extend their readers’ feelings towards the suffering slaves in the 
British sugar colonies. 
5.2 Pre-Movement Antislavery Literature: Towards a Politics of Sympathy in 
Sentimental Fiction 
The key feature of reading “for the sentiment” was the imagined causal link between 
reading sentimental fiction and the reform of society with which its practitioners, 
writers and readers alike, imbued it. The emotional practice of reading would create 
highly cultivated men and women of sensibility who had the capacity to see the 
injustices and miseries of the world and feel impelled through their compassionate 
natures to help in some way. As Ellis states, in a broad sense, “the sentimental novel’s 
articulation of these themes constitutes an attempt to reformulate social attitudes to 
inequality through the development of a new humanitarian sensibility”.611 Sentimental 
literature developed victim-centred narratives which focused on the miseries and pain 
of “the world” while figures of benevolence and feeling shed tears of pity. No figure, 
perhaps, could be more miserable and in need of a compassionate witness than the 
African slave, a victim of brutal violence who had suffered the loss of liberty, equality, 
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and humanity. By the second half of the eighteenth century, slavery was increasingly 
recognised as a major source of human suffering, principally due to the widespread 
increase in circulation of information about the slave trade and plantation life through 
pamphlets, travel journals and histories, and books by men like Benezet.612  
The attraction of the slave as the central figure in distress and the Briton – or 
Britain – as the figure of benevolent compassion and liberty was thus, in a certain sense, 
becoming increasingly obvious to writers of sentimental fiction. Sypher argues that the 
period between the late 1750s and 1787 was the moment when the theme of slavery 
transformed, first into antislavery sentiment, and later into more explicit abolitionist 
appeals.613 This time frame coincides with the emergence of the same topic in sermon 
literature, pamphlet literature, and events such as the Somerset case, and it is in this 
period that much of the antislavery themes and its associated rhetoric of sentimentalism 
were developed. In sentimental novels, depictions of slaves, ex-slaves and plantation 
life appear as small episodes within the narrative of the book which emphasise both the 
pain, fear, and misery of the slave and the compassion and benevolence of the man or 
woman of feeling who pities them. One of the first and clearest statements against 
slavery was made by Sarah Scott in her sentimental novel The History of Sir George 
Ellison, published anonymously in 1766. Through the marriage of Ellison to his 
wealthy Anglo-Jamaican wife, and his consequent acquisition of a slave-worked sugar 
plantation, Scott makes important comparisons between the cultivated, benevolent 
Englishman and the unnaturally hard-hearted female plantation owner which draw on 
the sentimental understanding of emotional cultivation and habituation. 
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Ellison is horrified by the cruelty and violence with which his slaves are treated 
by the overseer of his plantation and sets about improving the system, much to his 
wife’s disdain. The rhetoric Scott uses in the scene of Ellison’s interference in a slave 
punishment is classically sentimental, with tears emanating from both Ellison and the 
slaves he saves from abuse: falling to his feet, and with “streaming eyes”, they thank 
him for his generosity while he “wept” with the joy of “relieving our fellow creatures 
from misery”.614 Ellison’s sentimental argument for helping the slaves relies on the 
emotions that led to, and were experienced after, his benevolent action. Scott’s novel 
has been explored in several studies of abolitionist literature to examine both the 
sentimentalism of the work and her focus on amelioration of the conditions of 
slavery.615  While these studies have noted the stark difference between the emotional 
responses of Ellison and his wife which are a result of their respective upbringings, 
little attention has been paid to the significance of the relationship between the 
emotional norms of each character and their emotional practices implicit in Scott’s tale. 
My interest in this novel lies in the way emotional cultivation is understood as affecting 
moral behaviour. 
Mrs Ellison is presented to the reader as a hard-hearted woman who is unmoved 
by either the cruelties around her or the pity of her husband towards her slaves. More 
than unmoved, she is shocked and offended by his attempts to help them. Part of her 
reasoning is racially motivated: “she had a reasonable share of compassion for a white 
man or woman, but had from her infancy been so accustomed to see the most shocking 
                                                          
614 Sarah Scott, The History of Sir George Ellison, ed. Betty Rizzo (Lexington, Kentucky: The University 
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cruelties exercised on the blacks, that she could not conceive how one of that 
complexion could excite any pity.”616  Her habituation in seeing slaves treated badly is 
highlighted here. From a young age she has witnessed violence and cruelty and has 
grown so accustomed to both that she no longer considers slaves as fellow human 
beings worthy of compassion. Ellis states that the text justifies Mrs Ellison’s acceptance 
of slavery by declaring she is accustomed to it.617  The point Ellis misses is that, while 
the character herself is justifying her reasons for insensibility towards slaves, it is her 
emotional cultivation and habituation, and its consequences, that are being condemned 
by comparing her behaviour with her husband’s. Born and educated in England and 
therefore unaccustomed to the inhumanity of slavery, Ellison finds that in a different 
country, with different emotional norms, his benevolent humanitarianism is seen as out 
of place. From Mrs Ellison’s point of view, her husband’s intervention in the slaves’ 
punishment is improper and goes against the customs of Jamaica with which she has 
grown up: “Accordingly she calmly represented to him the impropriety of what he had 
done”.618  However, Ellison pursues his reforms and proves his sensibility, and thus his 
proper emotional education, through his compassion and his benevolent and charitable 
actions towards those he sees in miserable situations.  
Mrs Ellison, for her part, sees her husband’s compassionate acts as weak, 
reflecting that she “had always kept her slaves in as good order as any man in the 
island, and never flinched at any punishment her steward thought proper to inflict upon 
them”.619 Good order, in her experience, is maintained with violence and oppression. 
Her supposed strength in unflinchingly directing the punishment of slaves is proof, 
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however, of her poor emotional education. In sentimental ethics, the softer, calmer 
emotions, like benevolence, are cultivated; her pride in being seen as hardened and as 
strong as a man in her situation paints her as unfeminine and lacking in sensibility, 
showing no sign of the softened sentiments with which virtuous women were depicted 
in sentimental fiction. Her heart is hardened to the scenes of misery around her and her 
habituation in such cruelty has denied her an appropriate sentimental emotional 
education. This is further highlighted using another argument common to sentimental 
antislavery arguments: her demonstration of false sensibility when she falls into a fit of 
tears at the injury of her lap-dog. 
While walking the grounds of their estate and discussing their opposing views 
on compassion and slavery, an accident in which her favourite pet injures its leg draws 
“a shower of tears from Mrs. Ellison’s eyes”. 620  The force of the emotion she displays 
is in stark contrast to the total lack of emotion she is seen to feel towards slaves. Ellison 
is quick to see the hypocrisy of her feelings: 
to see any creature suffer is an affecting sight; and it gives me 
pleasure to observe you can feel it for the poor little animal, 
whose love for you occasioned his accident; but I confess I am 
surprized, though agreeably, to see such marks of sensibility in a 
heart I feared was hardened against the sufferings even of her 
fellow creatures.621 
Mrs Ellison is clearly capable of sympathetic feelings – tears, after all, are an indication 
of sensibility. However, they are misdirected. Her response to the injury of a lap-dog, 
traditionally seen in eighteenth-century culture as an object of luxury and unworthy of 
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the amount of care lavished upon them by their mistresses, is disproportionate to the 
amount of feeling she shows towards figures more worthy of compassion – slaves.622  
The sensibility she demonstrates is yet another sign of her poor emotional education. 
She has cultivated it towards useless objects – lap-dogs – and has allowed humanity to 
suffer. The narrator uses the lap-dog not to prove that she indeed has some sensibility, 
but rather, as Ellis points out, “to deflate or dissolve Mrs Ellison’s position, especially 
her ‘hard heartedness’, habituated cynicism and lack of compassion”.623   
Sensibility and sentimental ethics are thus appealed to in the novel as proof of 
the effectiveness of emotional practice, or cultivation, to moral action. Ellison, unlike 
his wife, is able to see the slaves’ miseries and fears, imagine their pain, and feel 
compassion through the sympathetic contagion of feeling that passes between himself 
and the victims. In the same way that Clarkson would later highlight habituation as the 
key to the difference between benevolent Britons and cruel colonialists, Scott pursues 
the sentimental argument that being practised in cruelty leads to more of the same, 
while emotional practices which cultivate sensibility and enhance one’s moral 
sentiments can only lead to humane and morally virtuous action. As scholars have 
stated before, despite only seemingly suggesting a mitigation of circumstances for 
slaves on colonial plantations, Scott’s discussion of the morality of slavery and the 
emotional force with which she describes the necessity of considering them as fellow 
creatures was certainly innovative for sentimental fiction in the 1760s.624  
Contemporary critical reviews of the novel highlight this aspect of the text.625 The fact 
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that these journals were interested enough in Scott’s representation of slavery and 
benevolence to reproduce its passages and circulate them to a wider readership points to 
its success both as a work of sentimental fiction and as an early piece of antislavery 
writing. The antislavery sentiments being appealed to in the text were beginning to find 
an audience. 
One reader who was particularly heartened by Scott’s message was Ignatius 
Sancho.626  Writing to Sterne in 1766, he praises “the humane author”, stating that, 
apart from Sterne himself, Scott is the only one to have “drawn a tear in favour of my 
miserable black brethren”.627  Sancho’s letter is interesting for its suggestion that 
writing about slavery in sentimental fiction could be of use to slaves and demonstrates 
that, for him at least, there was gain to be made in terms of public sentiment from 
engaging their readership in sentimental arguments about slavery. Noting the 
effectiveness of Sterne’s sentimental treatment of slavery in his Sermons, discussed in 
chapter four, Sancho asks his literary hero to include slavery in his next novel: 
 – I am sure you will applaud me for beseeching you to give one 
half hour’s attention to slavery, as it is at this day practised in 
our West Indies. – That subject, handled in your striking 
manner, would ease the yoke (perhaps) of many – but if only of 
one – Gracious God! – what a feast to a benevolent heart! […] – 
Dear Sir, think in me you behold the uplifted hands of thousands 
of my brother Moors. – Grief (you pathetically observe) is 
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eloquent; – figure to yourself their attitudes; – hear their 
supplicating addresses!628  
This passage is full of sentimental language and imagery – supplicating slaves, the 
“uplifted hands of thousands” presenting a “feast” to those with “a benevolent heart”. 
Sancho here is suggesting ways of depicting slaves in a sentimental fashion in order to 
gain the compassion of the reader. In doing so he is also implicitly suggesting that this 
would do good for his fellow slaves: it would “ease the yoke of many”. As Ellis points 
out, Sancho’s position on the effectiveness of sentimental writing is sophisticated: he is 
not being literal in his claims that literature can “ease the yoke” of thousands of slaves, 
but rather he is concluding that the most effective way of influencing the public, and 
hence a reform of the institution of slavery, would be to affect people’s feelings.629  
Whether Sterne listened to Sancho’s pleas or had already set about writing a 
sentimental passage against slavery, the final instalment of his Life and Opinions of 
Tristram Shandy (1759-1767) included the “tender tale of the sorrows of a friendless 
poor negro-girl”.630   
In the 1760s when Scott and Sterne were writing their novels, there was almost 
no discussion of antislavery ideas beyond what the Quaker community were 
producing.631  The inclusion of antislavery themes into their sentimental fiction opened 
the way for new arguments to be made against slavery that were based on the emotional 
norms of an increasingly growing reading public. These novels were among the first to 
link sentimental values and a position of antislavery. This was crucial to the 
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development of abolitionist emotional practices. Sentimental writers were planting the 
seed in their communities of readers that the institution of slavery ran against the 
emotional repertoire they were prescribing within their fiction and with the practice of 
reading that they were encouraging. Thomas Clarkson later commented that Sterne’s 
fable in Tristram Shandy did indeed prove of benefit in directing sympathy towards 
African slaves: “Sterne, in his account of the Negro girl […] took decidedly the part of 
the oppressed Africans. The pathetic, witty and sentimental manner, in which he 
handled this subject, occasioned many to remember it, and procured a certain portion of 
feeling in their favour”.632 Social sympathy and the moral sentiments were from this 
point firmly attached to antislavery arguments in literature.633 
Poetry was also vital to the developing practice of sentimental reading that 
linked sensibility, moral virtue, and an antislavery stance. At the same time as the 
sentimental novel emerged, a poetry which was associated with moralising, natural 
description, and melancholic mental states grew extremely popular.634 As Mullan states, 
“the private sensibility and the high-minded reclusiveness celebrated in many novels 
has its parallels in the poetic postures of wounded melancholy and solitary meditation 
typical of many of the fashionable odes, elegies, and laments of the period”.635 In these 
poems the state of “the world” is particularly lamented and the poet wishes for retreat. 
However, the melancholy of sentimental poetry, while isolationist, was not meant to be 
solipsistic. Rather, the feelings of the poets were meant to suggest a superior sensibility, 
setting themselves apart from the unfeeling world. Reading their melancholic laments 
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was to share in the poet’s grief for the ills they see around them and should result in 
benevolence on the part of the reader.636   Poets like Edward Young and William 
Cowper exalt social sympathy and benevolence while also yearning for isolation and 
retreat. There was also an urgency and indignation expressed within these poems which 
give them a more didactic bent than their sentimental counterparts in prose fiction. As 
Todd states, sentimental poetry is ultimately outward-looking: “the aim is not individual 
self-analysis but emotional instruction”.637 Sentimental poetry was thus often used more 
explicitly by writers to express social and political ideas than were novels.638  
Sentimental poems, unlike novels, are more likely to attack the root causes of social 
problems, particularly the greed of the wealthy, using the traditional didacticism 
attached to poetry as a genre alongside sentimental arguments for the improvement of 
society. 
William Cowper was one of the first sentimental poets to turn his attention to 
slavery as a topic of concern. Indeed, no major poet was as prolific in expressing 
antislavery ideas and his poems are central to exploring the abolitionist literary 
campaign. In his ode to benevolence and philanthropy, “Charity” (1782), in which he 
calls on a personified Charity to “prompt me with benevolent desires” and to “Teach me 
to kindle” the same “gentle fires” in others, Cowper rails against the “baser souls” who 
“thwart its influence” and enslave others.639 With a nod to his sentimental and religious 
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ethics, he asks, “Canst thou, and honour’d with a Christian name, / Buy what is woman-
born, and feel no shame?” (180-181).  His allusion to shame is in line with later 
abolitionist arguments about the impossibility of carrying out atrocities on other human 
beings if one had any sense of the shame of it. Cowper here is casting the perpetrators 
of enslavement as unfeeling; their ability to “buy the muscles and the bones of man” is 
proof of their insensibility (140).  
Cowper ties sentimental benevolence to a religious doctrine familiar to many by 
the end of the century, claiming it is God’s “social plan” which “by various ties attaches 
man to man” (15-16).  In line with this belief in a sociable world, Cowper is clear on 
where he places slavery and the slave trade. These are institutions which go against 
both nature and God. When “the tender ties of father, husband, friend” are broken, as 
they are when people are taken forcibly from their homes and sold into slavery, then 
“all bonds of nature in that moment end” (141-142). This was one of the most prevalent 
arguments used by abolitionists when they began to campaign for an end to the slave 
trade. If humans are inherently sociable by nature, then to knowingly break those bonds 
is unnatural and inhuman. Yet, he states that “Still there is room for pity to abate / And 
soothe the sorrows of so sad a state” (198-199). He clearly wants Charity, called down 
to the world through his poem, to touch the hearts of his readers and to make them feel 
for the sorrows of others: “Teach mercy to ten thousand hearts, that share / The fears 
and hopes of a commercial care” (278-279). He is sure that, given the opportunity, no 
one “would lose, that had the power to improve / The occasion of transmuting fear to 
love” (224-225). While not an overtly political statement against slavery, Cowper is 
implying that engaging our benevolent feelings is a step towards treating the social ills 
of others. In his final appraisal, if Charity was allowed to prevail she would spread 
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“wide her arms of universal love” (596) and enclose “creation in her close embrace” 
(598). The world, in other words, would be a better place. 
Before I move on to the poetry of the major campaign years, brief mention 
should be made of Thomas Day and John Bicknell’s sentimental epic poem, The Dying 
Negro (1773-1775), written nearly ten years before Cowper’s “Charity”.640 It is an 
overtly sentimental work, establishing a sentimental hero in the title character who 
expresses his feelings through the bodily symptoms readers had come to expect in 
literature of sensibility – tears, groans and sighs. The poem is a suicide note recounted 
by the enslaved African who wishes to leave the world rather than surrender his body to 
the chain and whip of oppression. The noble African is a sentimental hero because he 
undergoes suffering himself while also expressing his own compassionate emotional 
response to the plight of fellow creatures. His “dying eyes o’erflow” at the thought of 
his fellow slaves groaning “beneath some dastard planter's chain”.641 His feelings are 
contrasted to the slave traders who are characterised as having “feeble” souls, “unus’d 
to pity or to feel” (249-250). Once again, it is the inability to feel for others that marks 
the cruel from the humane and the fact that the traders are “unus’d” to the softer 
sentiments of compassion highlights their poor emotional education. Here Day 
deliberately juxtaposes the intrinsically noble African “savage” in whose “veins the tide 
of honour rolls” (126) and in whom “pity melts the sympathising breast” (129), with 
dehumanised, brutish slave traders marked by their inability to feel “each nobler 
passion” (252). Where greed tempts the Christian to perpetrate crimes against 
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humanity, the slave declares that, faced with the same temptations and promises of 
wealth, he would “scorn their glories as I hate their crimes” (304). 
While The Dying Negro is opposed to slavery, it does not directly appeal for a 
political solution to the miseries it presents to the reader. In line with other sentimental 
works of fiction, its purpose is to raise the emotions of the reader and, as Carey states, it 
“often seems content merely to wallow in the misfortunes of the suffering victim”.642 Its 
preface, however, which was added to the 1775 edition, is more explicit in its attempts 
to persuade the reader towards a more active antislavery stance. This preface, which 
takes the form of a dedication to Day’s idol Jean-Jacques Rousseau, conveys a number 
of arguments which condemn the slave trader and the hypocrisy of Western nations (in 
this case America comes under the most intense scrutiny) in clamouring for liberty 
while “the clank of chains, and the groans of anguish” are present in the background.643 
Yet again it is the greed of men, operating “under the mask of commerce”, which lies at 
the root of human misery and which taints and tarnishes “the lustre” of his nation’s 
“sublime institutions” – those organisations and establishments of philanthropy and 
improvement which have marked “the age of generous sentiment, and refined 
humanity”.644 Slavery is a blemish on the moral character of Britain and America. 
It is the work of art which is called upon to effect some sort of change, though 
what that change should be is unclear at this stage. Day asks Rousseau (and the reader) 
to “Astonish and instruct posterity by the dreadful spectacle of human crimes”.645 It is 
through a presentation of the horrors and miseries of slavery through art and literature 
                                                          
642 Carey, British Abolitionism, 80. 
643 Day wishes to “inscribe a piece, whose only merit is the humanity and freedom of its sentiments, to 
that man, from whose writings I have principally derived them”. His sentimental arguments in this piece 
are clearly based on Rousseau’s philosophy whereby civilisation is blamed for the ills of society. See 
Day, “Dedication”, The Dying Negro, v. and ix. 
644 Ibid., v, viii, and vii. 
645 Ibid., v.  
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that the world can be instructed of its inhumanity. In light of this his dedication ends 
with the hope that his poem “might contribute to such a cause, or interest the generous 
minds of my countrymen to extend an ampler protection to the most innocent and 
miserable of their own species”.646 This is a far more explicit antislavery statement than 
is present anywhere in the poem itself and, while it is not obvious in what shape this 
“ampler protection” would take, Day is clearly calling for some further philanthropic 
action on the part of the reader. It is perhaps this aspect of The Dying Negro which led 
to its constant republication and use as an abolitionist text during the campaigning 
years. It is clear from Day’s introduction to his work, and from the ideas presented by 
Cowper in his antislavery pieces, that the sentimental reader is not just meant to be 
saddened by the display of misery in these texts but is required to share in the 
indignation of the poets and to inquire more deeply into the causes of the injustices of 
the world.647  
By the 1780s, no topic was becoming more pressing to the sentimental belief in 
benevolent philanthropy than slavery and the man or woman of feeling was being 
impressed upon to act on the basis of their emotional responses to sentimental literature. 
The reader was becoming the person upon whom both the slave and Britain were 
depending to bring about a reformation of social ills and of morals. Thus, with the 
establishment of the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, the 
combination of sentimental affections and the more politically urgent, and perhaps more 
motivating, emotion of indignation combine to create a literature that was specifically 
political and distinctively abolitionist. 
                                                          
646 Ibid., ix-x. 
647 See White, Natural Rights. 
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5.3 “Weep with me Substantial Ills”: Poetry as a Tool of the Abolitionist Politics of 
Sympathy 
The appeal of the emotional excess of sensibility portrayed in sentimental novels was 
increasingly seen as outmoded, or even dangerous, as the century drew to a close.648 As 
Ahern points out, “commentators were increasingly likely to find a sentimental text 
more affected than affecting by the time the abolitionist cause was gaining 
momentum”.649 This begs the question of why a vast majority of abolitionist mobilising 
material used sentimental language, particularly in poetry. With the popularity of 
sentimental literature already waning by the time the first campaigns got under way in 
1787-8, it is unlikely that the reason lies purely in an appeal to the masses. Carey 
stresses the importance of the focus on “false sensibility” in abolitionist verse, which he 
states was a method abolitionist writers used to distance themselves from association 
with a literature often accused of populism, insincerity, and effeminacy.650  Yet he does 
not give an adequate account of the possible reasoning behind the continued use of 
sentimental language and arguments in abolitionist poetry, despite their apparent 
declarations against it.  An answer could lie in their advocacy of emotional cultivation. 
False sensibility is a sign of poor emotional cultivation in the emotional repertoire of 
abolitionists. In the protestations against sensibility within abolitionist verse, they are 
not proclaiming against sensibility itself, which is what Carey suggests, but a badly 
cultivated one.  
                                                          
648 See Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability; Barker-Benfield, Culture of Sensibility; Goring, Rhetoric of 
Sensibility. 
649 Ahern, Affect and Abolition, 7 (his emphasis). 
650 Carey, British Abolitionism. Carey claims that the reasoning behind their attacks on sensibility lies in 
the pro-slavery method of casting abolitionists as feminine, “tender hearted poetesses” unqualified to 
make political statements. Attacking sensibility was the abolitionists’ way of distancing themselves from 
such associations and claiming reason, not feeling, was behind their arguments (88-92). 
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In the abolitionist verse I examine here, “false sensibility” is a sign of misguided 
emotional practice which leads to the wrong emotional responses, stemming from the 
wrong emotional stimuli. True sensibility, one that responds to real events like slavery 
and not the fictional scenes of a novel or play, is morally virtuous and leads to 
benevolent, philanthropic action – the mark of the abolitionist. William Roscoe begins 
his two-part poem, The Wrongs of Africa (1787-8), by accusing a personified 
Sensibility with inducing futile feelings as it sits “in crowded theatres” and “with wat’ry 
eye, / Drop[s] o’er fancied woes her useless tear”.651 The rhetoric of sensibility popular 
in the theatres and in other forms of literature is only good for inducing “useless” tears 
in a feeling audience that fall vainly over “fancied” scenes of fictive misery. The 
“strong emotion” of compassion rises “in vain” in these instances (16), but not when 
faced with scenes that are real. His request to “Come […] and weep with me substantial 
ills” (12) is a statement that what he presents for the reader to witness through his poem 
is not a fiction and is therefore worthy of all the sentimental language at his disposal to 
move the reader to compassion. So, far from distancing his work from the literature of 
sensibility, Roscoe is making it clear that his real subject is not only worth the tears that 
will be shed by the reader, but also one that will draw tears of active compassion rather 
than useless pity.  He repeats this in the second part of the poem, published the 
following year: 
 – But soft – perchance a tale of private woe, 
May lightly touch the mind: or shou’d it prompt 
The tear of sympathy, may fail to rouse 
Those strong emotions, that indignant glow 
                                                          
651 William Roscoe, The Wrongs of Africa, Part the First (London, 1787), lines 10-11, Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online, Gale (CW3313367102). 
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Which virtue feels, when generous aims inspire 
Consenting bosoms; […] 
     – Listen then, 
Whilst truth restrains the muse’s wandering step, 
And gives her awful sanction to the song.652  
Once again the “tear of sympathy” is not enough when encountered with a tale of 
“private woe”. Tears must inspire, rather, “Those strong emotions” which are felt when 
active compassion is stirred – those “generous aims” which lead to benevolent actions. 
Again Roscoe is making sure his readers are aware that the tears they shed when 
reading his work are for “truth” rather than “fancied woes”. It is this knowledge that 
should lead to efforts to aid the suffering of slaves, which in the case of abolitionism, 
took the form of political action against the slave trade. 
Roscoe’s appeal to the reader to react to “substantial ills” is echoed by Hannah 
More in her Slavery, A Poem (1788): “O, plaintive Southerne! whose impassion’d strain 
/ So oft has wak’d my languid Muse in vain!”653  Referring to playwrights and poets 
that treated slavery before her, More is setting her work apart as one that does not 
awake an audience’s compassion “in vain” (38) but in the hope that they will be moved 
to action. Pointing out that she is addressing a real and not an imagined problem, she 
argues that “for no fictitious ill these numbers flow, / But living anguish and substantial 
woe” (53-54); it is “Fair Truth” that is her “hallow’d guide” (50). These lines assert a 
separation from sentimental fiction, which draws useless tears, while using all the force 
                                                          
652 William Roscoe, The Wrongs of Africa, Part the Second (London, 1788), lines 426-446, Brycchan 
Carey, http://www.brycchancarey.com/slavery/roscoe2.htm. 
653 Hannah More, Slavery, A Poem (London, 1788), lines 37-38, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 
Gale (CW3312280885). Thomas Southerne adapted Behn’s Oroonoko for the stage in 1695. Throughout 
the eighteenth century Southerne’s work was more popular than the original book by Behn as he 
emphasised scenes of pathos. It is Southerne’s Oroonoko that is cited by abolitionists at the end of the 
century, not Behn’s. 
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of sentimental language to move her audience to active compassion. Her poem, in other 
words, was not written for mere aesthetic enjoyment but as a contribution to a political 
debate and an instrument of a political appeal to call for an end to the slave trade. She 
wrote it, after all, with the express purpose of influencing minds in the lead up to 
William Wilberforce’s parliamentary motion for abolition: in early 1788 she writes to 
her sister of her haste in getting it published, stating that “here time is everything”.654 
Like Roscoe, her position on sentimentalism is not one of opposition but one which 
drafts sentimental language firmly to the aid of philanthropy and political movement. 
She is prompting an emotional response based on real suffering and upon which, in 
light of the efforts of the abolition committees in petitioning parliament, readers had 
real possibilities of acting.  
Other writers repeat this line of argument. In an extended attack on sensibility, 
Barbauld’s Epistle to William Wilberforce (1791) echoes the scene of Scott’s Sir 
George Ellison in which the refined lady, “Of body delicate, infirm of mind”, embodies 
the “languid” gestures of a debilitating sensibility while wielding “the household 
scourge” over her slaves with “unruffled mien”.655 Barbauld’s poem is more negative 
than the others mentioned here, as I discuss below, and her attack on sensibility’s 
futility as an instrument of political mobilisation has more to do with contemporary 
failures of achieving abolition in the first instance of its being presented to parliament. 
However, there is a warning to the reading audience implied in all of these poems. The 
                                                          
654 William Roberts, Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Mrs Hannah More (New York, 1834) 
282, Google Books, https://books.google.com.au/books?id=mB88AQAAIAAJ. She also worried that “if 
it does not come out at the particular moment when the discussion comes on in Parliament, it will not be 
worth a straw” (281).  More clearly had an idea that a poem on the subject would have a political 
purpose, her rush to get it printed suggesting that she hoped enough people, including her influential 
friends and acquaintances in parliament, would have read about and known the cruelties of the trade 
before they debated and decided the issue. 
655 Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Epistle to William Wilberforce, Esq. On the Rejection of the Bill for 




insistence that readers must be prepared to weep over real suffering as much as, or even 
more than, they do over “fictitious ills” is a hint at the practice of reading that 
abolitionists were creating in their sentimental poetry. That is, if a reader does not 
respond appropriately to the suffering presented to them in their poems, they have not 
cultivated their sensibilities to any real or moral purpose. They would display the 
hypocrisy of the slave traders and owners themselves who, like Scott’s Mrs Ellison, 
could weep over an injured dog while remaining totally unfeeling to the human misery 
around her. Thus, sentimental abolitionist verse was able to adopt a literary style that 
suited antislavery arguments, retaining the centrality of sensibility and social sympathy 
within their emotional repertoire, while, at the same time, adapting it in order to claim 
the moral superiority of their position.  They are moving beyond the realm of 
sentimental fiction, which only ever aimed at improving readers implicitly, to a body of 
work which explicitly calls for philanthropic, political action. 
To adapt sentimentalism to their politics of sympathy abolitionist poets drew 
upon the rules of sympathetic contagion through personification and apostrophes that 
called up the sentimental ideals to affect the nation and literally move people to 
benevolent political action.  Liberty, Mercy, Humanity, universal and social love, are 
hailed and called upon to literally affect the reader, and from thence the nation, with 
these values and sentiments. Personifying emotions makes them part of the conversation 
between writer and reader, the “person” who will carry the emotions from one to the 
other.656 It thus acts to channel the emotions the poet wishes to pass on to the reader 
                                                          
656 Apostrophic personification is a technique frequently used by James Thomson, whose works are 
frequently alluded to by abolitionist poets (More included lines from his Liberty as an introduction to 
Slavery). Keenleyside argues that Thomson understood personification to confer agency on sentiments 
which have the capacity to move persons, or a people. Presenting passions in this form gives them an 
agency to literally affect people: “Thomson imagines […] social love not as an internal feeling but rather 
as an external force, which binds” people together. Heather Keenleyside, “Personification for the People: 
On James Thomson's The Seasons”, ELH 76 (Summer 2009): 458-464, doi: 10.1353/elh.0.0044.  
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through sympathetic contagion. At the same time, through the very act of 
apostrophising sentiments like social love, these poets are implying that they do not 
exist in their society. The sentimental poet is one who sees a world bereft of the 
emotions they wish to see form part of its emotional repertoire. By literalising the 
movement of emotions from one person to another, apostrophic personification makes 
the poet, or rather the poem, a necessary tool of sympathetic emotional communication 
and a politics of sympathy. 
From his opening lines, Roscoe establishes “Humanity” as the principle upon 
which he bases his abolitionist stance. With his denouncement of false sensibility he 
turns to a personified Humanity to “strike the string that from a kindred breast/ 
Responsive vibrates” (5-6). He is appealing to the mutual sympathy of human beings, 
making full use of the idea of the text as the instrument of a reading practice which 
cultivates the social sentiments. It is through his sentimental rhetoric, his somatic 
language, and use of tropes of suffering that “Humanity” will spread from one person 
(the writer) to another (the reader). Thus the language of sympathetic contagion is tied 
to the idea of witnessing misery and feeling along with it:  
Come thou, and weep with me substantial ills; 
Torn from their natal shore, and doom’d to bear 
The yoke of servitude in western climes, 
Sustain. Nor vainly let our sorrows flow,  
Nor let the strong emotion rise in vain,  
But may the kind contagion widely spread, 
Till in its flame the unrelenting heart 
Of Avarice, melt in softest sympathy; –  
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And one bright blaze of universal love, 
In grateful incense, rises up to heaven. (12-21) 
In this passage we can see the poet’s assumptions about how emotions work. The 
“strong emotion” of sympathy is described as a “kind contagion” which must be 
allowed to spread among people if society is to achieve “universal love”. Personifying 
Humanity and calling it down to infect the nation with a contagious sympathy positions 
the text as an intermediary via which emotions can be passed between people, a tool of 
his emotional practice.  
Having established his text as one to be read “for the sentiment”, Roscoe asks: 
“Why feels not man for man?” (24). While “selfish aim[s]” (43) and “European 
avarice” (147) are at the root of the problem, Roscoe addresses the nature of the men 
who succumb to such greed that they ignore the suffering induced by it:  
[…] what powers unknown 
Of keen enjoyment can thy nature boast, 
That thus thy single bliss can grasp the sum  
Of hapless numbers sacrificed to thee? (69-72) 
These hints at the unnatural feelings of masters and slavers are made throughout the 
entire poem: he asks if the “tears [of the slaves] delight” the trader (73); if he feels a 
“horrid bliss / In the wild shriek of anguish” emanating from the hordes of slaves (84-
5); if “from the depths / Of loathsome dungeons, manacles, and chains, / [he] Canst 
draw strange pleasure, and preposterous joy” (100-102). The implication that those 
involved in the trade must feel a strange joy at the pain they inflict on others echoes 
Shaftesbury’s idea of the “unnatural” affections which give people an “inhuman delight 
in beholding torments, and in viewing distress, calamity, blood, massacre and 
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destruction, with a peculiar joy and pleasure”.657 Moreover, like Shaftesbury, Roscoe is 
clear that such unnatural feelings, such “horrid bliss”, are the result of cultivation rather 
than something they are born with:  
Or spring not rather thy detested joys,  
From some perversion of each nobler sense  
Indulgent nature gave thee? (77-79) 
Their “detested joys” and their cruelty are a “perversion” of the natural moral sense that 
nature, or God, gave them at birth. Their hearts are referred to as being “harden’d” (85; 
455), suggesting that they have become so through practice. 
The inhumanity of these people is identified by their inability to shed a tear of 
pity or to hear the “groan” of the slave “without compassion” (433-4). Roscoe imagines 
the response of a master or slaver – “some veteran trafficker in blood” (441) – to the 
accusations made of him as being “void of feeling” (432). While it is assumed that their 
“ears are shut to misery’s voice” and their “harden’d hearts / Lost to the social 
sympathies of man” (454-56), slavers claim that “the potent charm of interest” becomes 
the “substitute” of “humanity” and it is this which leads them to treat their slaves well 
(458-460). In highlighting the absurd reasoning of the pro-slavery debate, Roscoe 
reinforces his own argument that these men are not men of feeling. By suggesting that 
their proof of feeling lies in the fact that it is in their “interest” to treat slaves well, 
Roscoe is demonstrating to his readers the “veil,/ That not conceals, but more deforms” 
their “crimes” (489-90). Currie’s preface to the poem pushes this point.658 In an 
                                                          
657 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 2:163 (see chap. 1, n. 30). 
 
658 James Currie was instrumental in promoting and printing Roscoe’s abolitionist works. For discussion 




explication of the worst horrors of the trade, he states that the slaves are handed over to 
“masters whose natural feelings are destroyed by early and continual intercourse with 
the worst of slavery”.659 The planters have grown up in the Caribbean with slavery all 
around them, as Mrs Ellison had, witnessing cruelty on a regular basis and learning the 
emotional rules of their own plantocratic society. Thus “custom” led to a “corruption of 
the heart” and a “perversion of the understanding” on the part of the slave owners.660 
Their cruelty is not natural, it is a custom, a force of habit, and more “deeply to be 
deplored” is the fact that “there are some men deeply engaged in the traffic […] who 
are, in other respects, men of honour and integrity”.661 Such men, Currie implies, have 
not had the right emotional cultivation, their sensibility false for being misdirected.  
In order to highlight the difference between the anti- and pro-slavery sides of the 
debate further, the blush is used to signify the feelings of shame that any person who 
had cultivated a proper sensibility would experience in the face of such confronting 
images of misery. Calling for an emotional response, he demands to “let the cheek with 
burning blushes glow, / And pity pour her tears” (397-8). “Man” is the “author of the 
wrong” and must feel the shame of it: 
And shall not they, 
In colour, nation, faith, – associate all –  
Who see, yet not resent it; hear of it, 
Yet stand regardless; know it, yet partake 
The luxuries it supplies; shall these not feel 
The keen emotions of remorse and shame? 
                                                          
659 James Currie, “Preface”, Wrongs of Africa, I, v. 
660 Ibid., vii. 
661 Ibid., vii-viii. 
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And learn this truth severe, that whilst they shun 
The glorious conflict, nor assist the cause 
Of suffering nature, THEY PARTAKE THE GUILT? (399-407) 
This passage is a direct challenge to his readers: if they are men and women of feeling 
they should be blushing for the wrong done, weeping for the suffering endured by 
slaves. He is also extending the blame here, to everyone who knows about the cruelties 
of the trade, who hear of and see its wrongs and yet who do not feel resentment or 
remorse, who stand by and do nothing to correct the wrong, and who “partake” in its 
luxuries, that is, consume the sugar and rum produced by “suffering nature” without a 
second thought. It is here that Roscoe turns his sentimental arguments into a politics of 
sympathy. It is not enough to hear and see the facts; action must be taken to put an end 
to the institution.  
With friends in both the London and the Manchester committees, Roscoe was 
fully aware that the movement to abolish the slave trade had begun and knew that 
taking action was becoming a possibility for many readers, whether it be in the form of 
subscribing to one of those committees to fund awareness campaigns, signing a petition 
to parliament, or even refusing the consumption of slave produced goods.662  He 
addresses his readers as “ye generous few, whose hearts can feel / For stranger sorrows; 
who can hear the voice / Of misery breathe across th’Atlantic main” (408-10). In doing 
so he sets up a dichotomy between “us”, the abolitionists, cultivated in the appropriate 
sensibility to feel for the appropriate objects, and “them”, the cruel tyrants and 
perpetrators of violence and their supporters. He is othering the opposition, claiming 
                                                          
662 Correspondence between Roscoe and his friend John Barton, member of the London Committee, 
reveals that Roscoe’s Wrongs was sent to the committee to print and publish, with proceeds from sales 
donated to the committee to fund its campaigns.   
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they are not like “us” because they cannot feel, while making sure the reader is included 
in the “we” of the abolitionist community. It is the other – the unfeeling – who do not 
belong in a Britain which prizes “freedom dearer than the blood / That circles round” its 
heart (582-3) and upon which the slave trade is a “universal blot”, a “foul and open 
wound” (585, 588).  
Hannah More’s contribution to the abolition debate in Slavery praises iconic 
British figures who are meant to embody the moral sentiments. Her apostrophes to 
“gentle” James Cook (235)  and “peaceful” William Penn (244) are aimed at praising 
the supposed benevolence of their actions in their encounters with colonial others 
compared to the brutality with which slave traders treat the same peoples. Though the 
mildness and liberality of these figures’ colonial encounters are questionable, in the late 
eighteenth century they were held up as prime examples of sentimental patriots, 
spreading their benevolent brand of Britishness to the furthest reaches of the globe.  In 
More’s estimation Cook embodies the sentimental habitus: he has mild and gentle 
social affections which see him act benevolently towards others.663 Britain, which is 
personified within the next few lines as liberty, must be filled with the same gentle 
spirit that has followed Cook around the globe. She asks Britain to show other nations 
that “the liberty she loves she will bestow” (254) on her empire, to “spread the blessing 
wide as humankind” (256) and “redeem OUR fame” (262).  
Redemption is to come through action on the slave trade. In personifying Britain 
as a liberty-bestowing figure, imbued with the soft, gentle emotions of moral 
sentimental ethics, More is painting benevolence and social sympathy as particularly 
British virtues which its citizens have a duty to feel and perform. Along with her other 
                                                          
663 Cook’s “gentle mind” (235) and “love of humankind” (236) see him pursue a “mild and liberal plan” 
(237) in his voyages of discovery. More, Slavery. 
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major apostrophe, this time to a personified Mercy, the poem clearly sets out to urge the 
reading public to respond to her sentimental vision of a benevolent British empire with 
political, philanthropic action. Building on the assumption that the poem works as an 
instrument of emotional contagion in the practice of reading sentimental texts, the role 
of “the cherub Mercy” (263) called upon by the poet is to infect the nation with her 
“soft contagion” (268).  In other words, the reader is to catch the feelings imbued in the 
poem – love and benevolence – and act appropriately on the strength of those feelings. 
The “spreading influence” of Mercy is to move “from soul to soul” (267) shedding her 
“celestial dew” “on feeling hearts” (265). Yet “her spirit” only “breathes” over “the 
enlighten’d few” (266); like Roscoe, More is establishing the abolition movement – 
“us” – as the enlightened, the generous few who have “feeling hearts”. The reader is 
included in the “we” who can feel and it is therefore up to them: 
To still the clank of chains, and sheathe the sword 
To cheer the mourner, and with soothing hands 
From bursting hearts unbind th’Oppressor’s bands;  
To raise the lustre of the Christian name, 
And clear the foulest blot that dims its fame. (272-276) 
This is her politics of sympathy, expressed in the clearest terms in a vision of a 
benevolent people acting on their sympathy for others. Her keenness for this to be 
printed before Wilberforce’s motion is significant; she is clearly hoping this poem will 
influence minds before the vote for abolition is carried.  
The sentimental argument that runs through More’s poem, and which should 
move the reader to action, is the contention that humans are equal, regardless of “the 
casual colour of a skin” (64), based on their capacity for feeling. She demands of her 
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readers to “Plead not, in reason’s palpable abuse, / Their sense of feeling callous and 
obtuse” (147-8). In a footnote to these lines, More rebuts the pro-slavery argument that 
equates Africans with animals, thus justifying their treatment of them as commodified 
objects, stating that “Nothing is more frequent than this cruel and stupid argument, that 
they [Africans] do not feel the miseries inflicted on them as Europeans would do”.664 
This statement, along with repeated lines on the equality of feeling between white and 
black, clearly positions the poem as a work of sentimental humanitarianism, engaging 
the language of moral sentiments to assert the natural rights of African slaves. 
However, More is not in fact contending that all humans are equal. With the basis for 
equality lying in emotions and the capacity to feel for others, the slaver and the pro-
slavery opposition are excluded from More’s vision of humanity. The “keen affections” 
and “kind desires” of Africans (69) – marks of the man of feeling – are placed in direct 
contrast to the “murderers” (111) who ravage Africa for slaves. The “deed” of slavery is 
“unnatural” (132); it springs from a perversion of natural affections. It is therefore the 
slaver who is presented as the “WHITE SAVAGE” (211), made an other within his 
own nation and empire because of his inability to feel compassion or shame. Yet this is 
not the result of a natural cruelty; even those “of ruffian heart, and ruthless hand / Love 
[their] own offspring” (113-14). Everyone, in other words, has the natural capacity for 
love and sympathy. The traders and plantation owners cannot feel the moral sentiments 
because they have not cultivated them, therefore losing the capacity to feel the social 
affections for anyone other than their own families. 
As Carey points out, the deployment of the argument of common humanity 
based on the ability to feel for others allows More to identify herself and the movement 
                                                          
664 More, Slavery, note to line 148 (her emphasis).  
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with the discourse of sensibility.665 Her role as a poet engaged in the politics of 
sympathy is to bring the reader into that identity, creating a reading community who is 
willing to act for the movement. As a woman, More was peculiarly positioned to speak 
to, and for, a female as well as male community of readers. As Mitchell points out, 
female antislavery poets like More “established the legitimacy of her commentary on 
slavery in part by contextualizing her portrait of suffering within an ideology of 
domesticity”.666 As we have seen, there was a very real belief at this time in the 
civilising function of women and domesticity in society. Women were seen as agents of 
improvement insofar as their “feminized domestic virtues were an important part of the 
configuration” of polite society, as Mee puts it.667 Women, whose sensibilities were 
supposedly naturally more acute, were given moral authority in the private sphere and 
the sanctity of family and the home were seen as vital to the moral compass of society 
at large, its influence on the public sphere especially felt by those who privileged a 
sentimental emotional repertoire.668 Thus More proclaims that the “Horrors of deepest, 
deadliest guilt” (96) are those that see children torn from mothers and wives torn from 
husbands. She specifically draws the reader’s attention to the scene of familial 
desecration and violation of social bonds perpetrated on African villages by European 
slavers: 
See the dire victim torn from social life, 
The shrieking babe, the agonizing wife! 
                                                          
665 Carey, British Abolitionism, 86. 
666 Robert Mitchell, “‘The Soul that Dreams it Shares the Power it Feels so Well’: The Politics of 
Sympathy in the Abolitionist Verse of Williams and Yearsley”, Romanticism on the Net 29-30 (2003): 
paragraph 9, doi:10.7202/007719ar.    
667 Mee, Conversable Worlds, 10 (see chap.3, n. 14). 
668 See Daniel White’s discussion of the ways in which eighteenth-century culture projected sensibility 
out from the domestic space of the home “as a civilizing force of sympathy” in his article on Barbauld’s 
social and family circle. “The ‘Joineriana’”, 513 (see chap. 2, n. 86). On the feminisation of manners in 
polite public sphere see also Barker-Benfield, Culture of Sensibility. 
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She, wretch forlorn! is dragg’d by hostile hands, 
To distant tyrants sold, in distant lands! (99-102) 
The “hostile hands” of the traders, who carry out their crimes without feeling, further 
prove their inhumanity by breaking “the fond links of feeling nature” (108) in “one 
relentless stroke” (107). 
By focusing on the violation of familial relationships as one of the fundamental 
evils of the slave trade, abolitionist poets implicitly appealed to a system of social 
morality which measured its “normative human identity through the enduring affective 
power” of social bonds.669 Female poets could justify their poetic engagement in 
political and social issues by linking their antislavery positions to a sentimentalised 
domestic ideology. 670 While some have written of late eighteenth-century female 
writers as restricted in their subject matter to themes that demonstrate “delicacy of 
feeling” rather than social criticism, Midgley asserts that abolitionist poems in fact 
“demonstrate that women found a way to voice social and political criticism through the 
acceptably ‘feminine’ means of poetic sentiment and appeals to the emotions.”671 Their 
sentimental verse and arguments are, therefore, “clear calls for action”.672 Labouring-
class women were also able to voice their social criticism through this feminised form 
of political protest. Ann Yearsley, the labouring-class milk woman from Bristol, used 
the same form of sentimental poetry and argument to add her voice to the campaign. 
Yet, her criticism of the institutions which are at the heart of slavery are somewhat 
sharper than her fellow female poets from the middling ranks. 
                                                          
669 Tobias Menely, “Acts of Sympathy: Abolitionist Poetry and Transatlantic Identification”, in Ahern, 
Affect and Abolition, 56.  
670 It was not just female poets who used this technique: Roscoe included similar scenes in his Wrongs. 
671 Midgley, Women Against Slavery, 34. Katherine Rogers’ take on eighteenth-century women poets is 
of a group of women restricted from the political public sphere. Feminism in Eighteenth-Century 
England (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982). 
672 Midgley, Women Against Slavery, 34. 
223 
 
In Yearsley’s A Poem on the Inhumanity of the Slave-Trade (1788) the trope of 
family bonds is crafted so as to force the reader to imagine the horror and familial 
devastation caused by slavery entering British homes, thus creating an essential conflict 
between domestic, sentimental space and commerce, between natural social bonds and 
the laws that allow such bonds to be broken across the globe. Alongside the pathetic 
scenes depicting the slave Luco, who is torn from his home, tortured, and killed, 
Yearsley asks the reader to imagine the break-up of his or her own family and the sale 
of each member for a profit. Through a direct address to the reader, who at this point is 
being asked to identify with “the crafty merchant”, the poet launches her attack on the 
economic logic of a practice that denies the humanity of Africans, which in this case is 
determined by social and familial bonds.673 She knows the merchant would “oppose” 
her “strain” (75) and argue that “His toils are for his children” (77), an argument which 
she shows to be essentially incompatible with the type of commerce they undertake. 
She thus issues a challenge to the merchant:  
Away, thou seller of mankind! Bring on 
Thy daughter to this market! bring thy wife! 
Thine aged mother, though of little worth, 
With all thy ruddy boys! Sell them, thou wretch, 
And swell the price of Luco! (83-87) 
In this sustained imperative address to the merchant, demanding he sell his own family, 
Yearsley draws the reader into identification with him, the second-person address 
(“thou”, “thy”, and “thine”) making these demands directly of the reader. The reader is 
                                                          
673 Ann Yearsley, A Poem on the Inhumanity of the Slave-Trade (London, 1788), line 75, Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online, Gale (CB3326419074). 
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thus asked to imagine the intrusion of the “destructive system” (368) of “Commerce” 
(358) into his or her own domestic life.  
The imagined horrified reaction of the reader/merchant is scorned by Yearsley: 
“Why that start? / Why gaze as thou wouldst fright me from my challenge / With look 
of anguish?” (87-89). The love that impels them to “clasp” the “blooming youth” (101-
2) and “throw” their arms around their “little ones” (96-7) is completely hypocritical to 
the poet and proves the point that such men and women can only feel for their own 
“private woe” (104). The “selfish Christian” (104) who can weep for his or her own 
family and “Yet cause such pangs to him that is a father” (105) displays an emotional 
performance which is not based on sentimental norms. Weeping over an imagined act 
of separation is an emotional response to selfish feelings – the loss of one’s own kin. It 
is through this scenario that Yearsley challenges the nature of the people who support 
and carry out the trade. She asks, “Is it Nature strains / Thine heart-strings at the 
image?” (89-90). The rhetorical answer is “Yes” and the poet orders the personified 
idea of “Nature” to “rend” their souls over the idea of their families being targeted by 
commerce (90-91). It is nature which makes them feel compassion enough to weep for 
their own kin but such compassion is misspent; their tears are as useful as those spilled 
by Sensibility’s “wat’ry eye” described by Roscoe: they fall over imagined woes while 
the slave Luco’s “little brothers weep” (114) for very real reasons. Yearsley is thus 
casting the merchant and other supporters of slavery, as well as the reader who may be 
identifying with them, as having a poor emotional education. Their sensibilities are not 
attuned to the feelings of others which prevents them from either seeing the pain they 
inflict or taking action to prevent it.  
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Yearsley’s voice is more indignant and scornful of the institutions and people 
which trampled over the rights of others than either Roscoe or More had been.674 Her 
“Curses” on these institutions and people are many: on those who “rob the Indian of his 
freedom” (65); “On him who from a bending parent steals / His dear support of age, his 
darling child” (66-7); and “On the destructive system that shall need / Such base 
supports” as murder and robbing (368-9). As Menely points out, the context and cause 
of the suffering of Luco and his many African counterparts is always at the heart of the 
poem, situating his grief and pain in the economic system that created the slave, a 
system upheld by “Custom” and “Law” (18).675 She is deeply critical of laws in 
particular which “hang the meagre thief / That from his neighbour steals a slender sum / 
Tho’ famine drove him on” (370-372) while, as he hangs, the priest “laments the crime” 
but “approves the law, and bids him calmly die” (373-4).676 Moreover, this same law 
that “dooms the thief” (375) protects “The wretch who makes another’s life his prey” 
(376) – the slave trader – making mass murder a lesser crime than stealing bread. 
“Custom” and “Law” are therefore “curses of mankind”, as well as blessings; “we” are 
all “enslaved” by them while we “move” in their “direction” (18-21). In a final plea 
against them, in which she asks if this is “an English law, whose guidance fails / When 
crimes are swell’d to magnitude so vast” (378-9), she dares the “few / Who fill 
                                                          
674 More, after all, was careful about the type of liberty she was summoning: her appeal to Liberty is 
certainly not one that aims to stir up “that unlicens’d monster”, born of “Sedition” and the tool of “fierce 
Faction” – the mob – which the recent Gordon Riots had produced (lines 21-24). As Kaul states, 
Yearsley’s poem “is on the whole much less chauvinist and nationalist in its antislavery argument […] a 
fact that probably derives from her social vision as a working-class poet”. Suvir Kaul, Poems of Nation, 
Anthems of Empire: English Verse in the Long Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: The University Press 
of Virginia, 2000), 253. 
675 Menely, “Acts of Sympathy”, 54. 
676 Mitchell (“The Soul that Dreams”) argues that Yearsley’s criticism of commerce was connected to her 
social status as well as the circumstances of her emergence as a poet and the relationship with Hannah 
More, her one-time patron. More wished to control Yearsley’s income from the sale of her poems while 
Yearsley interpreted this as a desire to keep her in economic dependency. Yearsley’s Inhumanity has 
often been seen as an attempt to outdo More’s Slavery. See Kerri Andrews, “‘More’s Polish’d Muse, or 
Yearsley’s Muse of Fire’: Bitter Enemies Write the Abolition Movement”, European Romantic Review 
20 (January 2009): 21–36, doi: 10.1080/10509580802565297. 
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Britannia’s senate” (383-4) to try and “Defend the honour of a land so fall’n” (386, her 
emphasis). 
While Yearsley’s work is perhaps not as conservative as those described above, 
it still shares similar sentimental themes and arguments, particularly those based on the 
power of witnessing suffering, the nature of the slave trader, and the role of the poet in 
engaging the sentiments through apostrophe to affect the reader. In order to draw the 
reader’s attention to the inhumanity of the suffering endured by slaves, she 
“summon[s]” the reader to the “sight” (38) of “human woe” (31), “horrid and 
insupportable” (36).  Those summoned are not just the traders she attacks but also the 
“few / Who feel a more than cold, material essence” (48-9).  Just like Roscoe and More, 
Yearsley is singling out the compassionate reader as one of the “few” of true sensibility, 
drawing the reader into the “us” of the abolitionist community. Meanwhile, shame is 
used to contrast the feeling few with the unfeeling nature of the slave trader and owner: 
His sigh, his groan avail not, for they plead 
Most weakly with a Christian. Sink, thou wretch, 
Whose act shall on the cheek of Albion’s sons 
Throw Shame’s red blush […]             (204-207) 
The wretch in these lines is not the slave but the Christian European. The poet here is 
othering those who should draw a blush of shame for the crimes they commit if they 
were truly feeling “sons of Albion”. Indeed, she states that “the savage tribes / Are 
angels when compared to brutes like these” (351-2). The plantation overseer who 
tortures Luco, cast as a “renegade” (226) figure who from a young age “Abjures the 
tenets of our schools” (227), is “Unnat’ral”, a man whose “cruel soul” “feeds, with 
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gross delight” (236) upon the sufferings of the slave. This directly echoes Roscoe’s 
image of the “strange pleasure” and “preposterous joy” felt by torturers. 
Finally, as Roscoe apostrophises the “universal love” spread by “Humanity”, 
and as More calls upon Mercy’s “soft contagion” to affect the reader, Yearsley also 
ends her antislavery poem with an extended apostrophe to a principle central to the 
sentimental emotional repertoire:  
Hail, social love! True soul of order, hail! 
Thy softest emanations, pity, grief 
Lively emotion, sudden joy, and pangs, 
Too deep for language, are thy own: then rise, 
Thou gentle angel! spread thy silken wings 
O’er drowsy man, breathe in his soul, and give 
Her God-like pow’rs thy animating force, 
To banish Inhumanity! (389-396) 
“Social love” is the force that will “banish inhumanity” and bind people together in 
bonds of sympathy. It may be a principle “Too deep for language” but it is through 
language – her poem – that the sentiment is awakened. Through her personification of 
“social love”, Yearsley is using her poem as a tool of her emotional practice, aiding the 
communication of the sentiment from writer to reader and beyond. It is also through 
this rhetoric that her politics of sympathy is made clear, as she calls on the “universal 
good” (415) to:  
touch the soul of man; 
Subdue him; make a fellow-creature’s woe 
His own by heart-felt sympathy, whilst wealth 
Is made subservient to his soft disease. (420-423)  
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“Social love”, by way of her poem, is transformative, working to open people’s hearts 
to others and making them able to feel another’s pain. It is only when this occurs that 
Custom, Law, and Commerce will be “made subservient” to the “soft disease” of the 
moral sentiments.  
Such arguments were made countless times across a large number of poems 
written in this first vital year of the abolition campaign. One of Cowper’s antislavery 
ballads contains similar arguments.677  “The Negro’s Complaint”, which first appeared 
in April 1789, was the most popular of his set of ballads, perhaps because of its use of 
sentimental language.678 Ventriloquizing the voice of a slave, the poem speaks of the 
equality of Africans based on natural affection:  
Fleecy locks and black complexion 
Cannot forfeit nature’s claim; 
Skins may differ, but affection 
Dwells in white and black the same.679 
He lays blame squarely on those who took part in stealing him from his home and 
selling him into a life of misery and torture, all for “paltry gold” (6), while reminding 
the audience of the suffering that produces their sugar: “Sighs must fan it, tears must 
water, / Sweat of ours must dress the soil. / […] Think how many backs have smarted / 
For the sweets your cane affords.” (19-24). By using a first-person narrative, the reader 
or singer of the ballad is made to take on the identity of the slave, which plays into the 
                                                          
677 Cowper is known to have written six antislavery ballads in 1788-9, although only five are extant 
today.  
678 At least two of the other ballads he wrote in this period – “Pity for Poor Africans” and “Sweet Meat 
has Sour Sauce: or, the Slave Trader in the Dumps” – are very jolting, satirical poems which the 
Committee chose not to make use of. See Kaul, Poems of Nation, 248. 
679 William Cowper, “The Negro’s Complaint”, Poems, by William Cowper, 2 vols. (London: 1800), 1: 
lines 13-16, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale (CW3315749582). 
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idea of sympathetic identification through witnessing and feeling along with the subject. 
Meanwhile, the final lines cast the “iron-hearted” (21) proponent of slavery as the 
unfeeling other and lacking the inherent humanity that their own arguments claim 
Africans do not possess: “Prove that you have human feelings, / Ere you proudly 
question ours!” (55-6). Such a conclusion works to call the reader to action, because in 
order to distance themselves from identification with the unfeeling slaver they must 
prove their humanity by acting on the compassion they feel for the narrator. 
Members of the London Committee, and their supporters and associates, had 
made repeated requests to Cowper for some more antislavery verse in 1788, yet Cowper 
was reluctant to commit more time and effort to the cause.680 Wood has written of his 
unwillingness to comply with these requests, referring to his letters which give details 
of his mental state when writing on such a melancholy subject: “I cannot describe to 
you, nor could you comprehend it if I should, the manner in which my mind is 
sometimes impressed with melancholy” on contemplating the thousands of “miserable 
creatures, tormented as they have been from generation to generation”.681 Moreover, in 
an early example of the compassion fatigue that was to overcome Barbauld in her 
abolitionist poem, Cowper expressed himself as suspicious of the utility of another 
poem in the political cause of abolition, writing to Newton: “General censure on the 
iniquity of the practice will avail nothing, the world has been overwhelm’d with such 
remarks already, and to particularize all the horrors of it were an employment for the 
                                                          
680 The source of these requests varies which perhaps highlights the fact that many would have asked 
Cowper to contribute more verse, either because he had shown an interest in antislavery previously or, 
with the popularity of abolitionist verse taking off in 1788, contributions from a renowned poet would 
have been seen as an aid to the cause. See Carey, British Abolitionism, 100; Kaul, Poems of Nation, 245; 
Marcus Wood, Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67; Joanne 
Tong, “‘Pity for the Poor Africans’: William Cowper and the Limits of Abolitionist Affect” in Ahern 
Affect and Abolition, 131. 
681 Wood, Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography, 67-9. Quotes from James King and Charles Ryscamp, 
eds., The Letters and Prose Writings of William Cowper, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979-86), 
3:102-3 and 106. 
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mind both of the poet and his readers of which they would necessarily soon grow 
weary”.682  To his cousin he writes that “I hope also that the generality of my 
countrymen have more generosity in their nature than to want the fiddle of Verse to go 
before them in the performance of an act to which they are invited by the loudest calls 
of Humanity”.683 The poet was clearly dubious at this stage of the power of sentimental 
poetry to move a reader to action when the moral duty of abolitionism should be a 
natural consequence of having “Humanity”. 
Some of the verse he eventually produced thus combine a sense of futility and 
disillusionment with the idea of a politics of sympathy engaged through the use of 
poetry. In contrast to “The Negro’s Complaint”, his “Pity for Poor Africans” highlights 
the limits of the feeling in question – pity – in producing the desired emotional response 
that would make the reader take action against the slave trade. The narrator, who owns 
he or she “is shock’d at the purchase of slaves” and what they “hear of their hardships, 
their tortures, and groans / Is almost enough to draw pity from stones”.684 However, the 
pity they feel on “hearing” about the suffering, no doubt from reading other abolitionist 
verse, is inactive, the narrator choosing to continue ignoring the inhumanity of the 
trade: 
I pity them greatly, but I must be mum, 
For how could we do without sugar and rum? 
Especially sugar, so needful we see? 
What? give up our desserts, our coffee, our tea! (5-8) 
                                                          
682 William Cowper to John Newton, 5 June 1788, quoted in Tong, “‘Pity for the Poor Africans’, 147. 
683 William Cowper to Lady Hesketh, 21 March 1788, quoted in Tong, “‘Pity for the Poor Africans’, 147. 
684 Cowper, “Pity for Poor Africans”, Poems, 1: lines 1-4. 
231 
 
Against the forces of custom, luxury, and greed, pity has no chance of effecting 
political action. The responsibility for slavery moves beyond the slave trader and owner 
to the public in general who increasingly knows the evils of the trade yet is unwilling to 
consider a life without the produce of slave labour. The narrator – or Britain – has learnt 
to live with the feelings of shame that such an argument should produce in a person of 
true sensibility and to suppress the pity which is naturally felt on encountering the 
suffering other. The final stanza, which comes after an extended moral tale of a boy 
who joins a gang of friends in robbing a poor man, repeats the futility of pity in 
effecting a moral act. While “Tom”, or Britain, “blamed and protested”, he nevertheless 
“join’d in the plan; / He shar’d in the plunder, but pitied the man” (47-8).  
Anna Barbauld shared this concern for the effectiveness of pity to activate 
political reform. Her Epistle to William Wilberforce (1791) displays a far less sanguine 
argument than the majority of abolitionist poems. Written in the weeks after the failure 
of Wilberforce’s parliamentary motion to abolish the slave trade, the poem offers a 
searing prophetic portrait of the consequences of the moral failure of Britain in rejecting 
Wilberforce’s bill and, like Cowper’s “Pity”, begins with a comment on the futility of 
sentimental rhetoric: 
Cease, Wilberforce, to urge thy generous strains!  
Thy Country knows the sin, and stands the shame!  
The Preacher, Poet, Senator in vain  
Has rattled in her sight the Negro’s chain.685   
Alluding to the varied formats in which the plight of slaves had been brought to the 
public’s attention, through the sermons of the “Preacher”, the verse of the “Poet”, and 
                                                          
685 Barbauld, Epistle to William Wilberforce, lines 1-4.  
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the speeches of the “Senator”, Barbauld states that “rattling the chains” of slaves in the 
faces of their readers was not enough. A personified Britain has borne witness to the 
horrors it inflicts on other people: the “Muse” (11) has “assail’d” her with the “deep 
groans” of the slave (5), “rent the veil that hid his constant tear” (6), and “Forc’d her 
averted eyes his stripes to scan” (7). “Pity’s tear” has been “Claimed” (9) by numerous 
accounts of the inhumanity of the trade, yet Britain has failed to react according to the 
principles of sentimental emotional communication. The “Muse” was “too soon 
awak’d” (11), implying that against such forces as “Avarice” (25) and “thirst of gain” 
(30), the nation was not ready to respond to arguments based on appeals to the moral 
sentiments. Instead, the nation decided to live with the shame of its role in the slave 
trade and ignore the inhumanity of its actions: “She knows and she persists – Still Afric 
bleeds, / Uncheck’d, the human traffic still proceeds” (15-16). Thus, for Barbauld, the 
sympathetic bond that was supposed to form between the spectator and the sufferer 
broke down under the persistent crush of a custom which was far too lucrative to give 
up readily on the basis of emotional appeals: “Where seasoned tools of Avarice prevail, 
/ A Nation’s eloquence, combined, must fail” (25-6). In the end, the only consolation 
she can give is that, while British society will collapse into moral decay, the “generous 
band” (110) who fought for abolition will have “sav’d” (117) themselves in the eyes of 
future generations looking back at their deeds: “Succeeding times your struggles, and 
their fate, / With mingled shame and triumph shall relate” (118-19).  
Despite her pessimistic response to the apparent failure of sympathy in the 
political process, Barbauld’s poem does, nevertheless, tie her argument to the ethico-
political discourse of sentimental abolitionist norms, in which the contrast between 
proslavery degeneracy and antislavery superiority is carried out. Custom, or the 
practices inherent in institutions which ignore humanity for the purpose of commercial 
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profit, has perverted the natures of people in Britain so as to override any benevolent 
feelings that would naturally arise from witnessing suffering and which should inspire 
philanthropic action. Those who oppose abolition are still depicted as “th’unfeeling” 
(31) who use “flimsy sophistry” (27) and “daring” lies (28) to justify their “thirst of 
gain” (30). Practice has hardened these men to the extent that members of “Britain’s 
Senate” laugh at and mock the accounts of misery presented to them by the likes of 
Wilberforce who himself used sentimental arguments in his 1789 speech to parliament 
when introducing his bill:686  
From scoffing fiend bursts forth the laugh of hell; 
In Britain’s senate, Misery’s pangs give birth 
To jests unseemly, and to horrid mirth  (38-40) 
Their failure to respond to suffering with compassion is a sign of the failure of 
their own sensibilities. This argument is repeated in the vision of the planter’s wife who 
lays about “on sofas of voluptuous ease” (58) while “With languid tones imperious 
mandates urge; / With arm recumbent wield the household scourge” (67-8). This image 
of the “delicate, infirm” (66) mistress of a slave plantation, “contriving torture, and 
inflicting wounds” (70) while she sits about “with unruffled mien” (69), is the epitome 
of the debased nature of people involved in slavery. Moreover, the cruelty with which 
she treats her household staff and the inhumanity with which the master of the 
plantation treats his slaves are passed on to the next generation, “fermenting” the 
“milky innocence of infant veins” (51-2). Using the abolitionist argument that practice, 
                                                          
686 An example is given in chapter 6. 
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or cultivation, in cruelty begets further cruelty, Barbauld presents a scene which Festa 
describes as having “all the markings of sensibility gone bad”:687 
Fermenting swift, the fiery venom gains 
The milky innocence of infant veins; 
There swells stubborn will, damps learning’s fire, 
The whirlwind wakes of uncontroul’d desire 
Sears the young heart to images of woe, 
And blasts the buds of virtue as they blow. (51-56) 
Growing up in an environment which sees cruelty and torture enacted on other human 
beings on a daily basis can only pervert a child’s nature so that he or she, too, will be a 
cruel, unfeeling man or woman. Inured to “images of woe”, the “young heart” will 
cultivate a “stubborn will” and “uncontroul’d desire” which will harden that heart to 
compassion and benevolence, thus effacing virtue from the world. 
Therefore, the rhetoric of abolitionist sentimentalism is not entirely obsolete in 
Barbauld’s poem, as some have suggested.688 Rather, it is the failure of society in 
cultivating those norms which would have allowed such appeals to work which she 
protests. The poem is thus a lesson in moral improvement. Moreover, despite the 
expressions of dissatisfaction and indignation over the failure of emotional response in 
the British political process, Barbauld does envision a future in which such emotional 
response has occurred. There is a “future time” (17) which will look back at this failure 
and feel the “shame” of it (119). This must be a future, therefore, in which the abolition 
of slavery has been achieved and in which sensibility has been cultivated appropriately. 
                                                          
687 Lynn Festa, Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain and France (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 200. 
688 Ellison states that through her critique of sentimental portrayals of slavery, Barbauld “declares that the 
conventions of abolitionist sensibility are obsolete”. “Sensibility”, 45 (see chap. 1, n. 37). 
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However, as Menely points out, what accounts for this difference between the present 
and “succeeding times” (118), “a nation ossified now in its narrow interests and a 
universal justice to come, is left undefined”.689 Barbauld does not account for the 
change in “British morals” (104) to come because it has not yet taken place, but in 
emphasising that it will, there is a hope implicit in the poem.  
Despite increasing misgivings by some poets over the effectiveness of 
sentimental abolitionist verse in moving the nation to active compassion, the rhetoric 
made popular by Roscoe, More, Yearsley, and countless others was not abandoned after 
Wilberforce’s successive parliamentary defeats in the 1790s. The same arguments 
continued to be made, though the number of abolitionist poems decreased. Abolitionist 
fervour somewhat diminished, particularly once war with France began in 1793 and the 
consequent clampdown by authorities on any material deemed anti-government 
propaganda.690 Sentimental arguments likewise lost their political edge and were tied to 
the feminised, exaggerated language of gesture and affectation that came to define 
sensibility towards the end of the century, the type of sensibility that abolitionists had 
always been keen to distance themselves from.  Questions over the role of emotions in 
political and social practice emerged as debates raged between conservatives and 
radicals over who was more aligned to the culture of sensibility. Conservatives like 
Edmund Burke, who had once supported the American Revolution and was an 
abolitionist himself, viewed sensibility as the revolutionary transgression of sexual and 
class boundaries which had taken place in France, where the mechanism of emotional 
                                                          
689 Menely, “Acts of Sympathy”, 48. 
690 Abolitionists remained careful of seeming too radical in their efforts to challenge an institution 
sanctioned by the state. Pitt’s government enacted two Acts in 1795 in an attempt to repress all kinds of 
reform movements: the “Treasonable Practices” Bill which prohibited criticism against the monarchy, 
and the “Seditious Meetings” Bill which limited the size of public meetings. It therefore became very 
difficult for the abolition movement to be overtly political in their activities.  
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contagion was exploited by political writers in order to fuel violent uprising.691 The 
conservative Anti-Jacobin Review helped to tie sensibility to radicalism, or 
‘Jacobinism’, a term applied to any reformist view, laying blame on the power of 
impulsive feelings for the unrest it feared was spreading into England from France. For 
their part, radicals like Mary Wollstonecraft accused conservatives themselves of being 
aligned to sensibility, attacking the sentimental nostalgia which opponents like Burke 
used in their own political writings.692 However, both sides of this debate continued to 
use sentimental language in their works. As Todd states, “Clearly neither side wished to 
be left in possession of a now unfashionable sensibility, but neither side wanted entirely 
to abandon the power of emotive, sentimental language”.693 
The poetry of sentimental abolitionism therefore waned during the last decade 
of the eighteenth century, but it did not disappear altogether.  Robert Southey’s 
collection of sonnets on the slave trade, published in his collection of Poems in 1797, 
resumed the protest against “cold-hearted Commerce” and the “inhuman trader”, while 
scorning those who, at their “ease”, “Sip the blood-sweeten'd beverage!”694 While his 
sonnets are not necessarily sentimental in style, the abolitionist appeal to compassion 
through depictions of a weeping slave and his “silent woe” still make their 
appearance.695  The Romantic poets did after all inherit sentimentalism, though they 
distanced themselves from its affectations. As R.S. White points out, “although the 
                                                          
691 See Csengei, Literature of Feeling, 49. 
692 Wollstonecraft was scathing of Burke’s highly sentimentalised portrait of the toppled French royal 
family in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). See Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of 
the Rights of Men (London, 1790), Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale (CB3330307827). For 
Wollstonecraft, sensibility prevented reform: “soft phrases, susceptibility of heart, delicacy of sentiment, 
and refinement of taste, are almost synonymous with epithets of weakness [...] those beings who are only 
the objects of pity [...] will soon become objects of contempt”. Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 81-2. 
693 Todd, Sensibility, 130. 
694 Robert Southey, “Poems on the Slave Trade”, in Basker, Amazing Grace (see chap. 2, n. 115), Sonnet 
1, line 12; Sonnet 3, lines 8 and 9-10. 
695 Ibid. Sonnet 3, line 14. 
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excesses of affective aesthetics became insipid in the sterner climates after 1790, the 
core values of appealing to the reader’s sympathies, celebrating benevolence in its 
philosophical and political senses, passed directly into romanticism itself as a way of 
asserting natural rights through literature”.696 The Romantic poets who did write on 
slavery, such as Southey, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, continued to be faced with the 
challenge of appealing to the compassion of readers while at the same time not 
appealing to an affected sensibility. However, the political urgency of abolitionist 
poetry had faded by the 1790s, along with abolitionism itself. With continual failures in 
parliament and the abstention campaign proving of little use, the effectiveness of 
abolitionist poetry had been questioned too many times to be used by what remained of 
the movement for any other purpose than revealing their own feelings on the subject. 
Conclusion:  
Abolitionist poets were deeply aware of the moral and social function of the moral 
sentiments and the practice of reading “for the sentiment” that had become popular by 
the mid-eighteenth century. Their understanding of the social nature of emotions and of 
sympathetic communication allowed them to use their poems as spaces in which they 
could converse with their readership and pass on their sentiments. This had political 
implications because, in the ethical terms of their sentimental repertoire, feeling 
compassion for the sufferer would activate benevolence and philanthropy. They 
imagined that people would be literally moved to perform acts of political reform, 
which could take shape in many ways: subscribing to a committee, signing a petition (if 
you were a man), abstaining from West Indian produce, displaying abolitionist texts and 
ornaments within one’s household, using poems as conversation starters at the tea-table, 
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even influencing a parliamentarian who happened to be in one’s circle of sociability.697 
Readers of abolitionist poetry consisted of not just the general public, but high-ranking 
members of parliament as well. Part of the campaign the committees undertook was to 
send their publications to parliamentarians in order to influence their votes once the bill 
entered the House of Commons.  
Abolitionist poetry was thus explicit in its political and social commentary, 
more so than traditional sentimental literature. The occasional poems written in this 
period had specific political purpose and often explicitly urged action on the part of the 
public. While they used many elements of the sentimental language created by early 
works of fiction, abolitionists were not writing purely sentimental literature. Their 
constant statements against false sensibility highlight their wish to stay away from the 
affected excesses of literary sensibility. Rather, they were creating a specifically 
abolitionist literature, which used arguments based on ideas from a variety of discourses 
on the moral sentiments.  The sentimental emotional repertoire common among so 
many communities in the eighteenth century gave abolitionists the opportunity to use 
the powers of emotion in appealing to people’s sense of morality and their capacity to 
feel compassion, shame, and guilt for the wrongs their nation was committing on others. 
Working from the idea that witnessing inhumanity should produce feelings of 
sympathy, abolitionist sentimental poetry was essentially a test for its readers of their 
humanity and virtue. If they did nothing, or worse, if they identified with the unfeeling 
nature of the slavers, they could not lay claim to humanity because they did not have 
the capacity to feel. On the other hand, feeling compassion must produce an impulsive 
need to aid the suffering through philanthropic or political reformist action. Activists 
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were clearly writing from the perspective, at least for the first few years of their 
campaign, that sympathy, humanity, and social love could literally move people to put 
enough pressure on the state to end its involvement in the slave trade.  
Thus, while it is important not to overstate the impact of poetry in achieving 
social and political reform, there is value in acknowledging what abolitionist poets were 
trying to achieve through their poems. Their recognition of the sympathetic impulse and 
their sentimental discourse can be seen as an attempt at changing the way the reading 
community felt about the African slave, and about themselves as Britons, by producing 
texts which worked on the basis of emotional exchange. Reading “for the sentiment” 
was still vital to abolitionist rhetoric, but their insistence that it was not just for the 
sentiment is evidence of their rescripting of these norms. By combining the somatic 
language of sentimentalism with the apostrophic calls and personifications tied to 
political and didactic poetry, and by focusing their arguments on the principles of 
emotional cultivation, or practice, abolitionist poets created their own genre which 
brought together all the active elements of sentimentalism. Their politics of sympathy 
worked on the basis that a highly cultivated sensibility would naturally lead to a 
humanitarian impulse to do good. By making compassion and benevolence at once 
“natural” and something to be cultivated as part of the habitus of their reading 
communities, they could attempt to appeal to an ideal collective British “nature” that 






Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In his speech to the House of Commons on 13 May 1789, William Wilberforce repeated 
the argument of his fellow abolitionist activists when he cast the slaver as an other, 
habituated in cruelty rather than cultivated in the moral sentiments, and thus lacking 
that quality which is the mark of true humanity – sympathy:  
I do not accuse even the manager of any native cruelty, he is a 
person made like ourselves (for nature is much the same in all 
persons) but it is habit that generates cruelty: – This man 
looking down upon his Slaves as a set of Beings of another 
nature from himself, can have no sympathy for them, and it is 
sympathy, and nothing else than sympathy, which according to 
the best writers and judges of the subject, is the true spring of 
humanity.698  
In this speech we see the abolitionist politics of sympathy reach what was probably the 
height of its short-lived power. Sympathy had entered into the political rhetoric of a 
Member of Parliament in his call for the legislature to implement a total abolition of the 
slave trade. The speech was widely applauded in the House by those who agreed with 
his sentiments, and his employment of sympathy was commended. Edmund Burke 
remarked: “the full view of it which the Hon. Gentleman had that day displayed could 
not fail to excite in the breast of every man not dead to sensibility, he blamed not the 
Hon. Gentleman for knocking at every door, and appealing to every passion, well 
knowing, as the Hon. Gentleman had forcibly and correctly said, that mankind were 
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governed by their sympathies”.699  Yet the appeal failed. Delay tactics and new 
inquiries put forward by the pro-slavery lobby ensured a bill was not introduced for 
another two years and the result of that debate was a loss of 163 votes to 88 against 
abolition. The appeal to the humanity of parliament lost out to economic expediency. 
Nevertheless, sympathy continued to be appealed to by abolitionists within the 
essays, correspondence, sermons, and poems they produced for the movement. 
Understanding the choices they made in mobilising public support for their campaign 
has been the subject of much scholarly examination and it is widely acknowledged that 
their methods relied on the rhetoric of sentimentalism. My approach to understanding 
these choices has been to examine them through the perspective of emotions-as-
practice, an approach which opens up the possibility of engaging with abolitionist texts 
in a new way, giving access to the methodology behind their politically engaged 
appeals to emotions like compassion and benevolence.  This is because the emotional 
norms on which these appeals were founded were themselves based on an 
understanding of emotions as embodied practices. Eighteenth-century notions of human 
nature as malleable and of emotions as cultivated habits are directly comparable to the 
Bourdieuian theory of bodies as socially situated, as well as Scheer’s use of this theory 
to understand our emotions as practices which have a history.  
The overlapping practices, communities, and discourses that privileged the 
moral sentiments in eighteenth-century Britain developed an understanding of emotions 
based on the idea of improvement through practice. This is evidenced in the texts that 
emerged from a variety of communities and spaces for which the moral sentiments 
formed the basis of their emotional repertoires. I have shown that, in a variety of spaces 
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and communities, there existed a shared emotional repertoire which understood 
emotions as habituated experiences and practices and advocated virtue as achievable 
through the cultivation of social sympathy: the educational sites, from elite universities 
to dissenting academies, which advocated the cultivation of sensibility; the spaces of 
sociability, including those textual sites provided by the periodical press, which aimed 
to actively engage social sympathy in order to facilitate polite and improving 
conversation; the religious communities that championed active compassion through 
philanthropic reforms; and the reading communities that consumed novels and poems 
“for the sentiment”. I have read the texts produced by and used within these emotional 
communities as tools of their practices, aimed at mobilising and regulating the emotions 
privileged within their shared repertoires.  Their essays, children’s stories, periodical 
articles, correspondence, religious tracts and sermons, novels, and poetry advocate and 
activate benevolence, compassion, and pity through the somatic language developed to 
enhance the sensibility of readers, their capacity to feel for others symbolised by the 
tears, sighs, and blushes of appropriate sympathetic response.  
These philosophical, cultural, religious, and literary conditions of possibility for 
the development of abolitionist rhetoric have been discussed at length by many scholars 
in terms of discursive influence. However, these studies have for the most part focused 
attention on abolitionist literature as analogous to sentimental literature. Examining 
abolitionist arguments through an emotions-as-practice approach shifts the focus away 
from higher order theories of influence to the everyday practices which attempt to 
engage the emotional norms of communities in habitual ways. While my study 
continues the focus on literature – a necessity if one is to uncover the textual evidence 
of historical emotional norms – it does so with regard to abolitionist methods of 
practically engaging the emotions, rather than as a literary genre. In doing so we can see 
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that, while it makes use of specific sentimental arguments, abolitionist literature is not 
exclusively sentimental literature. The abolitionists’ use of sentimentalism in their 
political essays, newspaper correspondence, sermons, and poems, is, rather, a 
rescripting of the norms which make up the sentimental emotional repertoire, adopting 
those which suited their movement and adapting them for political purposes. Emotions-
as-practice is a useful approach to access the abolitionist emotional repertoire and their 
choice of rhetoric because they were rescripting norms based on an understanding of 
emotions that privileged emotional practice and the active cultivation of moral 
sentiments. Focusing on their arguments as emotional practices aids our understanding 
of how abolitionists came to rely, for a few years at least, on a politics of sympathy 
which appealed to the compassionate side of the British public and legislature.  
What these texts show us, however, is that the conflicted attitude to sensibility at 
the time, and the assumptions informing the emotional practices which were aimed at 
its cultivation, meant that its political power could not last long. The abolitionist appeal 
to sympathy lost its political vigour as soon as the first defeat in parliament took place. 
The fact they began to question the political efficacy of sympathy within their own 
works, as Barbauld did, signals the shift at the end of the eighteenth-century in 
perceptions of the role of emotions in civic and political practice, marking the 
beginning of the modern sensibility in which sympathy is seen, as Menely states, “as 
being neither consistent enough to constitute an ethical virtue nor charged enough to 
provide a political motivation”.700 The emotional communities which first nurtured the 
sentimental abolitionist rhetoric no longer seemed to exist, or, at least, had begun to 
privilege new emotional norms by the time the Abolition Act passed in 1807. New 
communities emerged which privileged a new kind of emotionalism, themselves 
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rescripted from the norms of sentimentalism, while the politics of the 1790s became 
more divided between radical and conservative as the pressures from a new libertarian 
France changed Britain’s political atmosphere. 701  
Scholars of post-Enlightenment and post-Romantic emotions, particularly as 
expressed in literature, have shown that the decline of sentimentalism needs to be 
considered a matter of discourse rather than actual feeling. Michael Bell points out that 
our modern distrust of sentimentalism and the politics of sympathy that emerged toward 
the end of the eighteenth-century is an inheritance of the changing discourse around 
these terms that occurred from the nineteenth century onward.702 His work shows that 
the quest for emotional education and cultivation in fact had an afterlife in the post-
Romantic nineteenth and twentieth centuries and that, while “sentimental” may have 
transformed over time into a term which describes affectation rather than “true” feeling, 
the emotions inherent to its practice did not just disappear.703 Suzanne Keen’s work on 
narrative empathy, which argues for the importance of reading as a skill for the 
emotional education of the self, similarly emphasises the afterlife of sentimentalism. 
She states that the newly established capacity to study emotions like empathy through 
neuroscience “encourages speculation about human empathy's positive 
consequences”.704 These speculations, as we have seen, are not new and Keen claims 
that the moral sentimentalism of the eighteenth century “dovetail[s] with efforts on the 
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part of contemporary virtue ethicists, political philosophers, educators, theologians, 
librarians, and interested parties such as authors and publishers to connect the 
experience of empathy, including its literary form, with outcomes of changed attitudes, 
improved motives, and better care and justice”.705 In this way empathy is 
acknowledged, as sympathy was in the eighteenth century, as the “feeling precursor to 
and prerequisite for liberal aspirations to greater humanitarianism”.706 
Many have thus shown that the same emotions privileged within eighteenth-
century sentimentalism continued to have a role in political discourse beyond the 
Enlightenment era. Robert White and Chris Jones demonstrate that, although the genre 
of sentimental literature was ridiculed by the later generations of writers in the 1790s 
and early 1800s, the core emotional norms of sentimentalism that centred on sympathy 
passed directly into Romanticism as a way of asserting natural rights through literature. 
707  Thus the politics of sympathy created by abolitionists continued to be used in the 
political treatises, novels, and poems of Romantic writers.708 Indeed, political 
movements and humanitarian groups still use sympathy for a moral or ethical function 
and can be seen to mobilise compassion and benevolence in their campaigns today, in 
particular those which focus on the humanity of downtrodden peoples. In light of this, 
Scheer’s claim that sentimentalism could be considered a largely ephemeral emotional 
style rather than a habitus is somewhat narrow when we consider the emotions that 
underpin the sentimental emotional repertoire of eighteenth-century communities. I 
have demonstrated that sentimentalism was not so much rejected by bourgeois 
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communities, as Scheer suggests, but rescripted and harnessed to the discourse of self- 
and social improvement for particularly bourgeois purposes.709 The post-romantic view 
of sentimentalism did not necessarily negate the emotions underlying it. What has 
changed perhaps is the theological context of these emotions.  
It is this afterlife of the abolitionist politics of sympathy that has led many to 
make conclusions about the sources of the emergence of humanitarianism in the 
eighteenth century. For Hunt, “human rights grew out of the seedbed sowed” by 
feelings of benevolence and compassion.710 She argues that, for the adherents of the 
emerging view of moral cultivation through sympathy, the practice of reading 
sentimental works and identifying with the emotions on the page helped to change the 
ways in which people regarded the other as well as their own roles in society.711 
Langford similarly claims that sensibility was fundamental to the legislative initiatives 
aimed at humanitarian reform during the last third of the century, helping to rouse 
public opinion towards a range of philanthropic and reforming activities.712  Making a 
case for the centrality of literature to the rise in importance of natural rights in Western 
culture in the eighteenth century, White states that the three key sentimental ideas of 
“sympathy, natural benevolence, and unforced altruism” fundamentally linked “the 
individual with broader society through the communitarianism of fellow feeling”.713 
Carey agrees that although the growth of sensibility as a popular literary phenomenon 
and philanthropy as a social force may only be seemingly related because they emerged 
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at roughly the same time, it likely “reflects a complex brew of social, economic, and 
cultural conditions peculiar to the eighteenth century”.714 
It is true that by the end of the eighteenth century when abolitionism emerged, 
social improvement and philanthropy had come to be seen by writers and critics 
themselves as a national institution peculiar to the British, due mainly to the increased 
visibility of charitable foundations. Tobias Smollett noted that “The virtues of 
benevolence are always springing up to an extraordinary growth in the British soil,” 
while Johnson claimed in his Idler that “no sooner is a new species of misery brought to 
view, and a design of relieving it professed, than every hand is open to contribute 
something, every tongue is busied in solicitation, and every art of pleasure is employed 
in the interest of virtue”.715 In his history of philanthropy in England Owen states that, 
“though sometimes no more than emotions which it was fashionable to display”, the 
benevolence and sensibility associated with humanitarianism “had a good deal to do 
with forming the social temper of the time”.716  Arendt connects this humanitarian 
social temper to revolutionary politics, stating that “History tells us that it is by no 
means a matter of course for the spectacle of misery to move men to pity; even during 
the long centuries when the Christian religion of mercy determined moral standards of 
Western Civilization, compassion operated outside the political realm and frequently 
outside the established hierarchy of the Church.”717 It was not until the eighteenth 
century that compassionate humanitarianism became common among certain 
communities in European society who linked their feelings to political forces for 
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change. These were not new feelings, but crucially, as Bell states, the moral sentiments 
were “not so much the invention as the coming into consciousness of a new 
sensibility”.718 In other words, the moral sentiments had been rescripted by new 
emotional communities. 
In their association with fellow-feeling and humanity, sympathy and compassion 
certainly enabled new forms of political communication and action as people became 
increasingly aware of injustices and abuses of natural rights. However, drawing direct 
links between sentimental practices such as reading “for the sentiment” and the reform 
programmes of eighteenth-century humanitarian movements can be problematic in light 
of the paradoxes inherent in the understanding of sensibility at the time. As Jones and 
Csengei both argue, sensibility was never a homogenous idea.719 As well as signifying a 
belief in innate benevolence and compassion, and being associated with “melancholy, 
distress and refined emotionalism”, sensibility could also be seen as a threat by critics 
because of its spontaneous, impulsive and uncontrollable nature. 720  Many derided the 
two-faced nature of the fashionable cult of sensibility which emerged out of novel 
reading with its tendency to overly emote over the trivial while ignoring important 
social issues.  As Barker-Benfield points out, alongside the concern for misery and 
misfortune in the world, there was a tendency in many works of sentimental fiction to 
romanticise the poor, depicting them in the classical pastoral tableaux of rustic peasants 
also popular in art and on chinaware.721 Indeed, abolitionist activists continued this 
tradition, emblazoning tea sets and jewellery with their own sentimental tableau of the 
supplicating slave. 
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The multiplicity of discourses and practices that contributed to its development 
as an idea, as a cultural phenomenon, and as an emotional practice made it possible for 
groups of various and opposing opinions to claim sensibility for their own views, 
ethical or otherwise. Being an avid reader of sentimental literature, for example, or a 
member of a particular religious community which privileged weeping, did not make 
one necessarily become abolitionist, as I demonstrated with the difference between 
Methodists Wesley and Whitefield. The complexity of the definition of sensibility and 
the differentiation in the ways diverse communities understood and expressed it makes 
it difficult to always attribute “nice” sentiments to sentimentalism. As such, many 
scholars have warned that the political implications of sentimental discourse depend 
entirely on both the agenda of the writer and the preconceptions of the reader.722 As 
Boulukos has argued, we cannot assume that the “sentimental attention to the suffering 
of slaves” that occurred in the final two decades of the century necessarily led to 
reformist political action.723 Sentimental rhetoric was used for all sorts of opposing 
political arguments, from the radical ideals of the supporters of the French revolution to 
their conservative, anti-revolutionary opposition, and from abolitionists to pro-slavery 
apologists. As Csengei states, it was just as “possible for self- interest, cruelty and 
violence to become constitutive aspects of the ostensibly benevolent, philanthropist 
ideology of eighteenth- century sensibility”.724 Indeed, as a form of rhetoric or 
persuasive tool, we can see its use on both sides of the abolition debate, with pro-
slavery lobbyists using sentimental expressions to argue against humanitarian reform, 
as I showed in chapter three.  
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Thus, being a man or woman of feeling, being practised in reading “for the 
sentiment”, and feeling for the suffering of others, did not necessarily mean one was 
willing to act on those feelings or willing to act for the same causes. Moreover, the 
whole idea of sympathetic contagion could function as a dangerous contagion of violent 
passions rather than calm sentiments, aiding the mobilisation of riotous political forces 
as well as that of philanthropic reforms. In the formulation of the emotions by Hume 
and Smith, the emotions which could be transferred between people, either through the 
contagion of sympathy or through the imaginative process, could be positive or 
negative, calm or violent. Both Csengei and Fairclough show that the concept of 
sympathy as a principle of emotional communication raised doubts about the possibility 
of regulating such communication, which allowed for its disruptive as well as cohesive 
political application.725 According to Fairclough, Hume’s idea of social sympathy was 
always limited to his own idea of what constituted “society”: his conception of intimate 
exchange between people takes place in the elite groups of which he was a member.726 
As Mee points out, however, “if human beings were increasingly defined as 
sympathetic creatures across a whole range of discourses and practices in the period, 
there remained an anxiety about where such sympathies led. […] What was the 
difference between the club and the crowd?”727  
The question this raises is what abolitionist activists expected of their 
audiences in terms of emotional and political response. I think the method of 
examining their own understanding of emotional practice and how they employed 
that within their reformist arguments tells us something of why political change was 
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encouraged via sentimental appeals, even though reader response to such appeals was 
unreliable at best.  Throughout their mobilising materials abolitionists are very clear 
on the virtue of cultivating a highly sensitive emotional repertoire, one that is open to 
the sufferings of others and one that is “naturally” induced, through experience and 
habituation in the moral sentiments, to act benevolently to aid that suffering. Their 
insistence on this as the “true” characteristic of the British people, and on the 
unnatural cruelty that arises from habituation in the practices of slavery, created a set 
of norms particular to the abolitionist community whereby their own actions were 
portrayed as morally virtuous and humane. Their political action to put a stop to the 
slave trade was proof, in their eyes, that theirs was a community of people who had 
succeeded in cultivating virtue. By setting up the dichotomy between virtuous activist 
and tyrannical slaver, the members of the abolition movement represented themselves 
and their wider community of supporters as having made the transition from self-
cultivation of moral sentiments, through sociability and education, to social 
improvement, linking the moral sentiments to a social and political cause. 
Many scholars have pointed out some of the consequences of the abolitionist 
appeal to a sense of British virtue and benevolence, consequences which seem 
inconsistent with their championing of rights and liberty but which are seen as the 
effects of the top-down nature of pity that activists used to mobilise support. Csengei 
states that the ideology of sympathy and benevolence functioned as a form of social 
control, the insistence on selective forms of charity pointing to a darker, ambivalent 
side of the charitable impulse.728 As Ellison points out, sensibility was as much a 
“feeling down” by those in positions of privilege as a “feeling toward” victims of 
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suffering.729 Festa writes that “pity carries within itself the very differences it is 
supposed to transcend”.730 Performances of benevolence by the privileged towards 
those less fortunate could thus further disempower victims of suffering. For Festa, 
Wood, and Ferguson, abolitionist appeals to pity the African slave contributed to a 
legitimising colonial, empirical, and racial discourse which carried through into 
nineteenth-century colonial practices.731 These scholars demonstrate that sentimental 
texts often deploy sympathy to help rationalise the exploitation of the colonial other in 
the project of imperial expansion, particularly those which represent the African slave 
in supplication to their European captors and saviours. Hannah More’s insistence that 
Africans “claim the common privilege of kind”, despite being “dark and savage, 
ignorant and blind”, betrays the same prejudice towards the colonial other as portrayed 
within the works of pro-slavery apologists.732 Moreover, the images of benign 
colonisers, the triumphalist tone of abolitionist poetry in particular, with their claims of 
the need to spread British liberty across the globe, and the paternalistic brand of 
humanitarianism that abolitionist rhetoric in general used in their push for political 
reform, left a lasting legacy in terms of British imperial identity and brutal colonial 
practices.733  We are warned by these examples to be wary of the progressivist claims of 
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abolitionist rhetoric and of self-congratulatory histories which speak of the “success” of 
abolitionism in Britain.   
Yet, at the same time, we cannot assume that all abolitionist activists and writers 
were solely motivated by a future imperial project or by any other motivation for that 
matter. We can only know what the extant texts they produced tell us. While their 
rhetoric may have influenced nineteenth-century understandings of British national and 
imperial identity, their main goal was immediate and local, inasmuch as it restricted 
itself to an abolition of Britain’s slave trade and not slavery itself. As Carey points out, 
in order to mobilise political action for the single aim of abolishing the slave trade, “it 
was not required that a reader fully empathised with the experience of slavery nor that 
they became alive to the dangers of colonisation. Instead, all that was required was that 
they were moved enough to write a letter, pay a subscription, sign a petition.”734 My 
study of abolitionist texts does not attempt to answer questions of motivation which 
may explain why the abolition movement developed or why, indeed if, it succeeded. 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the link the abolitionist community made 
between emotional practice and political action, as expressed in their mobilising texts. 
For this community, emotional practice was key to creating a society that would 
naturally want to aid the suffering of others and the practices I have examined here are 
just some of the ways in which they went about trying to achieve this. In their argument 
that philanthropic action emerges from a highly cultivated sensibility, and that tyranny 
is the consequence of a poor emotional education, the abolitionist movement marked 
the beginning of the rescripting of sentimentalism as it distanced itself from 
                                                          
734 Carey, British Abolitionism, 50. 
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sentimentalism’s reputation of solipsism and excess and tried to create a place for a 
politics of sympathy in questions of national reform.  
Whether we choose to see abolitionism as the beginning of the rise of 
humanitarianism or as central to Britain’s emerging imperial and colonial policy, an 
emotions-as-practice approach could open up new ways of analysing its legacy. 
Following the actions of abolitionists through into the nineteenth century and exploring 
the shifts and changes in emotional rhetoric, it may be possible to trace the abolitionist 
emotional repertoire in other reform movements and see how new emotional 
communities adopt and adapt its politics of sympathy. As a method for examining how 
emotional norms change over time emotions-as-practice highlights the ways in which 
emotions are understood and performed in their situational context. It has therefore 
proven useful to an understanding of social movement methods of political 
mobilisation. It would be interesting to follow up on the changes in emotional and 
political climate post-abolitionism and explore how these shifts changed the emotional 
scripts of other reform movements, from the further push for slave emancipation in the 
1830s to subsidiary rights movements that emerged alongside abolitionism like those 
fought for women, children, and animals. Can we see remnants of the abolitionist 
emotional repertoire in the movements of today? We may not share the same emotional 
repertoire as the communities who fought for abolition at the end of the eighteenth 
century, but it may be possible to trace the inheritance of it within particular 
communities, like social movements, by focussing on their emotional practices. 
Such studies may allow us to see that, while we acknowledge the impossibility 
of accessing “true” feelings in the past, we at the same time see, as Bell points out, that 
“there are rich layers of cultural practice assimilated into the present capacity for 
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understanding the life of feeling”.735 Despite changes in discourse on the emotions 
between the eighteenth century and the present, the moral sentiments have not 
disappeared. We just talk about them differently in terms of their psychological, 
physical, and spiritual foundations. This is why we cannot answer, as Scheer suggests, 
questions of changes in actual feeling in historical sources, even if we envisage 
emotions as practices of a “knowing” body. This does not negate the usefulness of 
Scheer’s approach. But there may be limits as to how it can be applied. For instance, by 
focusing on the congruence between emotions-as-practice and eighteenth-century 
notions of emotions as malleable and transformative, there is a danger in blinding 
oneself to the fundamental differences between the two.  
One difference lies in the consciousness with which humans are meant to carry 
out emotional practices. For Bourdieu, practices are largely unconscious habits 
whereas, in the formulations of eighteenth-century moral sentimentalism, the practice of 
emotions is very much a conscious effort to mobilise the feelings that were deemed 
vital to a person’s role in society. It was not enough to have a “natural” tendency to be 
benevolent. As Bell points out, “Like other natural faculties, this can atrophy if not 
exercised”, thus “the man of sentiment is positively enjoined to exercise and appreciate 
the springs of benevolence within himself”.736 The practical purpose of cultivating the 
moral sentiments is connected to their eschatological and teleological foundations in 
eighteenth-century discourse. Such foundations give them a moral, theological purpose, 
a progressive goal of achieving virtue, while modern theories like emotions-as-practice 
have no need for such “purpose”.737 So, even though eighteenth-century notions of 
                                                          
735 Bell, Sentimentalism, Ethics, and the Culture of Feeling, 206. 
736 Ibid., 35. 
737 Although, as stated above, some scholars disagree that the moral purpose of emotions like sympathy, 
or today’s empathy, has disappeared. See Keen, “Theory of Narrative Empathy”.  
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cultivation and twentieth/twenty-first century theories of practice seem a good fit in 
terms of their approach to human nature as changeable, we have to keep in mind the 
differences between the two ages, if only to maintain distance from buying too heavily 
into the idea of the progressivist discourse of Enlightenment thinkers. If we were to 
focus on changes in “actual feeling”, rather than emotional norms, there is a danger of 
implicitly confirming both the abolitionists’ assumptions about the changeable nature of 
emotions and their progressivist views that such changes are for the better. 
There may be limits as to what an emotions-as-practice approach to historical 
change can answer in terms of cause and effect. Moreover, while Scheer states that her 
theory “does not reproduce assumptions” in the source material of historical 
communities, I have argued that there is a degree of accord between emotions-as-
practice and the emotional context in which abolitionism emerged and from which 
activists rescripted their own emotional repertoire.738  Therefore, how Scheer’s theory 
can be applied to emotional repertoires which do not offer the same correspondence in 
understandings of human emotions requires further investigation. Nevertheless, 
emotions-as-practice works well for understanding particular aspects of the “emotional 
politics” of early humanitarian movements like abolitionism. A focus on practice for 
any community is a useful concept to uncover how shifts in emotional repertoires affect 
the ways in which societies manage those changes.  
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